Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 49: War's Evils​

The Champ de Mars, Montreal, April 2nd, 1863

Macdonald watched with some dissatisfaction as the two men were led out by their comrades. A large crowd had gathered, and he felt distinctly at unease. Though he sensed less hostility, and more curiosity. Beside him stood Cartier, Lysons, and Tache. Both the soldiers looked resplendent in their well polished dress uniforms, and the city fathers looked no less so. Mayor Jean-Louis Beaudry in full regalia, Bishop Bourget, John Redpath, George Stephen, and even Dorion were attending.

“I still find this distasteful.” He said, taking another nip from his flask. “I saw enough fools killed in 1838. Well meaning fools, but fools all the same. Shooting them seems like such a spectacle.”

“The men who occupied Windmill Point were hardly serving in Her Majesties forces.” Lysons said. “Those American bandits got what they deserved, and we cannot do anything but treat the mutineers here the same way. It is the law, military law, and we must maintain discipline, especially in these times, hangings would do no good here.”

“I relish this no more than you Monsieur Macdonald.” Tache added. “I treated with them myself, but I never promised them all amnesty. Besides, on the terms agreed the 36th Battalion was disbanded, and such a step must be heralded by those responsible being held accountable. The trial was held by a Volunteer tribunal, and our men, Canadien men, found them guilty. It is only fitting that we carry out the sentence.” He indicated the posts erected at the end of the parade ground.

The two mutinous captains were led, gently, by soldiers of the 5th Battalion to the posts. A priest accompanied them, and the two were tied without incident. Both men accepted blindfolds, but only one the cigarette. They were given a few moments to confer privately with the priest, before he walked behind the line of men assembling. A captain in the 5th stepped beside his men, sword drawn. Colonel Dyde stepped forward to read the charges to the assembled crowd.

As he did Cartier spoke up.

“I can understand their urge to take up arms.” That earned him narrowed eyes from Tache. “I was young and exuberant myself in ’37. We fought for what we believed was right. I don’t know if those men were wrong to fight, but I have discovered that the violence only begot more violence, and those who live by the sword shall surely die by it.”

“Hence why you’ve hitched your horse with me.” Macdonald smiled. Cartier favored him with a grin.

“We’ve accomplished more via the ballot than was possible with the rifles we had. This Coalition we have created is too important for us to be divided by petty issues over the ballot. We’re fighting for our very survival, and that has already cost lives. These men do a disservice to their home by hindering any defence of it.”

“Quite right sir.” Lysons said. “Though I find the ballot an unseemly process myself, men should not take up arms against their Sovereign. This government has been just, and acted well within the law. Whatever their reasoning, we have handled them gently, more gently than they deserve at any rate.”

Dyde finished his own small speech and stepped back. The militiamen stepped forward.

“Ready!” Cried the captain raising his sword. Macdonald took another sip from the flask.

“Aim!” The rifles rose and men took to knee.

“FIRE!” He chopped his sword forward and the rifles cracked as one. The men on the posts jerked as they were perforated with shot, and then fell limp. A few cries of shock went up from the crowd, but it was soon deathly quiet.

“It is done.” Lysons said. Macdonald shook his head, thinking back to the faces of the men imprisoned in Fort Henry all those years ago, the thunder of the cannons at the Tavern, he thought of the faces of the men lined up for battle just 30 miles to the south. It’s a long way from done, he thought quietly to himself.


Whitehall, London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, April 4th 1863

“I tell you again it is a weapon!” Gladstone exclaimed emphatically. Palmerston hid a sigh. Gladstone was going on again about an issue he had not been keen to drop since October last. Both Somerset and Russel were nodding with him as he trundled on regarding the merits of the Confederate States.

Palmerston himself however, was thoroughly tired of the rousing arguments being trotted out before the Cabinet. As Gladstone paused for breath he loudly rapped his knuckles on the table.

“Now gentlemen, to business.” He said smiling thinly. Gladstone looked as though he would object, but instead grumbled and took his seat. Soon he would manage to force Palmerston’s hand, but Palmerston would hold that off as long as possible.

“What news from the east?” Palmerston asked gravely.

“The Russians continue their subjugation of Poland, though now they have dispatched men to Lithuania as the uprising there becomes more serious. It seems that the French protests on the part of the Poles has come to naught, and Austria shows no interest in aiding them. Though we’ve rained protests down on the Tsar’s head he has been stonily silent or dismissive of our missives.”

“Any sign of a reaction to the Greek crisis?” Palmerston asked.

“Not as of yet. The Russian army seems completely intent on the crushing of the revolution, they’ve paid little mind to events in Greece it seems. The Polish rising could not be more fortunately timed in that regard. Our show of force in the Ionian Islands should serve to deter any adventurism on their part.”

“This is just as well.” Lewis added. “The secret convention between Prussia and Russia is most distressing. Threatening to combine their arms to crush the Poles, its atrocious. That fellow Bismarck has no shame!”

“If he has no shame should we fear he will goad the Gallic Bull to arms?” Palmerston asked. The specter of war had seemed very real when the Poles had risen in revolt three months ago. Russel shook his head.

“The French and the Austrians have condemned it as we have. I doubt either the Tsar or Prussian King feel they would be strong enough to invite the wrath of all Europe over the Polish question. We shall see how the Emperor in Paris plays his cards, but as he is digging himself deeper in Mexico I will be surprised if he pushes for war this year.”

“This year at least.” Palmerston grumbled. “Though speaking of this year, how has our planning developed over the winter?” Somerset was first to speak, regarding a pile of reports in his hands.

“We have the most recent reports from Admiral Milne just in yesterday from one of our steamers. He reports Cochrane’s ‘Particular Service Squadron’ has been most active in vexing the American coasts. It has bombarded Portsmouth again, and visited destruction on numerous smaller American inlets with fortifications. He believes this will keep the Americans guessing as to our naval intentions, as well as mounting further pressure on the American mob to negotiate.”

“Any further debacles we should be aware of?” Palmerston asked. Somerset bit back a retort and steamed on.

“The American squadrons in action have been in harbor for the winter months. Admiral Farragut’s ships have not bestirred themselves since November, and nor has a single one of our patrols been seriously challenged save by their batteries ashore. It is Milne’s opinion they are husbanding their resources for a push later in the year. Though he regrets to report that the winter months have roughly impacted his vessels serving off New York and Massachusetts.”

“Such is the fair weather of North America.” Gladstone snorted. “I assume he will be sending those ships on home for repair?”

“Naturally.” Somerset said. “He however assures us that none of this will interfere with his proposed operations this spring.”

“I for one remain leery of these operations.” Granville said. Lewis nodded as well. “All the frustrations of Sevastopol might be repeated, why are we to believe that this General Lee will deliver upon his lofty promises?”

“Come now, it is not as though I am proposing we divert troops from the Army of Canada or the Army of New Brunswick to help here.” Palmerston protested. “Milne has been supportive of acting in concert with the Confederate army for over a year now, and our own reports from Fremantle suggest that their army is much improved from the spring. Besides, General Lee led a daring raid into Maryland just this November, with the support of the fleet what might he accomplish now?”

“With two fleets we were vexed by the French in the Crimea.” Lewis recalled acidly. “I too am concerned, but so long as we are not removing men from our own goal we ought to be reasonably certain to avoid bad press if all goes wrong.”

“I am hoping that you gentlemen remember that in 1814 our fleet alone helped burn Washington and threatened Baltimore while sealing up their coast from Maine to New Orleans.” Palmerston said. “Now we will be helping one-hundred thousand Confederates with our fleet, we might end the war in a season! In conjunction with the Army in Canada and our gains in Maine and on the Pacific what hope has Lincoln to fight on?”

“We must hope he will finally see reason.” Granville said. “Why he did not seek terms last fall is beyond me.”

“The American mob must be placated.” Palmerston said dismissively. “He must have something to show so he is not thrown out of office. I have heard his enemies made significant gains last year, and this is sure to startle him. Lincoln and Seward are ever at the mercy of their newspapers and voters, it will drag this war on beyond reason.”

There were nods of agreement around the table. None doubted that the war was driven by the whims of the American populace rather than the proper decision making process exercised by a common sense Parliament. Palmerston himself was quite comfortable in thinking that if the people of the Disunited States desired a harder war he would gladly give it to them.

“The Army in Canada is quite ready for service.” Lewis replied. “Dundas has formally organized the army into three corps-”

“Three corps?” Granville asked.

“Yes, two in Canada East under Paulet and Grant, and Williams has been reassigned to Canada West to command the Third Corps. We have a spare division operating with the army in Canada East, and our reserve division in Halifax under Windham if any trouble should arise in Maine or the Canadas. All told, there are forty-eight thousand men under arms in Canada East ready for the spring campaigning season. All Dundas waits on is the thaw.”

Palmerston made no effort to hide his smile. Nearly fifty-thousand British troops poised like a dagger over the heart of the United States. True there was some fear that the whole expedition might end up like Burgoyne at Saratoga, Palmerston felt no difficulty would be forthcoming. The timid Williams had been dispatched elsewhere, and a hard fighter was leading the army now. They had effectively occupied all of Maine, and were poised to strike a blow at the heart of American industry.

“Then once the thaw arrives, I cheerfully anticipate in a month, two months at most, we shall hear Dundas is establishing his headquarters in Albany. Then, we can hope Lincoln and Seward will come to their senses and seek terms.” Palmerston said. “And with that, victory will be in our grasp.”

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 50: The Armies in Virginia Pt. 1

Army of the Potomac​

“Since the Battle of Fairfax, McClellan had nurtured his army in winter quarters at Centreville. Running in a line from the Shenandoah Valley at Harper’s Ferry to the pickets of Mansfield’s two divisions along the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, the six corps comprising the army had been in a defensive position since December. However, there had been a significant shake up in command…” - I Can Do It All: The Trials of George B. McClellan, Alfred White, 1992, Aurora Publishing

“The defeat at Fairfax, for all its lack of strategic goals, had greatly unsettled the Lincoln administration. In effect it had shown that some commanders were now unfavorable in the field and Stanton moved “with all the grace of a sledgehammer” according to Franklin, to ‘trim’ the ranks of generals seen by Washington as lacking in proper skill and command.

The first to go was McDowell. Long under a cloud of suspicion since First Bull Run, his late arrival along the Rappahannock in August, and his feckless command of McClellan’s reserve at Fairfax saw him relieved and called to Washington. In his place Major General William B. Franklin was appointed to command the IV Corps and was in turn replaced in his division by Henry Slocum. Another McClellan loyalist, Stanton had his reservations, but Lincoln would not countenance jumping the chain of command in this position.

In the III Corps Hooker had maintained his command, but having been disappointed by Butterfield’s performance in the field, raised him to his staff, appointing Major General Cuvier Grover to command the division thanks to the superb showing he had exhibited in the field.

Porter’s XIV Corps would see Jacob Cox resign from command in the 3rd Division in February after falling ill and under Stanton’s influence he would be replaced by Brigadier General Alfred Pleasanton.

By far the largest change in the army came to the cavalry arm. Having been used wastefully in the preceding campaigns, McClellan would be pressured to allow his cavalry commander, George Stoneman, to establish a purely cavalry division. Whereas previously McClellan had seen the cavalry as an extension of his signals corps and scouts, attaching them primarily to his brigades, Stoneman had pushed to establish a purely cavalry division. McClellan had initially resisted. The embarrassment faced by the Union army from Stuart’s numerous ‘joyrides’ around their lines had finally seen him acquiesce to these demands.

The new Cavalry Division was established with four brigades, some cavalry remaining attached to the individual corps and headquarters. The 1st Brigade was placed under the command of Major John Buford with the 8th US Cavalry, 9th US Cavalry and 2nd US Cavalry. The 2nd Brigade was commanded by Col. John Farnsworth with the 3rd Indiana, 8th Pennsylvania, 15th Pennsylvania and 9th New York. The 3rd Brigade was commanded by BG William Averell with the 12th Illinois, 10th New York and 1st Massachusetts. Finally the 4th Brigade was commanded by Brigadier General George Bayard who commanded the 1st New Jersey, 1st Pennsylvania, 1st Massachusetts and 2nd New York. The horse artillery was grouped under the command of Major James Robertson…

Come April the Army of the Potomac had been reorganized as such:

I Corps, Mansfield, with the divisions of Stevens and Sherman at Fredericksburg

III Corps, Hooker, with the divisions of Grover, Sickles. And Kearny at Centreville

IV Corps under Franklin, with the divisions of Slocum, McCall and King at Centreville

V Corps under Rosecrans, with the divisions of Ord. Whipple, and Reno at Centreville

XIV Corps under Fitz John Porter with the divisions of Morell, Sykes, and Pleasanton at Centreville

XII Corps under Sigel, with the divisions of Schenck, Steinwehr, and Schimmelfennig spread between Harper’s Ferry and Centreville, guarding McClellan’s rear and communications.

It was with these forces McClellan was charged with defending the capital and stopping any major Confederate thrust in 1863…” – The Maryland Campaign, Tom Hutchins, University of Pennsylvania, 1981

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 51: The Armies in Virginia Pt. 2

Army of Northern Virginia​

“The army which had wintered across northern Virginia was a different beast from that which had sallied forth in the spring of 1862. While it was slightly smaller at 123,000 men, it was one filled with confidence with the upcoming endeavors of 1863.

“Never has the army been in better spirits.” Lee would write in March 1863 “Their morale is high, our ranks overflow with volunteers. Each man has a fine rifle, food to eat, good boots, and ammunition courtesy of our British benefactors.”

In truth no Confederate army yet assembled could match that which Lee had put together in April. The men, no longer care worn and finally with a full years harvest in their bellies and no anxiety over their munitions, were indeed in high spirits. Though their commander deeply regretted the events at Fairfax, the men saw it as a great victory, or at least a simple lost opportunity to “give the Yankee’s a whipping they won’t soon forget” by the Southern men at arms.

Indeed Lee’s audacious plan for a spring campaign might deliver just that. “The Cabinet was enraptured with Lee’s vision of spring.” Seddon would later write. “A grand campaign directed against the Capitol itself, aided not only by the British fleet, but in concert with our own Navy.”

The Confederate Navy had indeed been the poor cousin of the fighting over the past year. With Britain entering the war Richmond had, much to Secretary Mallory’s displeasure, spent far more on the army and river fleet than the great line of battle Mallory dreamed of for the fledgling Southern republic. However, despite early reservations on his part, he was soon swept up in Lee’s vision of a campaign to sweep away the Army of the Potomac and place Washington under Confederate guns…” – To Arms!: The Great American War, Sheldon Foote, University of Boston 1999

“Lee’s campaign envisioned in 1863 was complex, a hallmark which the old General would become known for in time. He proposed, essentially, splitting his army three ways to “baffle and retard” the enemies reaction.

He had reformed the army in the winter, doing away with the unwieldy ‘wing’ system he had inherited from Johnston. Instead he had divided the army into four corps as such:

The First Corps under Jackson, with the divisions of Garnett, Ewell, D.H. Hill, and A.P. Hill, all told some 34,000 strong.

Second Corps under Longstreet, with Anderson, Early, Pickett, and Huger’s divisions standing 25,000 strong.

The theatrical Third Corps of Magruder with the divisions of McLaw’s, Jone’s and Griffith’s totaling some 24,000 men.

Finally Fourth Corps under Whiting with Hood’s, Holme’s and Ransom’s divisions totaling 26,000 men

Attached was the Cavalry Corps under Stuart, who though he had protested against the creation of a formal Cavalry Corps, Lee had been insistent in reorganizing the army, creating two divisions of cavalry under Wade Hampden and Fitzhugh Lee, with 8,000 men between them.

With Pendleton’s artillery, attached engineers and other odds, the army was ready for movement…

…Even at this stage though, Lee could not help but make a number of adjustments. Firstly he decided to detach Anderson’s division to Whiting’s Fourth Corps to create the strongest striking force he could. Magruder would lose Griffith’s division to further Lee’s plan, but as compensation receive Garnett’s division from Jackson’s Corps to keep each unit at near equal strength. This was paramount for Lee’s plans.

An ad-hoc division under the command of Samuel G. French, composed of the ‘scrapings of Richmond’ as they would be derisively called, was brought to Fredericksburg. It was largely composed of militia, wounded men, and green units pulled in to garrison the capital. It was barely a division worth the name with barely 6,000 men. However, with Griffith’s 8,000 men it allowed for 14,000 men to act the part of the army in front of Fredericksburg, and hopefully fix Federal attention for a time.

Samuel G. French​

In the meantime, Lee would lead the army north, through the Shenandoah Valley, cutting around McClellan’s impressive entrenchments just south of Washington, and forcing him to interpose himself between the Confederate Army and the Capitol. This would allow Lee to fight them on ground of his choosing, or so he hoped. In any event, he intended to give the Federal Army a hard knock and push them back on their heels, right into the arms of his ‘right hook’ in their rear.

While Lee led McClellan on a merry chase, the British fleet under Milne would sail into the Chesapeake, with the intent of threatening Baltimore. This would further serve to draw off Federal forces from the actual goal, landing 35,000 troops in the Federal rear at Annapolis. Whiting, who knew the defences of Maryland and Annapolis well, was charged with moving inland and cutting off Washington from the rear by seizing Annapolis junction. In doing so he would threaten the city from the east, while Lee could either push McClellan into the city or away from it, seizing the Federal capital and thus allowing the Anglo-Confederate forces to dictate terms to the Lincoln government.

Lee’s plan had met with some shock in London. Though there were many comments about the burning of Washington and the Battle of Bladensburg in 1814, the British thought sending a force up the Patuxent River to march a shorter distance to Washington was more advisable. Lee disagreed, and said that the rail lines needed to be severed so the Federal army could be placed in a disadvantageous position where they must endure a siege of the capital. When the British expressed skepticism, Lee pointed to Scott’s amphibious drive on Mexico City, or the French attempt to do so now.

Finally the British, who were lightly committed outside the naval distraction, acceded to the plan, merely happy not to be moving another army across the continent…

It would come down to Lee and his commanders to see whether the Army of Northern Virginia could create a decisive victory from the most audacious campaign of the war…” – The Maryland Campaign, Tom Hutchins, University of Pennsylvania, 1981

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 52: A Butternut Whirlwind ​

"Should warlike weapons fail us, disdaining slavish fears,
To swords we'll beat our ploughshares, our pruninghooks to spears,
And rush, all desperate! on our foe, nor breathe till battle won;
Then shout, and shout America! and conquering Washington!" - War and Washington, Jonathon M. Sewall

“On the 29th of April, Lee made his opening moves in the Maryland Campaign. Leaving French to command the ‘Corps of Distraction’ Lee turned his forces west and north, moving into the Shenandoah Valley.

Jackson, as befitting of his experience and ability, took the lead with his First Corps. The movement wound up from Culpeper northwards into the Valley where the extreme most pickets of Jackson’s corps and pickets had wintered at Winchester. They had watched the third division of Sigel’s XII Corps under Schenk which had been guarding Harper’s Ferry since the summer of 1862 after Jackson’s triumph at Winchester.

Sigel’s corps had suffered in the skirmishing throughout the Valley in August and November, Schenck’s division had suffered heavily at the Battle of Limestone Ridge and been forced out of Virginia. Being rotated out of line he had been replaced by Steinwehr’s division. His two brigades, Buschbeck’s and Barlow’s were stationed at Charlestown and Harper’s Ferry.

Buschbeck was headquartered at Charlestown, a few miles from Limestone Ridge, behind a series of entrenchments and forts which were built to protect his men from any descent by Jackson. Notably, his pickets had failed to establish any presence on Limestone Ridge which effectively blinded them to any movements by Confederate troops. Steinwehr’s men meanwhile were encamped in and about Harper’s Ferry. Small batteries had been thrown up along the fords and lookouts established in the hills nearby, but the difficulty of the terrain and the exhaustion of the men in November had precluded any attempts at fortification of the region. In total the two divisions numbered 8,080 men with 31 guns.

Lee’s forces had entered the valley with Jackson entering at Thorton’s Gap, while Magruder’s Corps had trailed through Swift Run Gap, allowing Jackson to precede them with Longstreet’s troops taking up the rear of the column. Lee was now using the Valley as a highway to move 86,000 men into the North, and so far all without detection. Moving his men hard, Lee’s three corps arrived in Winchester on the 9th of May, moving 102 miles in 10 days.

Here the first complexity of Lee’s plan came to pass. With his movements shielded in the Valley and the Federals blind behind Limestone Ridge, he dispatched Magruder to the task of dividing McClellan’s attention.

Magruder was tasked with once again driving McClellan to distraction. Alongside French’s ad-hoc corps they would create the appearance of trying to envelop McClellan from the east and south, which would pin forces in place as Lee moved north in his great turning movement. On the morning of the 11th, Magruder’s troops struck east as Jackson and Longstreet prepared to move north. Meanwhile, McClaw’s division struck out for Limestone Ridge, taking positions above it while moving to mount a reconnaissance in force of the Union fortifications at Charlestown. The marches began at 5:00am. Griffith’s troops moved to invest Harper’s Ferry while Jones’s men would act as a reserve to react in case of trouble…

…trouble only became apparent to Buschbeck as his lookouts sighted Confederate battle flags appearing on the high ground at 10:00 am. His messengers heading to Harper’s Ferry ran into Griffith’s troops moving along the Charles Town Turnpike, Buschbeck found himself suddenly cut off from communications with his superiors. All he could do was ready his positions and prepared to sell his life dearly.

McLaw’s division (Kershaw, Semme’s, Wofford’s and Barksdale’s brigades) moved rapidly to surround the Union strongpoints at Charlestown. The town was encircled by earthworks, alongside three strong redoubts, nicknamed Harper’s Battery, facing towards Harper’s Ferry, Battery Sigel, facing Limestone Ridge and Battery Berlin, facing towards Bull Skin Run. His men, the 29th New York, 154th New York, 27th Pennsylvania and 73rd Pennsylvania alongside a single squadron of the 12 Illinois with four batteries of artillery, numbered barely 2,500 men. Facing them were facing the 9,200 men of McLaw’s four brigades.

The preliminary maneuvering to battle was finished by 1:00pm. Magruder opened the battle with his artillery mounting a bombardment of the town, focusing on Battery Sigel and Battery Harper. Kershaw and Wofford’s brigades went in. Kershaw’s South Carolinians mounted a spirited attack against the earthworks of Battery Sigel, but despite heavy fighting over two hours, they were repulsed. Wofford’s Georgians made better headway, but Buschbeck shifted his reserve, in the person of the 73rd Pennsylvania, to that sector and they too were thrown back.

By 2:30pm the attacks had petered out. McLaw’s now observed by Magruder himself, felt compelled to throw his whole force forward to capture the town. Barksdale’s Mississipian’s led the renewed assault at Battery Sigel, while the combined force of Kershaw’s and Wofford’s men attacked Battery Harper, and Semme’s Georgian’s pressed the defenders at Battery Berlin. It was a brutal affair, and despite the artillery, Buschbeck’s gunners managed to keep many of their guns firing until the infantry overwhelmed them...

The attempts to storm Charlestown were costly​

By 5pm portions of the town were afire and Buschbeck himself was mortally wounded, alongside his senior commanders. Despite heroic resistance, the regiments (who had been at half strength before the fighting) were depleted and individual surrenders were being accepted by the brigade commanders. The last holdouts surrendered in the town square, having barricaded the main bank and surrounding houses as strong points. Of the 2,500 men who reported for duty, only 1,600 would be captured, while only 600 of those were completely unwounded. McLaw’s men, who had 9,000 men go to battle, would leave 600 men dead on the field, while 1,100 were wounded during the fighting, having literally blasted portions of the town apart with artillery. The casualties and prisoners would delay the move northwards to join Lee, but did not appreciably delay the fall of Harper’s Ferry.

While McLaw’s had fought a bloody engagement at Charlestown, Griffith’s troops had stolen a march on the Ferry Garrison. Barlow’s four regiments were spread thin, and the sight of a large Confederate army discomforted him. Immediately Barlow began preparing to retreat, as with no communication from Buschbeck all he could do was telegraph Sigel’s headquarters at Leesburg of the impending threat. Leaving a few pickets to commence token skirmishing, he commenced burning all the supplies he could not carry with him.

As Griffith’s men closed in they faced unexpectedly light resistance, and despite some tough skirmishing they occupied the town by 4pm and proceeded to put out the fires raging in the Union supply dumps. Barlow’s men slipped away across the Potomac in the direction of Frederick…

…Lee’s lightning movement allowed him to steal a march on McClellan before McClellan even had a chance to react. His possession of the Valley enabled him to mask his movements well, and by the dawn of the 11th, his troops were crossing the Potomac in force.

Jackson’s men began moving north, crossing the Potomac at Shepherdsville and moving towards Hagerstown. Longstreet moved to follow Magruder’s troops across at Harper’s Ferry, the two corps moving towards Frederick Maryland…” – The Maryland Campaign, Tom Hutchins, University of Pennsylvania, 1981

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 53: A Thief in the Night​

“The first warning McClellan had of any movement on Lee’s part came when reports trickled into his headquarters from sympathetic sources on the 7th. His intelligence gathering apparatus, clumsy as ever, attributed this at first to a movement by Jackson back into the Valley. However, by the 9th news of major skirmishing and finally a warning from Sigel that Jackson and Magruder were in the Valley in force.

Reports from Mansfield indicated that Magruder’s corps remained encamped in front of Fredericksburg, and all indications were that Lee’s army was along the Rappahannock. McClellan was faced with a difficult choice, turn to face this threat and potentially leave his rear uncovered, or march south and leave an enemy force in his rear. News of the Anglo-Confederate flotilla’s movement up the Chesapeake made the choice harder, not easier in his mind. However, for Stanton it leant credence to the idea the northern movement was the true threat. Increasingly urgent messages from Washington besieged McClellan’s headquarters almost hourly as Stanton exercised the now near dictatorial powers he had gained on May 8th.

Gambling, he dispatched III Corps under Hooker to conduct reconnaissance along the Rappahannock, leaving Sickle’s division at Centreville to hold his rear The remainder of his forces set out to Maryland on the night of the 9th. McClellan was now moving to counter the Army of Northern Virginia.

Moving north, he directed Sigel to gather his forces at Frederick and ordered his corps to concentrate in that vicinity. He sent Cavalry on wide ranging missions..." – The Maryland Campaign, Tom Hutchins, University of Pennsylvania, 1981

“McClellan’s use of his cavalry division was a step above what had been done in the year previous. Where before he had largely used it as pickets and scouts, he now decided to use it as his eyes and ears on the march northwards into Maryland.

The 1st Brigade under Buford was dispatched north to scout Frederick and its surroundings, while the 2nd and 4th brigades were to act as a screen for his own movements, and the 3rd Brigade under Averell would scout the passes on the Blue Ridge Mountains, trying to ascertain the Confederate movements…

…Averell’s troops crossed Catoctin Mountain at Leesburg, moving towards the Short Hills and Hillsborough along the Harper’s Ferry Turnpike to scout the enemy ahead of Leesburg. In doing so they ran directly into William “Rooney” Lee’s cavalry brigade.

Lee’s brigade consisted of the 2nd North Carolina, and the 9th, 10th and 13th Virginia cavalry regiments and Moorman’s Virginia Battery of Horse Artillery. Charged with screening the armies flank as it moved, he had ridden south east along the turnpike, aiming to blind Union scouts to the crossings at Harper’s Ferry. He’d settled in at the Short Hills, holding Hillsborough and chasing off retreating elements of Sigel’s command. The appearance of Union cavalry was noted by lookouts on the hills, and so Lee, audacious like his father, rode out to meet them.

Averell’s men had been travelling up the turnpike at an even pace. Using the North Fork of the Catoctin River to secure his flank, his command first made contact with the 9th Virginia at Crum’s Farm. The men of 1st Massachusetts taking fire from the fields around the farm.

Colonel Horace B. Sargent, having taken command of the regiment in late 1862, decided to dismount his troops, using the fences and hillocks to skirmish with the men of the North Carolina, and soon the Virginians were moving to engage the Union troopers. The 10th New York moved to the flank, and were soon engaged in a swirling melee with the men of the 13th Virginia Cavalry, while the 10th moved to counter charge them. The arrival of the 12th Illinois made the action heavy, and the two mounted arms skirmished along the river, the fiercest fighting coming Grubb House where the Illinois troopers moved to attempt to flank the Confederate troopers.

The Battle of Hillsborough showed the finer part of the emerging American cavalry tactics. While the Virginians and the New York and Illinois troopers fought mounted with pistol and sabre, the Massachusetts troops fought on foot with carbines, engaging as light infantry with the North Carolinians. The Virginian’s, while getting the better of the mounted fight, were suitably impressed by the discipline of the Union cavalry, and the North Carolinians did not manage to dislodge the Massachusetts men until the Virginians took them from the flank.

While the Confederates won the battle and succeeded in screening Lee’s movement, it was a step in the right direction for the Union cavalry arm…” – Cavalry in the Great American War, MG Amos Morrell (Retired), 1978, USMA

The clash of arms at Hillsborough​

“While McClellan moved to interpose his army between Washington and Baltimore with Lee’s forces, Lee himself found an unfortunate delay in crossing the Potomac. Confused orders meant that on the 11th, both Longstreet and Magruder’s Corps found themselves attempting to maneuver across the river through Harper’s Ferry, creating in one of Lee’s aides words “a slithering mass of men, guns, wagons and horseflesh akin to a living Gordian Knot.”

The nightmare situation would delay Lee’s crossing a whole two days and leave Jackson’s movement north dangerously exposed. A fuming Lee would spend the evening of the 10th attempting to reassert some control of the mess while chewing out his Chief Quartermaster, James Corley. “The whole situation could have been avoided if my commanders were merely capable of following my orders.” Lee would angrily write to President Davis, regarding the delay.

Now, rather than moving the troops on parallel courses, Lee directed both Longstreet and Magruder to move to Frederick…” – The Maryland Campaign, Tom Hutchins, University of Pennsylvania, 1981

“Sigel’s jumpy and exhausted troops has massed at Frederick on the left bank of the Monocacy on the night of May 10th. Stretched between the city and Monocacy Junction to cover the approaches to Washington, they waited eagerly for the arrival of McClellan’s army.

The battered troops of XII’s corps were positioned to protect Frederick and Monocacy Junction. Schimmelfennig’s 3rd Division was directly ay Monocacy Junction, while Schenck’s troops were at Frederick and Steinwehr’s ‘division’ which now stood at brigade strength, was held in reserve there. The men were exhausted and demoralized, having been roughly handled throughout the last six months, and rumours of Lee’s army bearing down on them had Sigel and his commanders all looking imploringly south for the tell tale signs of the army of the Potomac coming to reinforce them.

Instead, on the morning of May 14th, they saw plumes rising from the west. Lee’s army had arrived first…” To Arms!: The Great American War, Sheldon Foote, University of Boston 1999.

The desperate stand of XII Corps​

“It was Longstreet’s Second Corps which first engaged XII Corps at Frederick. Shaking out at 3pm the two sides formed for battle. Having marched hard, Longstreet’s men were tired, but their morale was high. Sigel’s men were fresh, but demoralized. Schenck’s troops, Stahel’s and McLean’s brigades of the 1st Division, moved to the west, positioning themselves between the town and stretching their lines to connect to Schimmelfennig’s 3rd at the Junction. It was a perilously thin line.

Longstreet, while taking some fire, brought Early and Pickett’s divisions to bear. Early brought his brigades (Lawton’s, Trimble’s, Hay’s and Smith’s brigades) to bear on Schenck, while Pickett arranged his own (Kemper, Hunton, Pryor) Schimmelfennig’s (Hecker and Kryzanowski) aimed to shield the Junction. Huger’s division was held in reserve, and by 5pm the two sides were blazing away.

The attack began at the junction where Pryor’s Louisianan’s led the way, skirmishing with both sides battling over the bluffs along the Baltimore Pike. Hunton’s troops moved to flank the Union line, and Hecker’s troops pivoted to control the flank, but were steadily pushed back. The fighting was fierce, especially amongst the trees of the nearby orchard, which quickly became the focus of the battle as the 26th Wisconsin of Kryzanowski’s brigade hunkered down in the trees and became a thorn in Prior’s side. However, after an hours hard fighting, the men of Schimmelfennig’s division were falling back across the Monocacy, numbers gave way.

In the north, Schenck’s men endured a charge from Early’s division, emerging from the woods near Frederick. Though they put up a spirited defence, they too were driven back slowly, and by 6pm were dangerously close to breaking. Sigel fed what remained of Steinwehr’s division into the fray, but a renewed attack by the men of Trimble’s brigade, preceded by the keening rebel yell, broke them. They dashed across the river, many drowning as they attempted to swim, for all intents and purposes the division ceased to exist, and XII corps began retreating towards Baltimore. Early was only slowed by his men stopping to collect souvenirs from the battlefield.

By 7pm darkness was beginning to fall, and the shadows were growing long. Longstreet moved to secure the Junction and Frederick, running pickets across the river, he awaited the arrival of Magruder’s troops. Sending his mounted troops across at the Junction, the took up positions at Gamble Farm for the night. His troops rested on the west bank of the Monocacy.

During the night however, troops began arriving along the west bank. Firing and shouts were only the first sign of trouble, and at 1am the cavalry retreated across the river in disorder. They reported they had been attacked by Union forces. The Army of the Potomac had come at last.” – The Maryland Campaign, Tom Hutchins, University of Pennsylvania, 1981

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 54: On the Banks of the Monocacy ​

"The flashing billows beat the whiten'd shores:
With cries promiscuous all the banks resound,
And here, and there, in eddies whirling round,
The flouncing steeds and shrieking warriors drown'd.
As the scorch'd locusts from their fields retire,
While fast behind them runs the blaze of fire;
Driven from the land before the smoky cloud,
The clustering legions rush into the flood" - The Illiad, Homer

“Once dispatched, McClellan had moved swiftly across the Potomac, swinging north and east to come at Frederick with XIV and IV Corps from the East along the Baltimore Pike, while V Corps moved up from the south along National Pike.

During the night McClellan had come along the stragglers and shirkers moving east from Frederick. In the darkness McClellan ordered them to stand aside and to wait until morning. However, it produced no small roadblock, and XIV and IV Corps were slowed significantly. That left Rosecrans V Corps as the only force blocking Lee’s army early on the 15th.

The other two Corps slowly filtered in throughout the night and morning of the 15th. V Corps occupied the heights on the east bank of the Monocacy, overlooking the Junction. XIV Corps shook out blocking Crum’s Ford and the Baltimore Pike. IV Corps was placed supporting XIV Corps, and watching the river to the north at Monocacy Road blocking the bridge there. The dishevelled XII Corps was held in reserve. By the morning of the 15th, McClellan had 80,000 men placed across the river.

Magruder’s men arrived during the night and morning, bringing the total number of men facing McClellan to 50,000 on the afternoon of the 15th. Both sides positioned and maneuvered throughout the day, with artillery duels intermittent between them. While Longstreet’s Second Corps stood south of Frederick, Magruder’s men occupied the lines northwards towards Monocacy Road. Lee established his headquarters at Frederick, while McClellan established himself at New Market.

Both sides were exhausted, and other than skirmishing and artillery duels throughout the 15th, neither side made to attack. Lee was awaiting Jackson, who had thus far been out of communication for nearly a week. McClellan was simply looking to stymy Lee’s advance to the east and on, he assumed, Baltimore. Other than a few probing attacks against IV Corps along the river, Lee stood his ground.

The 16th dawned bright and sunny. The weather was cool and damp in the morning, but as it gave way to afternoon gave way to morning, the ground was warmed and both sides expected action. Lee would not disappoint. Having spent much of the previous day reconnoitring the ground, he determined that the weakest part of the Federal line was to the south of the Junction across a ford discovered by Stuart’s cavalrymen.

Longstreet had placed Pickett’s men along the line, and his division was to carry the attack, while Huger’s troops would demonstrate across the river. Magruder was tasked with defending the Confederate left flank, and if at all possible, making contact with Jackson…” – The Maryland Campaign, Tom Hutchins, University of Pennsylvania, 1981

“The two armies occupied a line stretching almost 7 miles, each group was stretched thin, with Lee committing all his forces, while McClellan held some forces in reserve. Lee anticipated Jackson’s arrival, but would not sacrifice his timetable further, and expected to be able to drive McClellan back with a flanking movement to the south. He fully believed Early’s division of being able to accomplish this task. Longstreet would hold the enemies attention, and Magruder would keep them from launching a flanking maneuver of their own…

At 11am Early’s troops began moving across the Monocacy, though this move was impossible to ignore, it was partially masked by Magruder’s men storming into the teeth of prepared positions to the north and engaging in heavy fighting at Ogle Farm, which soon turned into a bloodbath.

Rosecrans V Corps was waiting though. Ord’s 1st Division was placed along the river, watching for enemy movement, and Early’s audacious attack was seen coming. Though Early succeeded in driving across the river, his men bogged down fighting in the rolling hills on the far bank. Ord’s brigades (Tyler’s, Allabach’s, and Barnes) skirmished throughout the hillocks, stymying Early’s turning movement. Tyler’s brigade refused its flank as Early crossed, and Allabach’s men delivered a withering fire from the hills into Early’s troops. Only the Confederate artillery allowed Early to establish himself on the east bank. By 1pm, the fighting had died down.

Longstreet had no reserves with which to push the attack…” – The Battle of Monocacy, John Simon, Pennsylvania Press, 1963

“Magruder’s push across the Monocacy, capturing the stone bridge, proved similarly fruitless. The Federal formations on the bluffs were too strong to dislodge in a frontal attack. By 2pm the battle had devolved into heavy skirmishing as both sides were exhausted…

Lee was concerned over Jackson’s absence. By this point he had been out of contact with the army for three days. Though he had directed Jackson to concentrate his forces at Monocacy Junction, he seemed to have vanished from the battle…

Jackson had been moving steadily north since crossing the Potomac. He had harassed Federal garrisons and towns on his march north, scattering the local militia and sending people to the hills. Though his forces played ‘Maryland My Maryland’ they found their reception amongst the locals lacklustre at best. Some did turn out to cheer, but most hid in their homes as Jackson moved through. Paying in greybacks for most goods, Jackson nonetheless made little effort to reign in his men’s excesses.

Crossing the South Mountains on May 15th, he soon turned his men south, aiming to link up with Lee by the evening of the 16th. His men earned their epithet of ‘foot cavalry’ and moved vigorously through Maryland, marching 10 miles in a single day. By 5pm on the 16th, his men had made contact with the extreme edges of Magruder’s line. Lee directed Jackson to feed his men across the Monocacy, and over the course of the night on the 16-17th his troops crossed north of the town at Ceresville.

Come morning of the 17th, Lee felt he was ready to strike again…

Though McClellan was aware of a Confederate crossing in the night, he assumed this was Magruder’s men, and only directing King’s division to hold the flank and refuse it from the expected Confederate flanking maneuver. Jackson’s troops, though they had been marched hard, had rested overnight as best they could and were ready for the assault. King’s troops, were caught completely off guard by the ferocity of the attack, and soon were retreating back into IV Corps line. Franklin, shocked by this development, had to reorient himself to face Jackson’s sudden appearance in force on the flank.

News of Jackson’s attack rippled along the flank, and it was supported by another push by Magruder attempting to storm the Federal works on the heights. Jones’s division steadily pressed the Federal troops under Morrell on the ridge, and finally Sykes regulars were committed to stop the attack completely. However, they were soon pulled out of the line attempting to prevent Jackson from enveloping the army’s flank. “There was great confusion, as none knew the strength of the Confederate force on our flank. Was it Magruder or was it Jackson? None could say for certain,” Franklin would later recall in the aftermath.

Garnett’s division was quickly pressing King back, allowing D.H and A.P Hill’s divisions to move parallel to the flank, where there were almost no Federal troops to oppose them. Sykes moved to support King, but the flank was quickly losing cohesion. McClellan now made the fateful decision to commit XII Corps to the fight. Still shaken and demoralized from the early attacks and the retreat, the diminished divisions of XII Corps were shaken by the hard marching and vicious attacks of the two Hill’s.

Piercing McClellan’s flank the two divisions were soon in amongst the staff and support troops, and McClellan was scrambling to maneuver his men into something resembling a blocking force. XII Corps began a fighting withdrawal down the Baltimore Pike, leaving Franklin’s men dangerously exposed and close to being enveloped between Jackson and Magruder. It was here when Rosecrans would make his mark.

Leaving Ord’s division holding the heights against Longstreet, Rosecrans moved Reno’s troops to fall into line with the men of Porter’s Corps. Filling into place they became the bulwark against Jackson’s attacks. By 11am Rosecrans had managed to stabilize the flank, but they could not hold the field, as Longstreet was renewing his attack with vigor. Ord managed to withdraw in good order, and soon V Corps formed the rear of the retreating Federal army. Though Jackson would move quickly, his exhausted troops could not break the Union defenders, and Lee was forced to allow McClellan to withdraw in the direction of the capital. Eager to speed the Union on their way, Lee ordered a halt to the pursuit as McClellan withdrew to Parr’s Ridge…

Establishing his headquarters at Ridgeville, McClellan drew up his battered army on the high ground, fully expecting the Confederates to resume the attack on the morning of the 18th. Unfortunately, as night feel on the 17th, he discovered the Confederates were already in his rear…”– The Maryland Campaign, Tom Hutchins, University of Pennsylvania, 1981

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 55: The Government Goes North​

“Since the British entry into the war in February of 1862, Stanton had urged some measure of preparedness should it become necessary to evacuate the capital. The specter of Cochrane’s ascent of the Potomac fifty years prior still haunted the Cabinet, and in some places in the Executive Mansion the scorch marks of the British torches were still visible. Lincoln had agreed with this sentiment “it would not do to repeat that calamity”, but urged that it be prepared quietly lest they cause a panic in the press or the government. Stanton, almost panic prone himself, agreed with the necessity of secrecy. He began having duplicates of necessary correspondence produced and stored, with preparations for it to be shipped to an as yet unknown location.

The Board of National Defense proposed many sites for an alternative to Washington. New York was suggested by Dix, but vetoed by the others for being both to close to the sea and for being a stronghold of the Democrats by Stanton. Albany faced the same problem, while Chicago was too far away, which would make a wholesale evacuation difficult. With much wrangling, in April Philadelphia was selected. Farther from the sea, and out of reach of British and Confederate armies it had the advantage of having a symbolic importance as the first capital and being a center of commerce and trade with easy rail and telegraph access to the rest of the nation. Stanton discretely began issuing orders for supplies and documents to be transferred to the city if necessary, while quietly putting the machinery in place to seize various buildings for the benefit of the Federal government…

…Lee’s invasion, and the subsequent appearance of the Anglo-Confederate fleet in the Chesapeake, stoked fears of an invasion of Washington. While Stanton and Welles believed the target was Baltimore, Blair insisted it was a feint against the capital. However, Stanton reacted properly in putting his contingency plans into motion, ordering men and material immediately transported to Philadelphia on special sealed trains…

…The most contentious product of the evacuation was that of the president. While Stanton insisted that he was to remain behind while his deputy went to Philadelphia, the President would not budge in the first days. Heated arguments erupted in the White House over his role, and at points the President’s bodyguard Lamon had to physically interject himself between the two men. Lincoln insisted he would not abandon the capital like a thief fleeing in the night. Stanton, damning the president’s stubbornness is alleged to have threatened to have Lincoln carried out of the city by force.

Finally Lincoln would quip, “I am not the nation.” During that particularly heated debate, Stanton would interject “But you are a symbol. To lose the President is to lose the whole game.” This remark seemed to suitably chasten Lincoln, and he agreed to join his family which was already evacuating to Philadelphia…

…Stanton had moved swiftly in the spring and summer of 1862 to lay the groundwork for the relocation of the capital. By the summer he had identified, and provided the legal framework, to seize no fewer than a dozen buildings for use by the Federal government in an emergency. Some were donated willingly, while others were donated with bad grace or simply seized…

When Lincoln arrived in Philadelphia he was ushered into the luxurious Lemon Hill. located on a bluff overlooking the Schuylkill River and Boathouse Row, it had been built in 1800 by Henry Pratt a wealthy merchant, had often opened the house to the public and so it was well known in the area. The city had purchased it in 1844 as part of a general buy up of properties to protect its water supply along the river. When Stanton had inquired about a property to house the president, the city had immediately suggested the property. Lincoln arrived there on the 10th of May, and immediately set about making it his headquarters in absentia…” – The Maryland Campaign, Tom Hutchins, University of Pennsylvania, 1981

Lemon Hill, the temporary Executive Mansion in 1863​

“The Senate established itself in the old Congressional Hall (the modern Court House) while the State Department took over Thomas Jefferson University, with the Navy moving to New York, though Welles himself would stay in Philadelphia with the government and Fox would manage the acquisition and supplies of the navy from New York. The War Department setting up shop at the University of Pennsylvania, and though Stanton remained in Washington, his assistant secretary John Tucker would serve in his capacity advising the president in Philadelphia. Congress takes over the University of the Sciences in Pennsylvania…” To Arms!: The Great American War, Sheldon Foote, University of Boston 1999.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 56: The Grey Tide​

“The joint Anglo-Confederate push up the Chesapeake was perhaps the most audacious movement of the war. Envisioned as a great turning movement which would upend the Federal lines and deliver the great prize of Washington to the Confederate army and allow the co-belligerents to dictate peace on their terms. It involved 36,000 Confederate troops, a brigade of British Royal Marines, a company of Royal Engineers, and twenty vessels of war (13 British, 7 Confederate) alongside numerous steamers and transports seized from the coastal and river trade and shepherded to bring the forces under Whiting to the battlefields east of Washington. Once the plan had been approved in London and Richmond, momentum carried it inexorably onward.

Despite the optimism with which the admirals and generals placed in it, the political leaders had been somewhat suspect. Though Palmerston, with his cherished but unrealized plan of the army and navy burning Kronstadt in 1855 and marching on St. Petersburg and the successful burning of the Summer Palace in 1860 in mind, knew it could theoretically work, he was constitutionally nervous about open cooperation with the Confederates. His fellow members of the War Cabinet, Gladstone especially, had no such reservations and believed that it was time for their co-belligerent to ‘pull its own weight’ and contribute to the war.

In Richmond, Davis was exceedingly nervous at putting such a large portion of the army out of contact with Lee’s main army. He was adamant that he must be kept fully informed on the progress of the landing and its accomplishments. For their parts, Mallory and Seddon were both ecstatic to be using their army and navy to accomplish the same sort of invasion which had come against them in 1861 when Northern troops and ships had landed along the coasts of the Carolinas or harassed Florida. “The shoe is at last on the other foot, and we shall see how comfortable Lincoln finds it,” Mallory had said gleefully when the operation began.

The troops had prepared and embarked at Norfolk, the roughly 40 transports, steamers, tugs and sloops preparing to escort the small Confederate army to its location. The army and navy was composed thusly as it moved out on May 9th:

Fourth Corps Army of Northern Virginia

Commanding Officer MG William H. C. Whiting

Hood’s Division
Law’s, Robertson’s, and Pender’s brigades

Holmes Division
Branch’s, Wise’s and Manning’s brigades

Ransoms’s Division
Ransom’s, Taliaferro’s, Evan’s and Hagood’s brigades

Anderson’s Division (detached from Second Corps)
Armistead’s, Wilcox’s and Featherston’s brigades

Confederate Navy, Home Fleet

Commanding Officer, Admiral Franklin Buchanan

Virginia(10)[F], South Carolina(10), Florida(9), Shenandoah(11), Raleigh(2), Beaufort(1), Teaser(2), Hampton(2)


Royal Navy, Chesapeake Squadron

Commanding Officer: Vice-Admiral Alexander Milne

Nile(90)[F], Queen(86), Edgar(91), Hero(91), Phoebe(51), Peteral(11), Rifleman(5), Sparrow(5),

Ironclad Squadron: (Commodore Alexander Cochrane) Defence(22)[F], Terror(16), Aetna(14), Glatton(16), Eurotas(12), Horatio(12)

Royal Marine Brigade (BG John Fraser)

3rd, 5th, and 6th Battalions Royal Marines

The exact landing point had been contentious among the planners. The British, remembering their experience from the 1812 War, pushed for a closer landing zone closer to Washington. They suggested following Cochrane’s original route up the Patuxent River to land nearer to Washington. The Confederates objected, pointing out Cochrane had only 4,000 men, while Whiting was transporting seven times the number of men. They rightly pointed out the flotilla would be going into a confined space, and more area would be needed to land the army. Finally, the two sides had agreed to the seizure of Annapolis.

The reasoning was two fold, the first was symbolic in the Confederate desire to seize the naval works there and occupy an important portion of Maryland. Secondly, it would allow the army to seize Annapolis Junction, and in doing so cut Washington off from the only real means of resupply now possessed by the Federal army.

Stanton of course, had reasoned out much the same as the Confederate generals stating: “It is well understood that, although the ultimate design of the enemy is to possess himself of the city of Washington, his first efforts will be directed towards Baltimore, with the intention of cutting our line of communication and supplies, as well as to arouse an insurrection in Maryland, In doing so he would place the City itself under siege without committing his forces to assault the fortifications directly.” In deciding this was so however, he made an error which would cost him greatly in the coming campaign. However, McClellan too had a similar reasoning, which would serve him equally poorly. Before the total control of the Chesapeake by Anglo-Confederate forces was possible, Stanton rightly assumed an army marching overland would of course maneuver against Baltimore, control of the seas opened up new avenues entirely.

The Union defences of Washington relied, in part, on her fixed defences, but also in the field forces maintained to protect the forts. Those defences in 1863 were under the overall command of George C. Thomas of Maryland, holding a mixed division of Maryland militia and Volunteers alongside Wadsworth’s division which held the defences. Also included in the defences were Rufus Saxton’s brigade of Colored Troops, who were administered as a separate brigade.

In total the Union had 24,000 men defending Washington. At Baltimore another division under BG Henry H. Lockwood composed of a brigade of Home Guards and another of Volunteers. The brigade defending Annapolis was headed by acting Brigadier General John Harris, commanding a brigade of Marines, Volunteers, and artillery. These forces combined added a further 12,000 to the tally defending the region.

Adding to these defences, were the navy’s Chesapeake Squadron under Rear-Admiral Louis Goldsborough and the Potomac Flotilla under Commodore Andrew A. Harwood.

The Chesapeake Squadron, responsible for the waters in the Chesapeake Bay, though in reality controlling nothing above Annapolis, would be the primary antagonists of Milne’s fleet. In May 1863 it consisted of the following vessels:

Minnesota(50)[F], the ironclad Roanoke(6), Cumberland(24), Seminole(18), and the gunboats Mystic(5), Liberty(2), Dragon(2) and Zouave(2)

The Potomac Flotilla was helmed by the frigate Susquehanna(15) along with over a dozen smaller gunboats of middling value. Though not directly involved in the battle, they, in conjunction with the forts south of Alexandria, defended the river from any attempt by the Anglo-Confederate fleet to attack the city from the south.

With I and III Corps south at Fredericksburg, the city was held by fewer men than Whiting could call upon when the fleet cast off on the morning of the 8th of May 1862…

…when reports of the Anglo-Confederate flotilla ascending the Chesapeake reached Washington Stanton had been quick to act. He had ordered Wadsworth’s division ready to march. When Milne’s ships began bombarding Alexandria, and just as Lee’s army was discovered moving North, Stanton believed he had the game firmly in hand. Wadsworth was ordered north to Baltimore, alongside the brigade of Volunteers at Annapolis, and the V Corps in New York was activated, and the brigade of New York Militia under Charles W. Sandford was ordered south to reinforce Annapolis, Stanton firmly believing that this was where the Confederates and British would throw their efforts…

Annapolis, 1860​

The two fleets passed Annapolis on the 10th, the British ships pausing only to shell the guns around Annapolis into silence before continuing north. The Confederate flotilla then, moved into action.

With numerous tugs and sweeps launching to land his forces, Whiting remained on his de-facto flagship, the steamer SS William G. Hewes overseeing the landing alongside a mixed staff of Confederate and British officers.

The Federal guns having, for the most part, been silenced, the Confederate gunboats shepherded the sweeps and tugs inshore. Firing on any Union man foolish enough to show himself, the Confederates proceeded to land most of Anderson’s division by the evening. However, Harris’s marines remained a nuisance, skirmishing and sniping the landers until the Royal Marines landed to the south of the city at Londontowne and marched inland. Taking Harris’s troops from the rear the marines were caught between the guns of the Confederate fleet and the troops ashore, though they skirmished until sundown they were forced to surrender. Their actions though, delayed further landings for a crucial day.

Though the telegraph hummed on the 10th, Stanton paid little attention to the reports. When no messages came on the 11th, he merely thought the Annapolis garrison had been silenced by British shelling. Even reports that Royal Marines had been seen ashore did not worry him unduly. He felt that all Confederate efforts would be concentrated against Baltimore, and so any diversionary raids by the British could be safely ignored or contained by railroad guards in the region.

By the afternoon of the 13th, Anderson’s and Ransom’s divisions, alongside Imboden’s cavalry, had been landed. Whiting, now anxious to be moving on, ordered them to march inland and seize the junction, lest the Federal army move to block their passage north. Anderson’s men, now the most rested and having their legs back, would lead the advance, with Ransom’s troops following. At 9am the troops began marching inland, moving through the hilly and broken terrain north of the city.

The march was tense, and as one private from the 9th Virginia wrote afterwards: “I know not what can be said about that march. We passed through deep cuts in the land, gloomy and treacherous looking. At every moment we expected to see the flash and hear the crack of a sudden Federal volley or the thunder of their cannon. But it did not come, and we spent a night at Elk Ridge in anticipation of victory.” Having marched ten miles, Anderson ordered the men to rest, and they would march on the Junction in the morning.

Annapolis Junction, circa 1900, target of the Confederate advance​

Their movements inland were noted however, and Stanton, still believing it to be a raiding force, dispatched Saxton’s troops on the afternoon of the 13th to reinforce the 5th Rhode Island guarding the junction. Embarking by train, Saxton brought his four regiments to the Junction, and the men were soon making makeshift breastworks to hold off the expected raiders and give them pause. Though the men of Rhode Island grumbled at serving alongside negroes, they would soon be thankful for their company.

As dawn broke on the 14th and miles away Sigel’s men fled for their lives from the grey tide, Anderson’s men advanced against the vital rail lines at Annapolis Junction. Though thick woods largely obscured it, Saxton’s men had pickets out, and at 10am they made contact with the advancing troopers of Featherston’s brigade. The bark and crack of rifles alerted the men that something was afoot, and they stood to. The black troops retreated back through the trees towards their breastworks, and Featherston paused to take stock of the situation. Relaying the message that the Federals were dug in, Anderson ordered Armistead’s brigade forward to attempt to envelope the Federal troops and drive them off.

Featherston’s mixed brigade of Georgian’s, Virginian’s and North Carolinian’s swept to the north while Armistead’s Virginian’s swept to the south, seeking to envelop and drive out the Federals. They were met by hot fire from the infantry and their few guns defending the position. Despite half an hour of hard fighting, they both failed to surround the Union troops or to drive them off. Frustrated, especially once he learned he was fighting black troops, Anderson waited for Ransom’s troops to arrive. Saxton, for his part, awaited word from Washington. When the scale of the Confederate assault had become clear he had dashed off news that he was facing at least a division of troops.

\
Saxton's Colored Brigade stands against the advance of Whiting's Corps​

By noon, the two divisions were in place, and they soon moved to launch another enveloping maneuver. Armistead’s men moved north, while Ransom sought to surround them from the south. Here, the heroism of the colored troops proved crucial. The 1st and 4th USCT moved with rapid speed from their entrenchments, skirmishing with Ransom’s brigades, providing ‘fire as hot as a division’ according to one captain in the 5th Rhode Island, holding the Confederates up for a crucial hour. The fighting was hot, and fierce, as each side asked for no quarter. Ransom recorded that his men even took unnecessary casualties fighting with the men of the Colored Brigade.

However, being outnumbered five to one, the action could have but one outcome. When mounted troops arrived from Washington, they were briefly able to cut a corridor for the troops to evacuate through. They moved south, skirmishing all the way, but the Junction was lost to the Confederate forces.

Stanton, now seeing the danger that Washington was in, sent messengers galloping north and south, calling for the men he had sent to Baltimore. However, soon the capital was cut off from the outside world, and all he could to was wait for the outcome of the great battle fought on the Monocacy…” – The Maryland Campaign, Tom Hutchins, University of Pennsylvania, 1981

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 57: The Road to Damascus​

“McClellan’s retreat to Parr’s Ridge had interposed his army between Lee’s and Baltimore, but in doing so he had left a portion of the road to Washington wide open. Lee sought to use this and directed Jackson to make a diversionary assault on McClellan’s positions. “You must baffle him as to our true intentions so that the army may march on Washington unobserved.” However, as with the campaign in general, the timing of this attack would be off. McClellan had learned from Stanton that he had Confederate troops in his rear, and on the morning of the 19th, just as Lee’s men were filing south towards the Capital, McClellan, alongside Porter and Franklin marched to Washington to aid the defenders, while Rosecrans would stay to delay Lee as long as he could. The much reduced XII Corps under Sigel was sent to Baltimore to provide a force in reserve…

…Lee moved Longstreet and Magruder up the Rockville Pike, which would take them directly on to Washington. Longstreet would split off at Urbana and move east through Damascus, then shifting southwards to march on Claysville, allowing Jackson to follow along in his rear, hopefully chasing the Federal forces southwards into the city, or cutting it off completely. The audacious turning maneuver would be foiled however, by McClellan’s urgent call back to the city.

As Longstreet broke away from Lee at Urbana and shift to Damascus, McClellan was riding south, bringing his two corps through Cooksville and towards the city. It is entirely possible the two forces might have missed one another, but both were moving with such speed that a meeting engagement was impossible to avoid…

The first shots were fired by the leading brigades of Pleasanton’s division which came into contact with Pickett’s troops just to the north of Claysville while the latter foraged for supplies ahead of their march. Soon the mounted troops on both sides were skirmishing, and Longstreet and McClellan were informed of the enemy in their front. Longstreet, alarmed at the sudden appearance of Federal troops, began forming his men for battle as he galloped ahead with his staff. McClellan, desiring speed, chose to only shake out Franklin’s divisions while urging Porter to form column and prepare to march on as Franklin engaged the enemy at Claysville…” – The Maryland Campaign, Tom Hutchins, University of Pennsylvania, 1981

Jackson moves​

“The meeting engagement at Claysville was entirely unexpected by both sides, but McClellan had the numbers. Longstreet, despite a valiant effort to break Franklin’s lines, failed to dislodge the former from Claysville, and seeing the troops of Porter’s corps marching by, assumed he was going to be outflanked, and withdrew in the direction of Leesborough to try and move to link up with Magruder…

…as Lee’s forces drew themselves up outside Washington on the 20th of May, McClellan’s army was streaming in to add its strength to the beleaguered defenders who had already stood off one assault by Whiting with the timely arrival of Hooker’s III Corps from Fredericksville. Both Jackson and Rosecrans would link up with their respective armies across the 21st to 22nd, and this would keep the lines fluid for the next week. However, with Whiting holding possession of Annapolis Junction, Washington was effectively cut off from the remainder of the United States.

“With our army to their north in possession of its only means of supply and communications, and only a hostile and much bereaved country to the south, the surrender of the City is only a matter of time and mathematics.” Lee would write to Davis on the 24th. The news brought celebrations in Richmond, and church bells were wrung across the nation from Charleston, South Carolina to sleepy Galveston, Texas on the Gulf coast. Davis would declare the 24th a day of celebrations and sending the news immediately to his ambassadors abroad.

However, he desired to encircle the city properly, and so recalled Griffith’s from Fredericksburg to bring Magruder’s troops up to strength. Whiting was charged with distracting the defenders to the east, placing his forces along the Anacostia River, near Bladensburgh. Jackson stretched his corps out from there, headquartering himself at the Maryland Agricultural College, while Longstreet was between the two and Magruder who was positioned at Cabin John Branch, only a mile back from Tennalleytown. Despite constant bombardments and skirmishing, Lee now circled the city with 112,000 men.

McClellan, even with the losses suffered at Monocacy and those in the battles of Claysville and Annapolis Junction still retained 95,000 men in Washington itself. At Baltimore, with XII Corps, the men under Lockwood’s command and the division under Sandford from New York, there were another 30,000 men, but they were out of contact with their commander and had no clear indication of who was in charge at the city either. Sigel claimed command of the troops by way of rank, but Sandford claimed he would only obey orders from the government, and Lockwood iterated he was charged with defending the city from the still present British threat. The unclear lines of communications between militiamen, regulars and Volunteer soldiers made the whole situation problematic, and so it would fall on Lincoln to make the final call…” To Arms!: The Great American War, Sheldon Foote, University of Boston 1999

The Confederate pickets before Washington​

“The situation facing Lincoln in those dreary summer days of 1863 were unimaginable. Washington was besieged, and for all the world knew, it had fallen. “Editorials were printed, it seems, hourly, about the fate of the nation and the loss of the capital.” George Temple would write gloomily in his diary. An assistant recalled seeing the normally pugnacious Horace Greely coming to work “ashen faced and shaking” upon the receipt of the news.

Lincoln for his part, would sit in brooding silence, taking the news of the campaign with increasing severity…

There seemed little to do then but to try and find a commander, or at least reinforcements for the campaign out East, but where were the men to come from? The troops in Maine could not be moved for fear of allowing the British to achieve greater mischief there. The Army of the Hudson was engaged and could not be weakened. The only men remaining to the government would have to be some body of troops from the West. Lincoln cast about for some commander, a “leader of men” who could right the rocky ship of the nation. With much searching, he finally settled on George Thomas commanding the IX Corps in the West. He would be moved East at all speed with a division of troops and directed to take command of the “Army of the Chesapeake” with all speed…” – Snakes and Ladders: The Lincoln Administration and America’s Darkest Hour, Hillary Saunders, Scattershot Publishing, 2003

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 58: In the Footsteps of Burgoyne​

“Come unto me ye heroes
Whose hearts are true and bold,
Who value more your honor,
Than others do their gold;
Give ear unto my story,
And I the truth will tell,
Concerning many a soldier,
Who for his country fell.” – A Song for the Redcoats, 1777 (traditional)

“The Army of Canada, now two corps strong, had been preparing for its southwards movement for four months. The transfer of staffs and officers between Canada East and Canada West had taken place over December and January, while the organization of the army sheltering at St. Jean had been of paramount importance in the early spring months.

Upon his elevation to Field Marshal, Dundas had been swift in reorganizing his forces in the mould London wanted. The army’s five divisions and one cavalry division were concentrated under the command of two overall corps, with a spare division acting as the army reserve. By May 1863 the army had been organized as such:

Field Marshal Henry Dundas

1st Corps: Lt. General Frederick Paulet

1st Division MG Henry Ponsonby

2nd Division MG Brooke Taylor

2nd Corps: Lt. General Patrick Grant

3rd Division MG William Norcott

4th Division MG Charles Warren

Russell’s Division: MG David Russell

Cavalry Division: MG John Lawrenson

Formally, though not actually, attached to this army was the 3rd Corps under Williams who had, until January, commanded the army in Canada East. His appointment to command in Canada West saw the 3rd Corps organized along these lines:

3rd Corps: Lt. General William Fenwick Williams

6th Division MG George T. C. Napier

7th Division MG Randall Rumley

Booker’s Brigade

These troops would in their turn, be responsible for the fighting in Canada West, and ensuring the Americans did not manage to land any blows in Dundas’s rear, allowing the main army to carry an offensive into the heart of American territory.

The campaign of 1863, in rough concert with Milne’s actions with the Confederate army on the Chesapeake, was designed to drive the Americans to the negotiating table on British terms. Its targets were ones which had been objectives for the British since the Revolution and in the campaigns of 1814. Their first goal was to seize control of Rouses Point and sever any American attempt at gaining a foothold on Canadian soil in Canada East. The second target, at Plattsburgh, would serve as a springboard for further invasion down the Hudson River Valley. Overall, it was expected that should the campaign progress well, the British army could drive a dagger into the heart of New York state and seize Albany, paralyzing the American ability to supply and coordinate any campaign in Canada.

Dundas had prepared the army for the campaign to begin in April. However, the brutal winter and cool temperatures of 1862-63 meant that the ice stayed on the St. Lawrence until May 3rd, meaning he could not bring in much needed supplies and gunboats until early May, delaying his movements till the 10th. Even though a trickle had manage to come north via the now British controlled Grand Trunk at Portland, but the long and vulnerable miles were often open to sabotage, which meant the route was not nearly as useful as planners in London had hoped.

Once the river was open to him however, he prepared to move South…” Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV.

Ambrose Burnside​

“The death of General Sumner from a heart attack on March 18th 1863 was a great blow to the morale and leadership of the army. This forced the elevation of the reluctant General Burnside. Though he had given a good showing operating his division, the general had little confidence in himself, and thus many of his subordinates had little confidence in him as the campaigning season of 1863 opened.

The Army of the Hudson though, was a formidable fighting force. With six divisions, an attached cavalry brigade and artillery, it was as strong as it had been in the spring of 1862. 50,000 men were now prepared for the campaign against Montreal. In Washington, it had been seen as essential that the army be prepared as much as possible for the campaign, and great depots had been constructed at Albany and Plattsburgh over the fall and winter. By spring, Burnside’s army could boast of more supplies than even the Army of the Potomac. It would be able to execute its mission without fear.

Burnside had been quick to accept the proposal laid out by Washington for an attack on Montreal. It was, as was well known, the lynchpin of Canada, and had been the goal of all of the previous years attacks. However, this time Burnside was determined he would do as was best. Though Sumner’s campaigns in June and July had all aimed to either sweep the British aside or go around them, Burnside planned to use the greater flexibility of his two corps to go through the British by forcing them to defend a wide front.

Instead of marching along the line of the Chateauguay, Burnside instead was opting a more streamlined approach. His corps would be concentrated at Rouses Point and Mooers. Richardson’s II Corps at Mooers and Casey’s XIV at Rouses Point. The plan was to follow the railroads north, and converge south of Montreal while the army was supported by Winslow’s squadron which would support the army during the descent of the Richelieu.

Though the British had destroyed the Canahauguay Railroad which normally connected the south bank of the St. Lawrence to Mooers Corners, Richardson was adamant he could still use the roads connecting it with the rest of the province. The two pronged descent on Montreal would force the British to react rather than open their own offensive. To do that, the majority of the cavalry was detached to operate alongside II Corps, while the two regiments of cavalry detailed to support XVI Corps would be left to aid the advance up the Richelieu…” The Union’s Shield: The Army of the Hudson, Donald Cameron, University of New York 1930

“In truth, the campaign had already begun at the end of April. Ever aggressive, Dundas had ordered that the line of supply for the American forces be interdicted as much as possible. On the 21st, the 1st Cavalry Brigade under Col. Low had been ordered to cross the border and attack the Champlain railroad bridge over the Richelieu which connected Rouses Point to Vermont and the rest of New York.

Low’s cavalry had crossed the border, some 800 men in all, and bore down on the bridge near Windmill Point. The Vermont militia were largely concentrated around Alburgh and East Alburgh, the company strength guard was simply overwhelmed. The bridge was burned, and the raiders retreated north. Occasional skirmishing would break out as both sides sought to interfere with the other. This however, deeply cut into the supplies Burnside could draw on quickly, now having to depend on the more circuitous routes running through Ogdensburgh.

Burnside himself, despite the dent in his supply situation, planned on using the river as his highway, but would also concentrate at Mooer’s and move on Montreal. To that end, as April bled into May he moved Foster’s division to Rouses Point and Casey’s to Champlain. Burns’s division was held at Plattsburgh alongside Howard’s from XVI Corps, while the advance brigades of Hancock’s division were moved to Mooers. Blenker’s men were to be billeted at Champlain.

However, the timetable of each general would be frustrated by the weather. The ice remained stubbornly late in the year, with Montreal remaining closed to the 5th of May, and with the railroad bridge burned and under threat, Burnside could not supply his forward movement in time with his men at Mooers. Though both generals had anticipated action by early May, they were trapped by nature itself. By the 10th, the roads remained muddy and stubborn, but Dundas was determined to waste no more time waiting on the weather. He ordered that the advance would begin early on the morning of the 11th.

At 5am, when word had arrived by courier, the 2nd Corps of the Army of Canada began moving southwards. Led by companies of locals from the militia, the two divisions took separate roads to Mooers. The Norcott’s 3rd Division crossed the border at the location of what had been Clayland and Buttler’s stores, which had been abandoned and then repurposed as militia blockhouses. The militia company manning the blockhouse was taken by surprise, and quickly overrun in the dawn hours and passed.

Warren’s 4th Division however, had no such luck. The militia, awakened by sounds unusual in the year, were ready and a sharp skirmish erupted until the artillery was brought up and the men literally blasted from their positions. The sudden thunder of artillery was heard in Mooers, and the men of II Corps were roused rudely from their sleep.

In 1863 Mooers was a sleepy town of just under 4,000 souls. Notable for housing Mooer’s Junction where the Plattsburgh and Montreal Railroad met the Ogdensburgh line, its possession was essential for the Union to supply its forces in northern New York. Grant’s task, was to capture it.

Defending the town in May were the forward elements of II Corps, Winfield Scott Hancock’s Division. They had been bivouacked in and around the village since early April, generally freezing and keeping watch on the border waiting for instructions to move. Joined by Blake’s cavalry, they were crowded inside the little village and had some 8,000 men in the region, supported by an ad hoc brigade of 3rd New York State Militia Division. However, there were fully 18,000 British troops coming directly at them, and they were in a sore position, separated by the Chazy River and their fortifications with the river at their backs.

Hancock’s division had by this point, a reputation against the British. MG Amasa Cobb’s First Brigade in particular was well regarded in the army of the Hudson. Formerly Hancock’s brigade, they had acquitted themselves well at Portland and First Rouses Point, and were considered blooded veterans against the British. So when the bugle called to form ranks, Hancock was quick to muster his regiments. Sent to hold north of the town at the all important junction, Cobb fell in behind pre-prepared breastworks. The memories of the British rifle fire were fresh and horrific in the minds of many veterans.

Stoughton’s Vermont (Second) Brigade formed up alongside, covering the flank and roads into town while the gunners manned their positions along the road. Davidson’s brigade formed the reserve. Blake’s Cavalry, the 4th New York, 8th Illinois, and 19th New York, moved to screen the flanks.

The telegraph hummed, and riders were dispatched to Champlain to bring Blenker’s troops to the action. Smith had to have known it would be far too late for Blenker to change the outcome of the coming fight however.

Norcott’s division would arrive first, shaking out as it turned to face the strong point at the junction. Using the woods as cover, the three brigades worked into line, Garvock’s 1st Brigade and Col. Thomas Kelly’s 2nd Brigade facing in, and Pitt-Rivers 3rd (Canadian) Brigade as the reserve. The artillery formed just north of Branch Creek, and was soon raining shot on the American positions, while the American artillerists responded in a generally futile counter battery duel.

Warren’s division was soon filing in beside Norcott’s with Dunn’s 1st Brigade in the lead, and James Lindsay’s 3rd Brigade supporting while Kelly’s 2nd Brigade was the reserve.

The artillery duel became general at 2pm and lasted until 3pm when the call for the advance sounded. Trusting the artillery to have softened the American positions, Grant hoped that one solid push would unseat the Americans and grant him the town. Garvock and Kelly’s brigades advanced, supported by Dunn’s and Lindsay’s. Skirmishers fired at any head that showed itself, and soon the firing along the line became general as the British advanced to within 200 yards. Though volley after volley was poured into their ranks, the regulars characteristically closed gaps when a man fell and continued onwards. Soon a trail of red clad corpses spread back to the tree line. However, when the British reached 100 yards there was a general volley, and four brigades advanced at a run.

“It was a splendid and terrible sight to behold,” wrote one 5th Vermont private “the mass of redcoats coming at a run, bayonets gleaming in the sun, seeming on the whole unaffected by our volleys. With a terrific HURRAH they were upon us.”

9,000 troops crashed into the breastwork. With the final volleys, the work soon became hand to hand. Dunn was seen leaping the breastworks, laying about with his saber and his brigade was soon surmounting the obstacles behind him. Lindsay’s troops were closing on the flank, and Hancock had no choice but to commit his reserve. Feeding Davidson’s 3rd Brigade into the line, the action became general and the weight of numbers was soon pushing the Vermonters and New Yorkers alike back into the buildings.

However, on the point of advance at the junction, the British advance stalled. Instilled with confidence by their bold commander, Cobb’s men, whether men from Wisconsin, New York, Pennsylvania or Maine, held firm despite the best the British could throw at them. One attack was seen off, then a second. Finally, Norcott sent Pitt-Rivers Canadians into the fray.

The Canadians were eager to prove their mettle, led by their own leaders they moved to turn the junction strong points flanks. Hancock, seeing it coming, moved the 49th Pennsylvania under Col. Irwin to meet them, but it was not enough. With a series of volleys, they were soon pushing the men of Pennsylvania back. In danger of being encircled, Cobb reluctantly ordered his men to draw back, greeted with jeers in English and French along the way.

Fighting spread into the town itself as both sides fought to hang on, house to house fighting became the norm but by 5pm, with the sun waning, and their backs to the river, Hancock ordered his men to retreat. It was a chaotic flight, with Stoughton’s Vermonters forming the rear guard. In the chaotic crossing over 100 men would be drowned in the river as they pushed to withdraw.

Only Cobb and Davidson’s brigades, the cavalry and half the artillery would successfully cross the river. Stoughton, wounded, was captured with over 4/5th of his brigade and made prisoner. Hancock’s division was now moving swiftly back into New York, with Hancock suffering his first taste of defeat, while Grant’s 2nd Corps had just won the first British victory on New York’s soil in over a century…” Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 59: To the Point​

“Burgoyne, the king's commander,
From Canada set sail,
With full eight thousand reg'lars,
He thought he could not fail;
With Indians and Canadians,
And his curs'd Tory crew,
On board his fleet of shipping,
He up the Champlain flew.” – A Song for the Redcoats, 1777 (traditional)

“While 2nd Corps was driving Smith’s men southwards at Mooer’s 1st Corps and Russell’s division was marching south from their entrenchments at Lacolle, shadowed by the ironclads and gunboats of Collinson’s squadron. Supervised directly by Dundas, this effort would involve the bulk of the British forces. Three divisions and 28,000 men were making directly for Rouse’s Point, supported by four ironclads, four mortar boats and eight wooden gunboats. The objecting was to seize control of the fortress and drive the Americans from their position.

Having moved almost as quickly as Grant, Paulet’s Corps was across the border by 7am, and soon found itself shaking out and skirmishing with the forward pickets of XVI Corps…” Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV.

Frederick Paulet, Commanding 1st Corps​

“The army was in splendid condition for the march. Having received fresh troops and replacements from home the regiments were all up to strength. Even the Canadians had proved their dedication to Queen and Country by filling out their regiments from the ballot. Though a most un-English institution, queer Canadian law held (and still does) that each man in a certain age bracket be available for such a duty, and I am told it dates back to the French regime.

Dundas crossed the border early on the 11th, and it was over ground that, from the skirmish and battle of the year past, out men were well familiar with. Ably assisted by the chief of staff MacDougal we were able to organize our lines of march to the south.

The decisive action of Low’s cavalry had cut the American railroad, allowing us to move largely unmolested into the enemies front without fear of his sudden reinforcement. I am led to understand that the enemy had yet to concentrate his main force at either Rouses Point or Mooers by this time, and was in effect, spread out along the whole of the frontier between these two points. This did much to encourage the men who, although still shaken by their defeat eight months previous, were determined to avenge this stain and earn battle honors for themselves in the coming confrontation.

Paulet’s 1st Corps shook itself out well, with Ponsonby and Taylor’s divisions forming the advance. Ponsonby, formerly heading the Guards Brigade was well suited to this combat with the Yankees, while Taylor’s men, loaned to us from the Army of the Maritimes, were veterans of the brutal fighting at Portland. Thus when they made contact with the enemy early on the 11th, they knew what to expect on the outskirts of that little American hamlet…” – The Story of a Soldiers Life, Volume II, Field-Marshal Viscount Garnet Wolseley, Westminster 1903

“Unlike Hancock’s division, which had been partially caught unawares, Foster’s men had been alerted to the British presence by sympathizers along the border and so were up and ready. They were steady in the knowledge that Howard’s division was marching north that very morning to meet them. All they had to do was hold…

Unlike the battle in September, neither the navy nor the army was completely ready. Though Foster’s men were expecting battle, their main reinforcements from Plattsburgh were still at Chazy, following a day’s previous march. Even with couriers riding to inform Howard’s men, they were still the better part of half a days march away. However, with the guns they had they readied for the fight of their lives.

Largely fighting over the same ground that so many men had bled and died over in September of ’62, the fighting was pressed heavily. Ponsonby’s division moved to sever the connection between Fort Montgomery and the main force in the town, while Taylor’s men would bleed to take the position at Waldon Farm…

Ponsonby’s men advanced under the cover of Collinson’s flotilla, the guns of the ironclads and mortar boats pounding the much abused fortifications of Fort Montgomery. With a murderous fire from both shore and lakeside, the garrison was, after nearly two hours of bombardment, compelled to surrender the fortress or face annihilation. The Guards would have the honor of accepting the American surrender. This unhinged the entire American line and left Foster’s men open to being outflanked…

In a hard fought delaying action, the men retreated from the village towards Chazy where they would combine with Howard’s fresh troops to make a stand…” Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV.

“The rapid capture of Rouses Point would shock both Burnside at Plattsburgh, and General Halleck in Albany. The news would travel swiftly to Washington. Acting swiftly, Halleck ordered that the full might of XVII Corps be prepared at Chazy to buy time for the army to assemble to slow the British advance. Hancock and Blenker were both notified that they should assemble at Plattsburgh as soon as practicable. Burn’s men were held in reserve in case of the unthinkable, but Halleck was determined he would stop the British advance well before Albany.

Once the men from Rouses Point were across, the bridges over the Little Chazy River were destroyed to prevent an easy British crossing, and men and batteries were posted at Chazy landing to be supported by Winslow’s squadron to prevent an easy ascent of the Champlain.

Burnside was determined to fall back upon Plattsburgh with his army to ‘stop up’ the British advance as it moved along the river. The men at Chazy would buy time for the fortification of Plattsburgh itself which, beyond batteries thrown up at Cumberland Head, was little prepared to see off a true assault.

Casey’s first task in arriving at Chazy on the 13th, was to see that all of his soldiers were across the bridges, and then see to their destruction. With the bridges destroyed, this would at least delay any British assault.

Placing his troops on the south side of the Little Chazy River, he ordered all buildings on the north side fired or pulled down to prevent their use by the enemy. Setting the men to building breastworks, he managed, in a little over 24 hours he managed to form his corps into a well placed defense. It was well timed, as Paulet’s divisions were, by nightfall on the 15th, arriving at his front. His own forces were laid out as such on the morning of the 16th:

Casey’s old division under BG Palmer, was holding the left of the position, anchored on the Little Chazy River, with all three brigades (Sandford’s, Howell’s and Davis’s) strung out through the town. Howard’s division with two brigades (Barlow’s and Meagher’s) standing in the line, while the 3rd Brigade under French was spaced between them and supporting two half batteries each at Adams Tavern and Chazy Landing meant to deter the British from crossing in conjunction with Winslow’s squadron. Foster’s troops were held in reserve to support them.

Paulet’s 1st Corps, was laid out with Ponsonby’s Division (the brigades of Dawkins, Russell and Ingall) directly facing Chazy, while Taylor’s Division (Brown, Ewart and Bingham’s brigades) occupied the line until it found the Lake shore. Russell’s troops were again held as the reserve.

Collinson’s squadron had steamed south in support of them, anchoring in Kingsbay, but on the morning of the 16th were steaming south to support the attack.

Predictably, the attack opened with artillery and sniping from the British lines early in the morning, with many unlucky sentries being killed as 4am broke. As the sun rose rifles barked as the British unleashed a fusillade of shot and shell against Casey’s works. The American artillery, having learned lessons from earlier in the war, held fire to keep their impact for the inevitable British attack.

At six am, skirmishers appeared along the north shore in front of Chazy, and the engagement became general. The American artillery responded to the advance of the British battalions, incurring the wrath of the swifter firing British guns. The main thrust of the attack though, came from Taylor’s troops in front of Howard’s division. Leading the charge was the 3rd Brigade under Brevet Col. Henry Bingham of the Rifles. The 1st Battalion of the Rifles was mixed in with the red coated infantry and advanced as skirmishers across the Little Chazy, wading up to their chests in the swift running current. Waiting for them along the shore were the men of Barlow’s brigade.

Keen eyed sharp shooters from the north bank picked off standard bearers and other officers, and the British emerged amid a scene of great confusion. Instead of forming up, Bingham’s orders were that the men should storm the breastworks by company under support from the Rifles, which they did with reckless abandon, scattering Barlow’s men, only to come under fire from Meagher’s troops. Meagher’s men had requested, and received, permission to take cover in Adams Woods, a series of woodlots along the shore which sheltered them from the worst of the fire of British rifles and cannon. They drove into Bingham’s men from the flank, while covering the more treacherous northern approaches with their own sharpshooters using the few rifles the brigade possessed.

This fouled the British attack early in the morning, but both sides knew it would ultimately come down to the events on Lake Champlain…” The Union’s Shield: The Army of the Hudson, Donald Cameron, University of New York 1930

The British cross the river​

“Winslow’s Squadron, sheltering by Island La Motte, had set off at 5am in the morning, under the sound of guns, to avoid being in an enclosed space against Collinson’s vessels.

Winslow’s vessels had been reinforced with two additional ironclads over the winter the new Plattsburgh(8) to replace the one lost in September and the Rouses Point(8) adding a fifth ironclad to his squadron along with his gunboats United States(4), Boston(2), Burlington(2), Shelburne(2), General Montgomery(3) and General Webster(3).

Collinson’s squadron too had been reinforced when the St. Lawrence opened, with the new ironclad Trois Rivieres(7) joining her sisters Richelieu, Yamaska, and Laurence. The gunboats had also been reinforced by two new Britomart class vessels Crown(2) and Beaver(2) alongside their sisters Sepoy(4), Bullfrog(4), Carnation(4), Spanker(4), Sandfly(4),Herring(4), Cherub(2), and Netley(2).

Winslow unfortunately, sailed his vessels directly into a trap. Collinson had positioned his ships early in the morning, waiting for the gunfire to be carried across the water, and the now stretched in a line between Point au Fer and Island La Motte, with his four ironclads in the center, and the gunboats anchoring the front and rear of this column. Expecting the Americans to use the more accessible au Fer channel, Collinson correctly deduced that he would have a chance to broadside his opponent. Betrayed by the rising sun, Winslow could barely decipher the silhouettes of his enemies when the thunder of the Royal Navy’s guns fell upon them.

The leading vessel, the Boston was blasted into scrap by the opening salvo, and the following salvos of heavy guns tore into the following ironclads. St. Albans suffered devastating damage and veered off, colliding with the gunboat Burlington and sending both ships drifting into Island La Motte. Winslow, in Albany, directed his gunboats to make for the head of the British line while he would direct his remaining four ironclads directly at the British center to break them.

With his T crossed, this was a bold maneuver, and as he charged, Collinson’s ships tore into his own. Winslow would be wounded on Albany’s command deck, but he would lead his ships through the British, who scrambled to avoid collision. This was not entirely successful, as the Troy would collide with Trois Rivieres heavily damaging both ships, as they fired at point blank range at one another. Despite her armor, Troy would be the greatest loser of this engagement as the British Armstrong guns gutted her, leaving her a burning wreck. Winslow’s surviving vessels stormed through the British center, but remained receiving broadsides as they tried to maneuver. However, the British line was well and truly broken.

Captain Dewey, leading the gunboat squadron, veered northwards in the wake of Island La Motte to attempt to drive around the British gunboats, which were even then turning to engage him. In a savage melee they would collide as Winslow attempted to bring his vessels to bear while under fire from the ironclads as they turned…

In truth, from here the battle might have gone either way, but the weight of British shell fire was too great. The gunboats one by one would fall silent, with Dewey about the United States striking last as he was encircled by the British. Only Albany and St. Albans would be able to maneuver southwards and fight through the British vessels, who had penned their sisters against the shoreline, driving both Rouses Point and Plattsburgh to ground.

By 7am the battle was over, the remains of Winslow’s squadron were steaming south with all haste to Plattsburgh, while Collinson moved his ships to bombard the American positions on the shore.” The Naval War of 1862, Theodore Roosevelt Jr., New York University Press, 1890

Though he faced defeat in 1863, the Battle of Lake Champlain would not be Dewey's last taste of combat​

“Feeding Foster’s Division into the line at 8:30 only delayed the inevitable. The British vessels had come alongside and were dueling with the under strength batteries, sailing past and then back again, lessening the damage that the field guns might achieve.

Russell’s division was committed to the American left flank, and soon they were across the river in force, threatening to unhinge the whole line and Casey had to order the retreat…

…The Battle of Chazy had been a disaster for Union arms. Though Casey would extract his forces with a hasty withdrawal, American naval power on Lake Champlain had been shattered completely. Only two ironclads now stood between Collinson’s fleet and control of the river, and Plattsburgh itself was threatened. Upon hearing the news President Lincoln was said to have exclaimed “My God, my God! What will the nation say?”The Union’s Shield: The Army of the Hudson, Donald Cameron, University of New York 1930

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 60: The Guns of Ticonderoga ​

“Our garrison they viewed them,
And straight their troops did land,
And when St. Clair, our chieftain,
The fact did understand,
That they the Mount Defiance
Were bent to fortify,
He found we must surrender,
Or else prepare to die.

The fifth day of July, then,
He ordered a retreat,
And when next morn we started,
Burgoyne thought we were beat.
And closely he pursued us,
Till when near Hubbardton,
Our rear guards were defeated,
He thought the country won.

And when 'twas told in Congress,
That we our forts had left,
To Albany retreated,
Of all the North bereft” – A Song for the Redcoats, 1777 (traditional)

“The defeat at Chazy unhinged Burnside’s entire strategy for northern New York. Shorn of his naval support, he was forced to abandon the incomplete fortifications of Plattsburgh and withdraw southwards with his troops into more defensible positions. This pell mell retreat earned him derision amongst an unfriendly press, but military realists stood by him. By the end of May he was retreating south…

Dundas could not move as swiftly as he would have liked. Putting the Union army to flight had cost men and material, and after seizing Plattsburgh, he was still required to connect his army to Grant’s 2nd Corps. The troops of 2nd Corps however, on unfamiliar roads, took over two weeks to march to Plattsburgh, harassed by Hancock’s retreating troops all the way. Finally able to meet with Dundas on the 19th, the once again combined Army of Canada turned its attentions southwards towards Ticonderoga and Albany…” – To Arms!: The Great American War, Sheldon Foote, University of Boston 1999.

“Even with the losses suffered in the battles at Rouse’s Point and Mooers, Dundas’s army was still in good condition for a march. The Canadian Brigade had been left to garrison the rear, along with Russell’s detached brigade under Scovell, who in conjunction with the squadron on Lake Champlain would protect our supply lines and communications back to Montreal and thence Quebec and the sea. From there we would obtain most of our succor, for we were marching through a barren and hilly country. With my better knowledge than that which I possessed in my youth, I can see now how Burgoyne went to ruin in 1777, leading to the great and inglorious defeat which brought the French in on the side of the Yankee.

It was hoped by many in the army that we would be winning a great victory which would, in our eyes follow the undoubted success of the joint operation against Washington then being conducted in accordance with our fleet. The navy had carried all before her, Portland, Portsmouth and Olympia, that how could we expect nothing less than glorious victory and the Yankees asking for terms?

I shall not forget that morning in Plattsburgh. I had been among the enemies abandoned fortifications during the night, then spent my evening in the barracks so recently vacated by the enemy General Burnside. We had found a town trembling in fear at what they imagined would for sure be the depredations of the redcoats. Over a thousand had fled southwards with the army, much reducing the place in size. Imagine their shock when we passed through, paying good British sterling and keeping good order in the ranks! Though when the morning of the 2nd of June dawned, I doubt many were sad to see the Army of Canada, then 40,000 strong, departing southwards.

Mounted with Dundas’s staff, I could see the first regiments of Paulet’s corps streaming forth from their camps. First came the cavalry, scouting to the south, and behind them the Guards Brigade, earning the right to have the other regiments ‘eat their dust’ for their splendid performance at Rouse’s Point. Then the men of the 2nd Brigade under Lord Alexander Russell, who all were veterans of the fighting which had been so vicious since this time a year ago in the spring of 1862.

As the great stream of red coated infantry marched south in good order, it was hard not to reflect that twice in the past century British armies had marched these same pathways to ignoble defeat. It must have weighed heavily on the minds of our officers, but none showed it. Indeed, all were cheery and acted as though we were to make sport of invading Yankeedom. In the headquarters, the general would lay friendly wagers with the division commanders regarding who would march their regiments into Albany first. I recall that among the brigade and regimental commanders, similar wagers were prepared and offered. The only ones who abstained from such discourse were the cavalry, feeling that such wagers with mere infantry were beneath them.

It was only after two days march, at the town of Peru when we received our first contact with the enemy, who was very unwilling to render us possession of the place. The skirmish was with the cavalry, who had stumbled upon one of the enemy’s patrols. Though it was a short sharp action, it set the standard for the next few days. Often you could not go a few hours without hearing the lively crackle of musketry along the flanks or to the front of the march.

The first major contact with the enemy came at the banks of the Ausable River. Having dug fairly respectable entrenchments, he was unwilling to give way except to overwhelming firepower. It was here that a curious innovation was tried by our gunners. They found themselves able to fire over the heads of our infantry, with proper elevation, and into the entrenchments of our enemies. Though highly successful, it spooked many of the older officers and infantrymen. I could not say I blame them, and it seems to have taken place on sporadically since then.

Breaking the enemies lines on the Ausable, was toughish, as the men had to scramble uphill against entrenchments. Even with this innovative artillery, and even against an enemy armed primarily with muskets, we found the going difficult. I was aiding in the direction of battery fire with the 3rd Division as Russell sent his 2nd Brigade in. It was astounding to watch, and with some pride, as this unit, comprising the First Battalion 10th Regiment of Foot, Second Battalion 25th Regiment of Foot and the 12th Battalion of Canadian Volunteers went in. Though there were some greenhorns in these new companies, they behaved like veterans. The Canadians no less so, and I think Russell deserves much credit for integrating these men so well into the division.

Even in these scrambles the enemy never gave up easily, as he was fighting for his home ground. It was only on the 22nd of May that the army was finally able to scramble through these positions. It was then we entered a most dreadful country. A great fastness of hills rising up about us, the roads leading haphazardly through the mountains, and on many occasions we were obliged to remain out of contact with the squadron. The reader is invited to think of the fastness of the Scottish Highlands or maybe some foothills of the Alps. To say that this was a vast and most formidable country would be an understatement! Our actions then became those of companies and sections, not divisions, or even brigades and regiments! Passing through the locally called ‘Poke a Moonshine Mountains” and in the shadow of Bosworth Mountain near the otherwise unremarkable but grandly named Port Douglas, the enemy made his most concerted stand yet.

Along this line the enemy was under the command of general Richardson of the American Second Corps, and under him were two divisions to guard the approaches to the interior. Throwing up his forces near the high ground, and his flank held absolutely securely by Auger Pond and the mountain slopes, we came upon a great nightmare. Entrenched into this rocky ground the enemy was determined to wait us out. We had at that time not the shipping to move considerable force around him, and no certain dispositions on whether he had prepared for such an eventuality. After a costly probing attack on the 26th, Dundas determined we must seek out another route. However, this would prove, after three days of probing and searching, impractical for want of shipping.

Our attempts at creeping around the position via the small farm roads then existent were frustrated constantly by the enemies sharpshooters who took a dreadful toll, even when mortar boats were hurled forward to drive them back. Many times this wasteful tactic only succeeded in blocking the very roads we were trying to use! Dundas decided then that it would come down to siege tactics, and our heavy guns were called upon.

This was the same dreadful work which had been undertaken outside Sevastopol against the Russian works. No Englishman will forget the images of the slaughter at the Great Redan or the bloody fights at the Quarries. Though Dundas himself had not served upon that field, his subordinates had, and were invaluable in helping him plan and coordinate our advance. It is to be admitted that the officers assigned in this case by London were, astonishingly well selected. It did indeed suggest that something had been learned by the hard lessons of Crimea and the Mutiny. The heavy guns opened up a coordinated bombardment on the 28th, blasting all through the day, like a great summer thunderstorm. I have spoken previously about the bombardments of June 1855, and I may assure the reader that this bombardment of just over 100 guns was almost minuscule in comparison to the 600 present before Sevastopol, but I’m sure to the Yankees it seemed just as powerful! Little too did the Yankees know that we did not intend to stop for some time, or until all our shells had been expended! This great bombardment continued for three days, only concluding on June 1st.

During this period, our storming parties had not been idle. Well selected groups of men would creep forward and take the enemies outer works, and in one much celebrated instance men of the 96th managed to carry off a number of the enemy as prisoners, bringing with them the colours of that regiment! There was much rejoicing in our camps that night. But for some time, it was the work of a regular siege. Our sappers driving trenches forward, the guns ‘softening’ the American positions, and the constant skirmish one associates with siege.

Finally, on the morning of June 2nd, the army advanced in strength. Under the cover of guns Warren’s 4th Division went in. Even watching from the rear with the staff I could see that it was a dreadful fight. The distant thunder of guns and the occasional whizz of shrapnel and spent shells by our position told us that it was indeed a fearsome engagement. Much of my time was spent with Marshal Dundas as he spied the increasingly obscured battle with his field glasses. Couriers would ride up, I would issue the orders he dictated, and they would ride off again. I confess, that being so far from the action I was indeed feeling bored by the second hour of fighting. It was only when news that The 3rd Division was not following its own orders to demonstrate against the American position that I was able to excitedly ride out and into the fray.

The eternal crackle of musketry like distant lighting and the continual pop-pop of rifles and thunder of cannons was beautiful to behold. I was quite enamoured with it and found myself hoping to be assigned to guide some wayward brigade into the action. Sadly, it merely transpired that some enterprising captain of the artillery was refusing to move his battery without orders, and thus holding up the assault of 3rd Division with his obstinance. Speaking with the authority of Dundas (which was broadly true) I ordered his infernal battery aside so that the division could advance and scale the heights to attack the American rifle pits there.

I’m sad to say this was the great part I personally played in the Battle of Bosworth Mountain. However, it was with great pluck and heroism that our forces drove over the Yankee positions, and poor General Richardson, though his men fought gallantly, had no choice but to retire before our force of arms. Alas, it cost us a great many men killed or wounded. But the Yankees too lost heavily. The reports afterwards say we lost some 5,000 men over the course of the whole battle, and I confess that I do not know the number of Yankee soldiers lost, but I can scarce believe it was as many as our own.

I found myself greatly impressed with the bluecoats fortitude. An interesting anecdote from the battle should tell of this. When the men of General Lindsay’s brigade overran a portion of the works on Bosworth Mountain, they capture a whole Yankee regiment belonging to the German Division (or Dutch as the Yankees called them) of Richardson’s force. These men, many who spoke only rudimentary English fought hard, and nearly to the last, so that it was when they were compelled to lay down their arms, only one quarter of that regiment was found unscathed by the ferocity of the battle.

The reader may also wish to note an interesting fact we learned from prisoners at that fight. While our army in the Crimea was drained constantly of men from the hardships of the campaign and the ferocity of the fighting, our regimental system meant that we could bring drafts of men from the depots at home and bring these regiments up to strength as we had done with the army in Canada over the winter of 1862-63. However, these Yankee regiments would recruit up to a strength of 1000 men, and with the normal wastage from disease and desertion have perhaps 800 men ready for duty, perhaps less when one considers the need for camp duties and outposts. However, when interrogating a captured Yankee officer we asked him what he believed the strength of his regiment was. He answered perhaps 400, or maybe 300. This seemed to be the universal response of the men we captured, and in one case as little as 200 men! It is astounding to think that any army would allow its units to waste away in such a state so that the cohesion and experience of a regiment is lost! Despite this, they fought bravely and as veterans. They were stalwart, implacable foes who it is hard not to admire. But they were, by and large of the same Anglo-Saxon blood as our race, and could they not help but fight bravely. One can only wonder how powerful they should have been with the proper introduction of a regimental system of depots like our own.

Following this victory of course, we pursued the Yankee’s further south…” – The Story of a Soldiers Life, Volume II, Field-Marshal Viscount Garnet Wolseley, Westminster 1903

“Though the British advance had thus far driven the Army of the Hudson south, each delay and retreat had bought time for Burnside to dig his forces in. Though Richardson’s men had been badly mauled at Bosworth Mountain, their stand had bought time to fully entrench at Ticonderoga.

That old French fortress, one which had seen much bloodshed in the Revolution, remained. Now however, it had been strengthened by earthworks, gun batteries, and over 32,000 men to man them. In a line of well fortified earthworks that stretched from Lake Champlain, in front of the Town of Ticonderoga, and anchored on Trout Brook in the shadow of the Adirondack Mountains. This formidable line was further reinforced by booms and a great chain spread across the river, which was in turn protected by the two remaining ironclads of the Lake Champlain Squadron. It was a formidable defence, one which would take time to overcome, and this was exactly what Burnside depended on…

Dundas arrived to find, to his astonishment, a line stronger than either of those faced at the Ausable River, or Bosworth Mountain. Frustrated, and with limited avenues of advance to his objective, he settled in to once more face the Army of the Hudson across its trenches.”– The Union’s Shield: The Army of the Hudson, Donald Cameron, University of New York

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 61: Marching Through Canada​

“The winter of 1862-63 had been unkind to all the combatants, but to the Army of the Niagara most of all. It’s 25,000 men were spread thin along the shores watching the British positions across the Trent River. Smith had been forced to recall all his divisions, leaving the garrisons along the St. Lawrence to the 4th Division of New York State Militia, which had decreased the ability of either side to mount any serious offensives across the river. His replacement, Prentiss, found the situation no better.

The grim stalemate had set in since the climactic battle of Mount Pelion in August of the previous year. Both sides had been exhausted and stretched to the limit, and the simple truth had been that neither London nor Washington had the material to spare for such a remote front. Other than a series of inconclusive naval actions on Lake Ontario, the front lines had been stalemated for months.

It had been in February that the dispositions of the armies had changed. The destruction of railroad bridges in the Union rear had meant that, with the lake frozen Prentiss was relying on a supply route stretching back to Buffalo some 200 miles distant. The network of rails ran largely through hostile country which, even with troops from the Northwest and militia scraped up from New York, was restive against the American presence. This created an intolerable situation in the late winter that forced Prentiss to take the fateful step of ordering a retreat from his lines on the Trent River, all the way to Toronto. This retreat had caused uproar in both Washington and Albany, Stanton and Halleck sending furious messages to his headquarters demanding to know the meaning of his cession of territory. Prentiss had replied “It was my duty to this army to preserve it. Though this loss of territory is regrettable, maintaining my force as a coherent deterrent to the British army is of the utmost necessity.”

Though censured, it did not take long for most observers to agree he had been correct. Over one thousand men had been invalidated from his force between December of 1862 and February of 1863. Placing the army in the more secure Toronto, had been absolutely necessary…”

Harassment of the occupiers caused considerable infrastructure damage​

“The losses in men and material to the Canadian guerillas during the occupation were, in statistical terms, generally minor. Other than the occasional skirmish with patrols and fired wagons or stolen horses, the Canadians had done little to truly stop the American movements along the shores of Lake Ontario as far east as the Trent River. The coming of winter, and the subsequent completion of the harvest, meant that many hands which would otherwise have been engaged in business, were now idle and itching for revenge.

Although the American advance through Canada West had been, in comparison to many invading armies, rather gentle it was not without incident. Union troops had burnt the homes of those suspected or known to be serving in the militia, most famous was the destruction of Dundairn Castle, the palatial residence of Aide de Camp to the Queen Alan MacNab who had gained some infamy for the destruction of the Caroline in 1838, and many would say it was this news which spurred his November stroke in 1862. The incident which stuck out in Canadian minds however, had been the burning of Brantford. Though General Smith had taken Turchin to task for this remarkably poor decision, it had caused aroused great anger amongst the populace.

One Michigan colonel would note in a letter home “These people [Canadians] are like us in their manner. They go to the same churches, read the same prayer books and even sing the same hymns. But to them we are as foreigners. They loathe our acents[sic], despise our flag and openly wish for our ruin. Men and women turn their backs when we march by or when our trains travel through. There is a spirit of hostility wherever men in blue go, and rarely do they travel unarmed.”

York County, and Toronto in particular, were most overtly hostile. Over 4,000 men from the city and surrounding countryside had marched south, then north, fighting the invaders. Even though they had been forced to abandon the city, the regions inhabitants found ways to spite the Americans. The remaining citizens were defiant, women spitting at soldiers, merchants charging outrageous prices for goods, and in one instance Captain William “Bull” Nelson had a chamber pot dumped on his head.

The American occupation headquarters at Fort York in Stanley Barracks, always made for depressing news. Train derailments were almost daily problems, and sections of track were torn up often. “One man with a match causes more trouble than an entire Limey Division.” The commander of the occupation forces, MG John J. Jackson would complain.

Jackson himself had offered his services on the Northern frontier when war with the British broke out in February. Though he had been reluctant to serve against his fellow Virginians, he had no such qualms about fighting the British. His previous experience in the army before his resignation would come from garrison duty on the frontier and in Virginia, while when he resigned from the army in 1823 he had taken up a career in law. This made him a natural choice to work in an area fraught with potential danger and legal hurdles…

…in the winter of 1862 the garrison of Canada consisted of 29 regiments of infantry, four each from Michigan and Wisconsin and four others from across the West and Northwest and a further nine understrength regiments of New York State militia. Supported by six regiments of cavalry and batteries of artillery, this force was responsible for keeping the peace and deterring any advances by the British. Nearly 20,000 men were tied up on garrison duties, absent the 25,000 men in the field army.

Facing them were possibly as many as 2,000 irregulars. Most groups numbered less than 100 men, and many of the fighters were opportunists, ambushing patrols and stealing horses. One of the most persistent was led by Captain William D. Pollard who had previously been a company commander in the 31st Volunteer Battalion. Most of his men were stragglers from the disastrous action at Delaware Crossroads, but others were those galvanized by the invaders actions. They had carried out the action in January which had destroyed the Grand Trunk bridge across the Rogue River, which cut off Smith’s army from any resupply for near a month. Operating under the moniker “Pollard’s Rangers” they had caused unceasing headaches for the occupiers. Ambushing patrols, derailing supply and troop trains, and even making off with an entire shipment of artillery ammunition at one point.

…by March, Halleck in his headquarters at Albany had become thoroughly tired of the inability of Jackson or Smith to suppress the guerillas. He appointed one of his up and coming staffers, Phillip Sheridan, to deal with the problem.

Sheridan was a career officer. The New Yorker had in fact been born in Albany, and was familiar with many of its environs from his childhood. Enrolling at West Point in 1848, he had gained a reputation for aggressiveness which would serve him well on fields from Canada to the Great Plains. Commissioned into the 1st US Infantry, he had served out West in the Pacific Northwest, fighting the Yakima and Rogue River tribes, leading small fighting companies in intense skirmishes. When the Civil War had erupted the young officer had been scooped up by Halleck in November as the foreign crisis deepened. Quickly proving himself indispensable Halleck kept Sheridan on with his staff where he did exemplary work in the coordination of the offensives on the Niagara and across the border with Canada East.

However, ‘Little Phil’ was yearning for a combat command, and when the chance came to command a special brigade in coordination with the local garrison he leapt at the chance. His orders were to “clear the country of guerillas and bandits to ensure the operational success of our army in Canada West” and his ‘Detached Brigade’ would take to that work with aplomb.

Composed of three battalions of mounted troops, four companies of mounted artillery and two light batteries, the Brigade acted as a fire brigade, when trouble was reported, the men would pounce on a county. The mounted men would sweep through villages and towns, men with militia commissions or families with reported ties to the enemy would be swept up and hostages taken. Word would go out that if the guerillas did not surrender themselves, hostages would be executed. Almost immediately these tactics began to pay dividends, as numerous guerillas surrendered, or attacks in the areas associated with the known guerilla bands decreased with a remarkable rapidity. The only exception to this rule, were Pollard’s Rangers…

…By the start of May, with the British 3rd Corps advancing in the wake of Prentiss’s retreat, Pollard was determined to begin a general rising to try and drive the Americans off entirely. In doing so he began stirring up trouble in districts previously thought pacified. Sheridan though, prepared a trap. He took fifty hostages, and relocated them to the Short Hills region, putting them in an improvised stockade. Pollard gathered roughly two hundred men to mount a rescue operation, acting on information that the stockade was only guarded by a single company while Sheridan was supposedly reacting to an attack on blockhouses in the next county. Gathering his men for an audacious evening assault on May 9th, Pollard readied them to give another stinging defeat to the American occupation forces.

Instead, Pollard was met by four companies of infantry, and a regiment of cavalry led by Sheridan himself. In the ensuing battle, over half of Pollard’s group were killed or wounded, and another fifty captured. Pollard himself was among the dead…” – Rangers, Bushwhackers and Jayhawkers, Irregular Fighters in the Great American War, West Point, 1971

Harsh methods would be used to keep order​

“Despite some confusion in the change of command during the winter, the newly christened Third Corps of the Army of Canada was looking much forward to taking the fight to the Yankees in the spring. To our surprise though, this task was made far easier as the Yankees decided discretion was the better part of valour and had withdrawn over 100 miles backwards to Toronto, abandoning all their gains from the previous spring.

That this was the work of the noble resistance of the firm yeoman and patriots of Canada could be doubted by no man. Marching in glory from our winter camps we were much cheered throughout the country as the people had suffered from the Yankee despotism throughout the winter. No fences were left intact, and much had been requisitioned from an already hungry populace where so many men had left to take up arms against the invaders. Despite this, the women and old men turned out and cheered and gave beyond their means so that the army marching back to drive off the invader might be comforted for only a while. It was enough to drive even a stoic man to tears. One farmer mounted his roof and energetically waved the British flag as our army marched by, rejoicing as he sat once again under the protection of that same flag.

General Williams was much in evidence, handing out rations and ordering blankets donated to the local population. The infantry would often stop for a day to help collect firewood and the firm men of the British regulars endured much privation so that private lands might not be disturbed by their presence. The army baked bread and paid well for anything it took, even accepting the much inferior Yankee currency at loss on occasion.

My cavalry was much in evidence in this period. The Yankees were not totally without fight, and every other day we would skirmish with his pickets and patrols who ranged beyond his lines. Though from all reports, they had no major presence save that at the City of Toronto itself.

However, we moved as swiftly as we could, and by the middle of May, we faced the enemy on the outskirts of the city. The York Brigade was in a fierce mood upon seeing their home once again, and so when the General ordered that the Yankee works be probed, they volunteered to a man to do so. The probing actions on May 20th and 21st determined the Yankees had entrenched themselves on the Scarborough Heights, with a long line stretching to the north with its flank anchored on the River Don, and another line of works covering the city to the north and west.

My own troop, knowing the land, were instructed to scout around it and attempt to determine the depth of these lines. Here we found ourselves in a lovely little skirmish around Garding’s Mill north of the city. We chanced upon a Yankee cavalry company, perhaps equal in strength to our own. Not willing to let our reconnaissance be in vain, I ordered the charge. With sabers drawn we hurtled towards our blue counterparts, who fired wildly and engaged us in piecemeal with a great collision of horseflesh. I found myself in combat with a dashing looking Yankee captain who, though while he had a fine mount, knew little of the sword and managed to wound me but slightly while I delivered to him a great slash to the throat.

I confess, it was here I came closest to meeting my maker in the war. A Yankee trooper had drawn on me and I found myself reaching for my pistol. There was the crack of the gun and I waited for the sting of the wound and hopefully a quick end, only to see the Yankee’s horse fall and the man himself flail wildly as his mount collapsed under him. Once again I was saved by the shooting of the venerable Sergeant Charles Smith who rode to my rescue. The old regular made no comment on it, but rode on. It was yet another clue that I should revise my opinion on the cavalryman and firearms.

With information from the loyal townsfolk, we determined the Yankee line was manned but weakly, though their numbers exceeded our own with some 25,000 men in the city, while our whole force numbered a mere 19,000 who were able to face the occupier. Any attack was bound to be costly, and so we dug our own counter works, and searched for an opportunity…” Soldiering In Canada, Recollections and Experiences of Brigadier General George T. Denison III, Toronto Press

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 62: Plight of the Ironclads​

"The bravest man feels an anxiety 'circa praecordia' as he enters the battle; but he dreads disgrace yet more." - Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain, Volume 2. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1897

“Since the fight at Grand Junction in early February, Johntson had been cautiously entrenched behind his fortifications at Corinth. He did not know Grant’s intentions, and for the first time in the war he seemed at a loss for how to conduct his forces….”– On the Shores of the Mississippi: The Western Theater of the Great American War, Francis MacDougal, University of Boston, 1996

“Though the army was well entrenched at Corinth and the infantry sluggish or inert, Forrest and our cavalry were not. With 7,000 of perhaps the finest horsemen in the world under his command, Forrest was determined to make up for any loss of face the army had suffered at Grand Junction. Though General Johnson remained behind his works, he felt it necessary that the enemy should not have it all his way.

On the 4th of March he authorized Forrest to sweep out and discomfort the Federal army. It was suspected that the Federal army would use the Memphis and Louisville Railroad to aid his advance northwards, perhaps to take our recaptured forts on the Tennessee from the rear. General Forrest decided it would then be better to deny him that vital line. Riding for Paris, the division broke in two, Armstrong’s 1st Division sweeping south to distract our Federal counterparts, Wharton’s men, coming down on the town of Paris. The area was in much alarm at the prospect of a Federal advance, but Forrest was far more feared thanks to his willingness to do what needed doing when it meant destroying the enemy.

We swept southwards, scattering Federal patrols like turkeys. I dare say that the Federals would have been hard pressed to miss our intentions, but we tore up miles of track before coming into contact with the main Federal army. As predicted, they were moving along this track towards the Tennessee River. We skirmished and withdrew, leading Grant’s generally ineffective cavalry scouts on a merry chase along the line. Forrest wrote to refer to General Johnston that now would be a grand time to come and humble Grant from the flank. The mighty army and its host of infantry remained inert however, and Forrest was forced to fight on his own. We could not stand against the foe in the field and so were compelled to withdraw southwards…” I Rode With Forrest, Ephraim S. Dodd, Houston, 1899

USS Cairo in 1862​

“Grant’s goal in the early campaign season was, in line with directives from Washington, to bring Johnston’s army to battle and inflict a ‘decisive blow’ on it in order to try and staunch the Confederate forces in the West. With eastern Kentucky still in Confederate hands, and the thought of Johnston moving north to threaten Louisville fresh in the minds of all in Washington, it was thought some Federal offensive would be necessary to keep pressure on the Richmond government, and potentially draw forces away from the Virginia front…

The plan drawn up for March was to try and force Johnston to battle by threatening Nashville. Grant however desired to present a more tempting target. To that end, he convinced Foote to split the Mississippi Squadron in half taking some ships and a number of transports north, they would shoot around and threaten the Confederate forts from the river while Grant’s army would threaten them from the landward side. It was then hoped this would draw Johnston out of his entrenchments to the south…

The fortifications built up by the Confederate engineers from the end of 1862 to March of 1863 were far more formidable than those which had confronted Grant only a year previous. Fort Johnson[1] was built on to the high ground across the Tennessee River in Kentucky, and mounted newly imported Whitworth and Armstrong guns, the same as those which now adorned the reoccupied Fort Donelson. The garrison had drilled with them, and those few men who remembered the previous year, were quite determined to show off their new weapons.

As Foote’s fleet steamed into range, the guns opened up on pre-sighted targets. Foote’s small flotilla, consisting of Cairo, St. Louis, Cincinnati and Essex drove into a ‘hail of screaming metal’ one crewman on the Cincinnati would write. Foote would gamely exchange fire with the Confederate forts, running the guns. However, this was where disaster would strike. A shot from a 110pd Armstrong cannon would blast Cairo at less than 200 yards. The round shattered her bridge, sending the craft veering wildly out of control, and killing all men there, including Foote…

The Mississippi Squadron retreated north after seeing to it that Cairo sank, and hastily began trying to get word to Grant about the Battle of Fort Johnson.” – The Western Flotillas of the Great American War, Ambrose Benson, University of Louisville, 1979

Andrew H. Foote, 1806 - 1863​

“Grant would wait at the crossings of the Tennessee for Foote for five days before the news reached him of the defeat. Disgruntled, and very aware of the threat of both the reinvigorated Tennessee River Squadron and the Confederate army to his rear, Grant would remove himself to Paris Tennessee, and send his horsemen out to protect his supply lines.

Pondering the question, he realized he faced two options:

• He could abandon his line of advance into Tennessee from the interior and return to the line of the Mississippi, potentially leaving Johnston’s army in the rear or
• He could advance directly against Johnston and try to defeat him at his works.

Weighing his options, he would, after brief consultations with Washington, decide that his course was now set for Corinth Mississippi, while George Thomas would march south into Kentucky to deal with Kirby Smith and his Confederate Army of Kentucky…” – On the Shores of the Mississippi: The Western Theater of the Great American War, Francis MacDougal, University of Boston, 1996

-----

1] Named for George Washington Johnson, not the general

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 63: Grenada Run​

Come on, come on, Come on, old man, And don't be made a fool, By ev'ry one, You meet in camp, With "Mister, Here's your mule." - C. D. Benson, Nashville, 1862

“Pope had begun his march against Grenada in early March, departing at the same time as Grant had departed for the Tennessee. Taking his own three divisions southwards, he passed unopposed across the border into Mississippi where he paused at Horn Lake to send a missive to Washington “The armies of liberation have crossed into Mississippi where the home of the arch traitor Davis lies. We shall endeavor to plant the flag of Union upon its ashes so that it may never be removed.”

Continuing onwards they faced almost no opposition save from guerilla sniping and cavalry skirmishes along their path of advance. The first serious Confederate resistance came at the crossings on the Tallahatchee River. Here Tighlman had sent his leading brigade under Abraham Buford to contest the crossings. Setting his headquarters in the town of Panola, Burford put his men and guns in breastworks atop the local hill line of Nelson’s Bluff, his guns covering the waters directly in front of the town, and the rail bridge Pope would require to support his advance.

Marching to support him was the relatively weak brigade of Winfield Featherston, comprised of recently raised Mississippi troops…

Featherston​

The leading regiments of Pope’s force (BG Eleazar Paine’s 3rd Division) in Daniel Tyler’s 3rd Brigade ran into the rough positions Buford had hastily thrown up along Nelson’s Bluff. With guns covering the river crossings directly ahead of Panola and sharpshooters much in evidence along the rail crossings, Tyler’s troops settled in to skirmish with their Confederate counterparts as the remainder of the army came up.

By the morning of March 11th Paine’s division had settled in across the Tallahatchee from their opponents. A series of sharp skirmishes had been running from 6am to the time Pope and his staff arrived to assess the situation, by which time Hamilton’s division was settling in behind Paine’s division. Pope determined that the position could be carried by assault crossing below the rail bridge in conjunction with Hamilton’s division which would march a mile north to secure a crossing at Belmont. There, Pope would simply envelop the enemy force and drive them southwards. Though the bridge across at Belmont was out, Pope assigned his engineers to begin repairing it…

Fighting began in earnest at 4am on the 12th as pickets of 12th Louisiana espied the efforts to rebuild the bridge at Belmont. Supported by a battery of 4 guns from the Pointe Coupee Artillery, the disrupted early efforts to force a crossing of the river, while Hamilton rushed his own guns to oppose them. The attempted crossing at Belmont thus degenerated into an artillery duel as the engineers could not rebuild the bridge until the Confederate artillery had been driven off, and the sharpshooters proved difficult to dislodge and a skirmish became general across the ground.

At the railroad bridge, the men of Paine’s division began attempting to ford the river in small batches on rafts constructed over the preceding day at 5am. This soon came under intense musket fire from the defenders on top of the bluff. Paine’s artillery opened up now to drive to drive the defenders away, and for 15 minutes an intense cannonade bombarded the rebel positions across the river, until the order to advance was given. It was the men of the 10th Illinois who led the charge, fighting up the muddy slope, but the ground was against them as one survivor described it “men charged up only to slip right down, leaving muddy furrows in the hillside as they tripped and fell or were shot down” which blunted the first attack after an hour of fighting. Tyler’s brigade rallied again, just beneath the enemy, mainly a mix of Arkansas and Alabama extraction.

By 7am, Paine reasoned the attack could go in again, and the bugle was sounded and the men rushed up the slope once, more, initially to just as disappointing results. However, a sound minded captain in the 60th Illinois ordered his men to use their raft as a makeshift ladder, and soon they were climbing the slope and getting in amongst the defenders. The men of the 10th and 16th copied this tactic, much to the annoyance of Paine, who had to send orders to stop the use of rafts so more men could cross. But the damage had been done, and these makeshift ladders were up along the hill, with the 60th, 10th and 16th Illinois up in force alongside some of the 10th Michigan. Morgan’s brigade was soon following on rafts of their own, and hard skirmishing, some with bayonets and clubbed rifles, was erupting on the top of the hill. Though the fighting was so rough that Col. Toler of the 60th was struck down, Paine’s division held the top of the ridge so that by 10am most of Buford’s brigade was falling back, right through the green Mississippians who had only begun to arrive by 9am. These units, rather than stand and fight, began to trickle back amid confusing orders, nearly causing a general rout until Featherston managed to establish a general rearguard…

Pope would spend the next three days repairing the bridges across the river, while Paine’s men chased the retreating Confederates as far as Hope’s Depot. The army began marching again on the 16th, some sharp skirmishing erupting at Hope’s Depot, but nothing like the Battle of the Tallahatchee. Many in the army soon assumed an easy capture of Grenada…

Beauregard, at his headquarters at Grenada, after sending Featherston’s troops north had only his 1st Brigade under BG Robert Lowry largely composed of state troops, both militia and new volunteers. He had been, since the end of February and the fall of Memphis had been sending pleading and cajoling letters to Corinth trying to prompt Johnston to action. Letters to Richmond had first annoyed, and then alarmed Davis as it became clear the Federal army would be capable of mounting an offensive into Tennessee and Mississippi. He also asked that Johnston move, but Johnston would cite supply and manpower difficulties. This would strain the previously well kept relationship between friends, general and commander in chief. As Grant’s army was retreating to Paris, Davis implored Johnston to attack, but he made no move to strike Grant’s army.

At the beginning of March however, he did order Polk’s 1st Corps to move south to Grenada to help defend the Confederate position there. Polk’s forces would actually manage to move parallel to Pope’s army, moving by rail to Tupelo, and then finally overland to Coffeeville and Grenada. They would join the retreating brigades of Buford and Featherston, with two divisions moving into existing earthworks and positions across the Yalobusha River.

Pope’s corps arrived the morning of March 18th and began maneuvering to cover the town. Both armies were in relatively enviable positions. High ground was separating the two sides across the Yalobusha, allowing each side to command dominating positions along their front. However, each side was also not well place to assault one another. Beauregard though, had constructed eight major redoubts along the south bank of the river, stretching from Grenada itself and to the crossing at Graysport.

With cleared fields of fire, earthworks and now 24,000 men defending it, Beauregard felt he could hold his position securely…

Pope upon seeing the fortifications, hesitated. He still rankled from his repulse at Fort Pillow, and he was not totally unaware that Beauregard had been reinforced. The parallel march had not gone entirely unnoticed, and other than being certain that it was not Johnston’s whole army Pope could not be sure how much larger the Confederate garrison was. It was unfortunate that he now found himself slightly outnumbered by his Confederate enemies.

On the 19th, probing attacks began immediately in the early hours of the morning. Aping their success from the Tallahatchee, troops from Morgan’s brigade crossed in the early hours under cover from their artillery, but the veterans from the Army of Tennessee in Cheathan’s division were waiting for them…

The attack was a disaster leading to the loss of 400 dead, and 700 captured or wounded. Pope would ride the lines along the remainder of the 19th and 20th, and come to the unfortunate conclusion he would need more men to overwhelm the defenders at Grenada and continue south. A forlorn private would write home, 'Gone were the proud hopes, the high aspirations that swelled our bosoms a few days ago.... [The army] has strong limbs to march and meet the foe, stout arms to strike heavy blows, brave hearts to dare — but the brains, the brains! Have we no brains to use the arms and limbs and eager hearts with cunning?' …” – On the Shores of the Mississippi: The Western Theater of the Great American War, Francis MacDougal, University of Boston, 1996

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 64: A Marathon to Corinth​

“Again, in our enterprises we present the singular spectacle of daring and deliberation, each carried to its highest point, and both united in the same persons; although usually decision is the fruit of ignorance, hesitation of reflection. But the palm of courage will surely be adjudged most justly to those, who best know the difference between hardship and pleasure and yet are never tempted to shrink from danger. In generosity we are equally singular, acquiring our friends by conferring, not by receiving, favours.” – Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book II

“Grant’s failed attempts to cross the Tennessee had raised many voices in anger in Washington. The death of Commodore Foote had been grievously felt given his good service on the Mississippi, and now Grant’s “turn around” was seen as tantamount to failure. Grant however, would not be deterred. He insisted there was a firm strategy to be had, and while he retreated overland, was already looking for a way to strike at the Confederacy…

…news that Polk’s Corps, or at least a portion of it, had marched for Grenada sealed his decision. With some of the foe not defending that strategic location Grant would at once march for the ‘Crossroads of the Confederacy at Corinth.” - On the Shores of the Mississippi: The Western Theater of the Great American War, Francis McKean, University of Boston, 1996

“Even with Polk’s departure Johntson still had 46,000 men at Corinth, including a strong showing of Mississippi militia which raised that total to just under 50,000. Despite his supposed idleness at Corinth, Johnston had been far from idle in the period between his withdrawal and Grant’s advance. Having been severely disappointed before by his engineers, Johntson personally supervised the construction of works at Corinth. Slaves were drawn from plantations in Confederate hands across Mississippi and Tennessee, and they were set to work building trenches, bunkers and earthworks which would render it ‘a regular Gibralter’ in the words of one southern private.

By the end of March, Johntson’s work parties had extended a crescent of defences from College Hill in the southwest , centered on earthworks fronted by the Corona College, all the way to the hills overlooking Phillips Creek in the southeast. He had his two corps occupying those lines. Bragg’s Second Corps in the southwest as far north as the Memphis Road where the Third Corps under Hardee was in charge to the south east. For all that though, the defences from the College to Memphis road were lightly manned, only a single division of the Second Corps (Ruggles) and filled in by militia wherever practical. Bragg was forced to keep Sterling Wood’s division as the army reserve. Hardee’s two divisions manned the line to the southeast, Hindman’s at the seam where it met Ruggles, and Breckinridge running all the way to the end of the line. Here they covered as much of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and the Mobile and Ohio as practical, ensuring a constant flow of supplies.

Johntson assumed that Grant would come from the northeast towards him as he retreated from the Tennessee. He would prove fortunately correct in that assumption…” - A Mire of Blood: The Siege of Corinth, Michael Sullivan, Kansas City Press, 1999

“Grant’s advance was far from leisurely, yet it was not as rapid through the early April rains as Grant would have liked. He did not ride his men hard, but he was clearly impatient to be at Corinth.

Often riding with Sherman’s vanguard, the two men would huddle in close coordination, much to the displeasure of McClernand, who felt slighted as the rearguard. The van of Sherman’s division reached the outskirts of the Confederate lines on the 10th of April…

Grant’s army swarmed west and south, Lew Wallace’s troops moving south, Sherman to the west and McClernand’s troops moving to the furthest west to secure the rail lines towards Memphis. Though Forrest had been active in his rear, Grant meant to make as much use of those lines as possible. Nearly a week of hard skirmishing followed as Johnston aggressively sought to disrupt Grant’s preliminary position. This did not bother Grant however. “Johnston will find no surprises to make here. He has dug the grave and I mean to bury him,” Grant wrote to a concerned Dix.

Johnston however, seemed to have been largely snapped out of his lethargy by the appearance of Grant’s army on his own doorstep. Besides the entrenchments already dug, he had sited new guns, and was enthusiastic in ordering spoiling attacks on the Federal preparations. The only worry that Grant felt was that this sudden activity may prompt Johnston to retire rather than stay and fight, and he encouraged preparations with all speed. The heaviest fighting would come at the Widow Surrat’s home, which changed hands three times in the days leading up to the formal investment. After eight days of constant skirmishing, bombardment, and midnight raids back and forth along the lines, Grant’s own siege lines mirrored those of the Confederate defences.” - On the Shores of the Mississippi: The Western Theater of the Great American War, Francis McKean, University of Boston, 1996

Grant's men fought hard to discomfort the Confederate forces.​

“The problems in the siege showed themselves almost immediately. Though each line was just as long, Grant’s line was a long U shape in which his men had to march the length of it to support one another, while Johnston had merely to march within that line to bring his reserves a much shorter distance. The wet weather complicated matters as men found their rifle pits and trenches transformed into a sea of mud, and Grant’s early efforts to make attacks proved costly as they bogged down in the muck. The men of the army began to jokingly call their redoubts names like “Fort Pea Soup” or “Fort Latrine” and "The Outhouse" among other less savory names.

Matters were not helped by the nature of the environment. Alternating between warm, freezing, and dismal, lines of packed men bred disease. Sherman’s men, encamped across from Hardee’s men, was in densely wooded terrain across a great dismal swamp. He estimated that, after a week, his division had between fifteen and twenty percent of men sick.

Inside Corinth itself, it was not much better. Of the roughly 50,000 men present, ten thousand could be found on the sick lists on any given day. These matters exacerbated the siege, and caused Grant to reflect on his need to bring it to a swift and speedy conclusion…”- A Mire of Blood: The Siege of Corinth, Michael Sullivan, Kansas City Press, 1999

“The main attack Grant had settled on would come on the morning of the 3rd of May. He had spent a week in consultation with his officers, and had decided his hammer blow was going to fall on what her perceived to be the weakest part of the Confederate line. The reconnaissance had convinced him that the lines towards Memphis were more strongly manned, while those directly facing Sherman were lightly manned.

Grant’s confusion is understandable, as is his haste. A long drawn out siege would assuredly weaken both sides, but it was a lamentable intelligence failure that day…” - On the Shores of the Mississippi: The Western Theater of the Great American War, Francis McKean, University of Boston, 1996

“The attack opened early on the 3rd, the men of Thomas K. Smith’s brigade had spent a miserable night wading through the swamps while artillery thumped over their heads and sharpshooters were taking shots at the defences. They had been lucky in that while their own artillery kept the heads of the defenders down, the defenders also had declined to use flares, instead depending on the illumination of their own guns and those of the enemy to inform the duel. Behind them they had laid plank roads for their comrades to follow.

Spending a cold, fitful night just beneath the Confederate defences, they scaled the hills in the early morning and took the Confederate sentries by surprise. In a vicious series of hand to hand fights, the banners of the 89th Ohio flew on the Southern ramparts.

This had been what the attackers were waiting for, and the ranks of Sherman’s division proceeded to wind their way through the impromptu roadway which had been created for them. With a foothold already established, Sherman rushed to get his men on the earthen redoubts and storm the walls. From there they could open a great gap in the Confederate defences and hopefully decide the battle. Sherman himself was not far behind his troops with his staff observing the advance...

Unfortunately, despite the bravado of Smith’s brigade, their attack could not be missed. Even with Grant applying pressure all along the line, Johnston responded forcefully to this capture of the works. He sent the men of Wood’s division to plug the gap, while holding the offensives along the line. Grant, hoping to peg Johnston’s attention elsewhere, ordered McClerland in to distract Bragg’s men, at 8am, but as the hours ticked by, McClerland did not appear…

With three of his brigades committed, Sherman was frustrated to find that he was stalemated. He sent a rider to Grant at 9am requesting reinforcement to force the attack on, and Grant obliged, but this was where the nature of the Federal siege lines worked against him. He had to request that Hurlbut send his 4th Brigade under BG Jacob Lauman to assist Sherman, so that he might march five brigades against the enemy. Lauman’s men were formed and ready to march, but they had to march outside the line, along a greater distance that it had taken to get Wood’s Confederates to arrive. It ended up taking Lauman two hours of hard marching to reach Sherman’s position, and to Grant’s considerable consternation he found that McClerland was still only lightly skirmishing with Bragg’s troops…

...By 2pm Sherman was stalemated and intensely frustrated. Against the wishes of his staff, he rode forward from the remains of Surrat’s farm to chivy Lauman into the position he desired. His own four brigades had crossed the ground ahead, but by the time Lauman was ready, it had been torn up by shot and shell and Sherman was swearing colorfully at the unfortunate brigadier. But the torrent was cut short as a Confederate cannon blast knocked Sherman from his horse. Both Sherman and Lauman were wounded, and it was feared Sherman mortally…” - A Mire of Blood: The Siege of Corinth, Michael Sullivan, Kansas City Press, 1999

“The news reached Grant an hour after Sherman had been rushed to hospital behind the lines. Grant, seeing that his attacks were doing no good this day, called them off and after ensuring his orders were followed, rushed to see to his wounded general.

Despite the best efforts of his surgeons, Sherman would die from his wounds that evening at 7pm…

In the aftermath of the attacks, Grant declined an offer from Johnston to allow a truce to recover the wounded. Grant was determined to make a go of it again on the morning of the 4th, and true to form he did. His men advanced over the bodies of comrades wounded or trapped against the defences of Corinth the next day. However, the attacks again petered out, and Grant at last accepted a truce for the dead and wounded to be collected...

The attacks of May 3rd and 4th had cost Grant some 4,000 men dead, wounded and captured, in exchange for only 1,900 Confederates. Worse, as Grant would later write to his wife Julia “In Sherman I have lost more than a friend, I have lost my right arm.”...

On the 5th Grant reorganized his forces. McClelarland was sacked for ‘failing to perform in the face of the enemy’ and replaced with the more energetic Lauman, while Sherman’s old division was to be reformed under what had been intended to be the temporary command of Smith, but events in the east stalled Grant’s request for a replacement…” - On the Shores of the Mississippi: The Western Theater of the Great American War, Francis McKean, University of Boston, 1996

William T. Sherman, 1820 - 1863

-x-x-x-x- ​

"Having left two divisions behind, Thomas was apprehensive about his advance, but enthusiastic regarding his ability to threaten Frankfort. Despite urgent messages from the War Department, Smith constantly flitting about his headquarters in Louisville, Thomas would spend all of March and April organizing his forces. Fiery messages from Stanton could not move him, and Smith’s subdued prodding similarly had little effect. However, when Thomas did move, he moved with irresistible resolve on May 2nd.

Alexander McCook’s division led the way, with a strong cavalry division under William Sanders, wreaking havoc with the Confederate front. Kirby Smith and Johnston had both been dismissive of the Federal capabilities with cavalry, and so the organization of a formal division, both while the best Confederate cavalry was far away in western Tennessee and their own spread out as picketts and garrisons, the sudden swarm of Federal riders came as quite a shock to the Confederate troops defending eastern Kentucky.

Sanders was able to wreak havoc with Confederate communications, and captured numerous small garrisons, with his most successful action being the capture of the entire Confederate garrison at Long Run with all their supplies and munitions…

William Sanders would become the most successful Federal cavalryman of 1863​

McCook’s Regular Brigade, under Lt. Col. Shepherd, were the first to attack the outer line of the Confederate defences at Frankfort on May 7th. These probing attacks firmly fixed Smith’s attention in place, causing him to scramble to bring Cleburne’s division up from its positions along the Salt River to reinforce Churchill’s division at Frankfort, convinced that Thomas intended to besiege the state capital and end the legal authority he claimed over Kentucky. While McCook’s men made a great show of preparing to attack the city, Thomas instead crossed the Salt River.

Driving off the now undermanned and disorganized Confederate garrisons, Thomas proceeded to capture the all important crossroads at Bardstown where he had earned his fame the year previous. From there he sent Sanders cavalry out in all directions, raising up uproar. They raided as far south as Munfordsville, before speeding to the east in Harrodstown. Finally his raiders would travel north and east to threaten Lexington, prompting Smith to beg for the recall of cavalry from the west in Mississippi and Tennessee, as his own were only then reforming at Frankfort.

Sanders raiders vanished as promptly as they had appeared however, and Thomas himself was setting up his headquarters in Danville, well south of Smith’s position by the 21st of May. Determined to drive off the Federals to his front, Smith moved to attack his tormentors, but they too vanished, McCook’s division marching south and west to link with Thomas.

Reasoning he had a chance to attack Thomas in strength before he could link with McCook’s full force, Smith marched with Cleburne and two of Churchill’s brigades southwards to attack Thomas at Danville.

McCook however, easily outpaced Smith, and by the time the Confederate force had arrived, Thomas’s two divisions had formed up to await him on the outskirts of town. Smith, eager as ever, ordered his men in. Thomas, who was prepared for just such an attack weathered the first assault well, with the Regulars providing the best showing that day, standing off two separate attacks by Liddle’s larger brigade, and forcing Cleburne to commit heavily to the right flank they anchored. Crittenden’s troops were hard pressed, and Crittenden himself suffered a grievous wound partway through the fighting....

By midday the Confederate force was spent, and Thomas judged now was the time to counterattack...

...Cleburne’s rearguard action prevented a total rout, but Smith found himself falling back towards Frankfort, with the looming knowledge that Thomas meant to cut him off at the Cumberland Gap, and prevent him from reinforcing from East Tennessee, which would put his units in western Tennessee in jeopardy.

Once again however, as quickly as Thomas appeared, he was retreating. By June his forces had withdrawn back to their positions near Bardstown, and the cavalry was harassing the Confederate forces south and east. Smith was completely baffled, but when Kentucky finally received the news of the Siege of Washington, he understood…” To Arms!: The Great American War, Sheldon Foote, University of Boston 1999.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 65: Rivers Run Red​

“The word given, the horsemen start in a body, loading and firing on horseback, and leaving the dead animals to be identified after the run is over. The kind of horse used is called a "buffalo runner," and is very valuable. A good one will cost from 50 to 70 pounds sterling. The sagacity of the animal is chiefly shewn in bringing his rider alongside the retreating buffalo, and in avoiding the numerous pitfalls abounding on the prairie. The most treacherous of the latter are the badger holes. Considering the bold nature of the sport, remarkably few accidents occur. The hunters enter the herd with their mouths full of bullets. A handful of gunpowder is let fall from their "powder horns," a bullet is dropped from the mouth into the muzzle, a tap with the butt end of the firelock on the saddle causes the salivated bullet to adhere to the powder during the second necessary to depress the barrel, when the discharge is instantly effected without bringing the gun to the shoulder.” - Red River, Joseph J. Hargrave, Montreal, 1871

“The territory known as Rupert’s Land, stretching from the base of the Rocky Mountains in the West to the shores of Rainy Lake and the westernmost extent of Canada West was first incorporated under the control of the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1670 by King Charles II to his Cousin Prince Rupert of the Rhine after which the territory was named. It was decreed that the “sole Trade and Commerce of all those Seas, Streights, Bays, Rivers, Lakes, Creeks, and Sounds, in whatsoever Latitude they shall be, that lie within the entrance of the Streights commonly called Hudson's Streights, together with all the Lands, Countries and Territories, upon the Coasts and Confines of the Seas, Streights, Bays, Lakes, Rivers, Creeks and Sounds, aforesaid, which are not now actually possessed by any of our Subjects, or by the Subjects of any other Christian Prince or State” and “that the said Land be from henceforth reckoned and reputed as one of our Plantations or Colonies in America, called Rupert's Land.”

Under the Company charter the lands were exploited for centuries for their rich furs, with a tenuous route existing to the remainder of British colonies through the seas at York Factory on the Hudson Bay and then overland past the Lake of the Woods along the shores of Lake Superior. For two centuries the Company would provide charter to European traders working for the company at a series of expanding factories and forts across the interior. These brave travellers were often along in the wilds of the continental interior for years or even decades at a time, which led to a certain amount of intermarriage between the Europeans and the Aboriginal peoples of the prairies, the most notable example of these, being the Métis people…” - From Selkirk to Hesperia: The History of the Red River Settlement, Samuel J. Sullivan, Wolseley, 1992

Rupert's Land and British territories in North America circa 1862​

“The Métis Nation has its foundations in the European fur trade of the late 1600s, with the Métis emerging as a distinct group within the prairies in the 1700s by tradition. These at first were largely intermarriages between Frenchmen and the women of Aboriginal peoples such as the Ojibwe, Creeks, or Saulteaux. The unions were fruitful for both parties as the Europeans brought trade, firearms, and access to the wider world in return for furs, pemmican and shelter. With this came the greater understanding of the Aboriginal languages and peoples for the Hudson’s Bay Company, though the Company did not always trust them…

...the English speaking Métis were a minority until much later in the times of the fur trade, and it was not until larger groups of Anglo-Scotch settlers began to appear around the Upper Red River Valley in the 1800s…” - The Northwest Is Our Mother: The Métis Nation, Jean Tache, Fort Garry Press, 2011

“The Red River Colony, or the Selkirk Colony, had been founded in 1811 under the guidance of Lord Selkirk, that wild and fiery leader of the Hudson’s Bay Company. He had initially intended it as a way to provide for the poor and dispossessed in his native Scotland, but mismanagement and a lack of preparation meant that the early settlers faced an uphill fight… The early settlement of the Red River region was marked by a long series of crises and ecological disasters and within the first decade of settling the region it had already suffered warfare, epidemics, prairie fires and a major flood…

By the 1820s, with the end of the Pemmican War and the forced merger of the Northwest Company with the Hudson’s Bay Company the colony began to rise to prominence. Stable crop yields of wheat began to flourish and by 1830 there were over 1,000 settlers… at this time the site became a natural meeting ground for the Métis people. The first annual buffalo hunts began at the Red River settlement in 1820, setting a tradition which would continue for over half a century…” - From Selkirk to Hesperia: The History of the Red River Settlement, Samuel J. Sullivan, Wolseley, 1992

“By the 1840s the Métis nation was becoming increasingly fed up with Company rule. For centuries there had been no centralized law and order, with courts only organized on an ad hoc basis. However, the desire of the Company to control the fur trade and all economic activity within the Red River Colony and its factories and forts within Rupert’s Land, let the company to attempt to apply an increasingly heavy hand. They would even call for reinforcements form the British Army in 1846 with three companies of the 6th Regiment of Foot staying at the fort before departing 1848.

Their departure though allowed the Métis to begin expressing their discontent with the Company monopoly. Smuggling became endemic, and the company chose to crack down…

...in 1849 Pierre-Guillaume Sayer and three other Métis in the Red River Colony were arrested by company men brought to trial in May at the General Quarterly Court of Assiniboia. They had been caught with furs not checked with Company clerks and were so brought up on charges of violating the Hudson's Bay Company's charter by illegally trafficking furs.

The arrest caused outrage, a prominent hunter and speaker among them, Jean-Louis Riel, stood and announced the arrest and gathered a crowd and the bells were rung in St. Joseph and hundreds of Métis crossed the water to surround the courthouse. They placed Riel at their head, and he led them in demanding a fair trial. Soon four hundred armed Métis surrounded the court, and the prosecutors had to physically push their way inside. The presence of a few hundred armed members of the nation certainly intimidated the judge and jury and after a brief trial, the court found Sayer guilty, but came back with a recommendation of mercy and Sayer was free to go. He came out carried on Riel’s shoulders, and cries of "le commerce est libre" greeted them. Riel was celebrated as a hero for standing up to the Company. To the HBC’s dismay, the outcome was that they would have to meet the free traders on equal terms instead of with threats of legal action. It cannot be doubted that watching his father in the crowd that day, Riel’s son was inspired…

By 1856 the Colony was changing. The Red River settlement had grown to 6,523 people…

These newcomers were different. Largely from Protestant Canada West, these settlers were predominantly interested in absorbing the Red River, and all of Rupert’s Land into Canada…” - The Northwest Is Our Mother: The Métis Nation, Jean Tache, Fort Garry Press, 2011

Jean-Louis Riel​

“By 1861, the population of the Red River Colony had grown to 10,000, approximately half of them being of French/Métis descent. The newcomers though were largely British descended Protestants, and they had a very firm ‘Canadian attitude’ which meant they owed their allegiance to cities like Montreal and Toronto rather than to the Colony as a whole. The two most prominent men were Henry McKenney and his half-brother John Schultz[1] had come to the colony and soon had formed a "Canadian Party" which partnered with William Coldwell and William Buckingham who established the first newspaper of the settlement, the Nor'Wester.

It was the existence of this newspaper, circulated not only in the colony at Red River but in Canada as well, that ensured the influence of the Canadian Party on subsequent events in the Colony. It took it’s stance from George Brown’s Toronto Globe. "The North-West must and shall be ours," he vigorously proclaimed. It is no surprise then that the Nor'Wester also urged annexation to Canada and that it ran frequent excerpts from the pages of the Globe dealing with the future of Rupert's Land. The Nor'Wester was really nothing more than an eager offshoot of George Brown's paper. What is interesting to note is that both Coldwell and Buckingham had been employees of the Globe before they moved West.

Contrasting this was a smaller, but just as vocal, “American Party” led by the German-American George Emmerling set up a hotel in the colony, and his establishment became the rallying point for this group. Linked by the waterways and cart roads to St. Paul, this group was intimately entangled with the Minnesota merchants.

Both groups hated the charter of the Hudson’s Bay Company with a rabid passion and found any excuse to agitate against it. This was about the only issue which united them. The “American Party” called for the swift annexation of the territory into the United States. The “Canadian Party” demanded that the settlers be given more self rule as a part of Canada, or that the Red River become a Crown Colony. It was the increasingly strident demands of these groups which, ironically, pushed the third faction, the Métis, into supporting the company.

The fur trade was part of their life blood, and the company made no efforts to interfere with the annual buffalo hunt. The Métis though, were legally, by both the American and Canadian definition, squatters. They feared that any change in government would dispossess them of their land and drive them to the periphery. Any change from the easy status quo was a threat to their way of life and so they, against all expectations, began to back company rule.

The three groups faced off against one another, and matters would come to a head far sooner, and later, than many anticipated.

Into this mix was thrown the new governor of Red River and Assiniboia, the Scottish born William Mactavish. Having joined the Company in 1833, he had worked tirelessly to uphold its business values, and swiftly impressed his bosses. He was rewarded constantly with promotions and in 1858 was promoted to the lead the area. A thoroughly trained and efficient business administrator. The qualities of “mental calibre,” “energy,” and “determination” as well as “executive ability” were all observed in the well mannered Scotsman. Tall, sandy-haired, he was known for having a well modulated voice and manner which served him well in many negotiations. He managed to ride a smooth transition over the fractious parties in the Colony, and smoothed ruffled feathers, and courted the Métis. However, he would later admit that he would far rather have “served as a stoker in hell” than run the Colony… he faced flood in 1860, and famine in 1862...

When the American Civil War had broken out, as the only newspaper, the Nor’Wester had initially been pro-Union. But, as with most newspapers in British North America, when word of the Trent affair had trickled overland it had roundly denounced the Union actions. John Schultz was vocal in his desire to form a Volunteer company to defend the frontier, and indeed he did manage to raise a single company of 100 men who vowed to defend their homes.

There was anxiety amongst the whole settled population as the only real British presence, a detachment of the Royal Canadian Rifles under the command of Major George Seaton, had marched overland back to Canada West in October 1861. Originally sent in 1857 as a response to the border crisis in Oregon and the march of an American column to Pembina[2]. Arriving there Seaton correctly deduced that his men were intended to enforce the company law. Instead he barracked them at the fort and allowed them to treat the whole event like an extended vacation, considering his mandate to be the defence of the frontier if necessary, and to support the governor in enforcing law and order and nothing more.

Once they had left Mactavish was very disappointed to see them go. However, it was far too late to get them back, and they were ultimately folded into the unsuccessful defence of the western portion of Canada West in spring 1862. Mactavish then began casting about for men to help defend the colony. Though he hated working with the Canadian Party, they were most eager to express their willingness, and by the spring of 1862 he had roughly 300 men armed and stationed at Upper and Lower Fort Garry. As a precaution he had ordered the two steamboats on the Red River, both owned by the Company, the US built Anson Northrup and the newly built International brought upriver as a potential riverborne defence.

Thankfully the remoteness of the ‘British’ settlement there, a lack of American resources in the West, and the outbreak of the Dakota War, meant that they were left alone for the first year of the war…” - From Selkirk to Hesperia: The History of the Red River Settlement, Samuel J. Sullivan, Wolseley, 1992

William Mactavish​

“...the plans for the Red River Expedition, far from being a brainchild of the cautious Buell, can be said to have emerged in the hotels and offices of St. Paul. That there was some small political and strategic advantage in an expedition northwards cannot be denied, but it is also undeniable that there was vocal support from St. Paul merchants for the outright annexation of that territory which had existed even before the war.

One of the ringleaders was James Wickes Taylor, a special agent of the Treasury Department who had dealt extensively with business from the Hudson’s Bay Company, and since 1859 he had advocated for the peaceful annexation of the colony, but was prepared to demand the use of force. In this he had the ear of two important figures. The first was Col. Henry Hastings Sibley, the former first governor of Minnesota and now the hero of the late Dakota War where he had brutally put down the Dakota uprising. The second was the new Governor, Alexander Ramsey. All three men were staunch Unionists, Ramsey being credited as the first governor to put forward the aid of his state to the Federal government, and so the proposed expedition meshed with their political, military and territorial ambitions.

Buell took little convincing, as he desired a victory which would allow him to be reinstated in the east nearer the main theater of the war. With Taylor sending back impassioned pleas to the Treasury Department, and then Ramsey’s departure to serve as a senator in Washington in March 1863, his own direct conversations with the President and the War Department, permission was not long in coming. They all allowed Buell to lay out the plan as his own idea, but nothing could have been further from the truth. Buell’s ignorance of the area, coupled with the far greater understanding in the region, made the plan one put forward directly by Taylor and Sibley. Taylor himself expressed that ‘In this present war there is no question that Minnesota alone could hold, occupy, and possess the entire Red River to Lake Winnipeg,’ which set plans in motion…” - The Red River Expedition, Maxwell Fischer, Friedrichsburg State College, 1969

From left to right, Taylor, Sibley and Ramsey​

“The aftermath of the Dakota Uprising in the Red River Colony had caused something of a shock for the settlers, the follow on campaigns in 1863 had sent over six hundred starving and hunted Sioux fleeing across the Medicine Line. This further alarmed the Métis, who became worried at the thought of a general invasion. Even after the Battle of Grand Coteau fighting between Métis and Sioux remained common.

News that the border was being closed, and that anyone with British extraction was being considered ‘hostile’ by American troops also caused genuine alarm. In June 1863, most Metis in the Red River had gathered at Lower Fort Garry to prepare for the annual buffalo hunt. There though, they had to consider matters of momentous import.

In the normal course of a year the great hunts involved upwards of 1,300 people, largely the unsettled Métis or those from outside St. Joseph. However, fear and unrest had brought in 2,000 men, women and children to discuss the war, some from as far west as the Saskatchewan River. The question of the day to be determined was whether or not the Métis had a part to play in the war. The gathered assembly elected Louis Riel, the hero of Sayer Trial, to preside over them in the matter.

The debate was joined for several days, as the intentions of the American government were mooted back and forth, the families from south of the imaginary border line offered their own opinion. Many of the nation worked as cartmen and drovers to earn extra income for their families, and their need to cross the border to hunt the buffalo was considered sacrosanct. Wild rumours that they would be killed or have their land confiscated were thrown around, but Riel was able to calm the people.

In the end he put forward two questions to the assembly:

1. Did the American Government offer the Métis people anything they did not already have?
2. Would the replacement of the Hudson’s Bay Company by the American Government benefit the Métis people?

The answer to the first question was a resounding no. While the people of the nation did not particularly care for the HBC men who ran the colony, Mactavish had proven generally popular with the Métis and had obvious sympathies towards them and refused to exercise political authority over them when called upon by the lii Canadas in the settlement. His lax attitudes, good relations, and respect for their institutions had earned their trust.

By contrast, the Americans, much like the Canadian settlers, largely saw the Métis as barely civilized ‘half-breeds’ who would have to give up their way of life sooner or later. Though the Métis people appreciated American democratic institutions, they were not eager to trade a largely indifferent and ineffectual government 4,000 miles away in London for a more present and more obviously brutal one in Washington. Though there had been some talk of simply letting the soldiers cross the border to pursue the Sioux, the question was raised on how they might get them to leave afterwards…” - The Northwest Is Our Mother: The Métis Nation, Jean Tache, Fort Garry Press, 2011

“It was the Assembly of 1863 which brought the question of war before Mactavish. With the pitiful resources at his disposal, he had only the small number of Volunteers and company staff at his disposal. Being intimately familiar with the organization and discipline of the Métis people, he would make the fateful approach…

The meeting which took place in Fort Garry remains to this day a subject of vicious debate between historians and the people of the province. As few present were left to witness the agreement made in the aftermath (and many would say Macdonald went to great lengths to hide any evidence of it) the exact terms of the agreement are unknown, and after the events of 1870 will likely remain forever shrouded in controversy…

What can be firmly established is this, Mactavish approached the Assembly and asked if it would be in the power of the Métis people to help defend the colony. Riel confirmed that this was true, and in line with general Métis sentiment. However, what the Métis wanted was a stake in the running of the settlement in return. In exchange, they proposed that the land title of all Metis in the settlement, or the area around it, be recognized. Mactavish would later say he only approved of the first condition, and happily granted them a say in running the settlement…” - From Selkirk to Hesperia: The History of the Red River Settlement, Samuel J. Sullivan, Wolseley, 1992

“When Mactavish approached the Assembly, he practically begged the leaders there for their aid in defending the Settlement. Seeing that this was a matter involving all of the peoples of the Red River, the Métis agreed, but only if their conditions were met. Riel laid out that they would accept this responsibility on the condition that the land title of the Metis be respected, and that they get a say in running the Red River settlement alongside the Church. Mactavish eagerly agreed to these points, and the agreement was witnessed and signed in late June of 1863…” - The Northwest Is Our Mother: The Métis Nation, Jean Tache, Fort Garry Press, 2011

“The proposed expedition against the Red River, owing to the paucity of American resources, had to wait until later in 1863. Firstly because Sibley was required to use his Minnesota troops to further campaign against the Sioux in the Dakota Territory, driving them off at Big Mound and Stoney Lake. From there he had to leave men to garrison the forts, and then form another group to invade.

He settled on a modest invasion force. He gathered his veteran troops, the 7th Minnesota under Col. Stephen Miller, who had fought in the recent Dakota War and in the July ‘63 campaign in Dakota. They were joined by the new 9th Minnesota under Col. Alexander Wilkin, a newly raised force but comprised of reliable men. Finally he had four companies of cavalry freshly raised under Edward Hatch. He was though, forced to beg a battery of artillery from Regulars, and Buell granted him the use of Battery F, 2nd US Artillery under Lt. John Darling.

All told, with the infantry, cavalry, artillery and teamsters and guides, Sibley had put together a scratch force of just under 1,500 men.

The plan was to assemble the ‘Red River Column’ at Pembina, alongside the supplies and wagons necessary for the effort. There the men would set out along the well used cart roads which led right to the Red River Colony. They would, as necessary, besiege and capture Upper and Lower Fort Garry, and set American control over the area between the Lake of the Woods, Lake Winnipeg and the Saskatchewan River. It was assumed that the presence of 1,500 American troops would simply overawe the locals. With a ‘settled’ population of barely 10,000 and then mostly half-breeds, resistance was not expected to be fierce.

The campaign of course had to wait until later in the year. He had the 9th garrison Fort Snelling, drilling alongside Hatch’s cavalry, whose first company was dispatched to watch Pembina…

The Canadians and Métis had not been idle either. In July the Métis had appointed Jean-Louis Riel as their principle chief. In exchange he had appointed seven smaller chiefs of 100 men below him in accordance with Métis hunting discipline. Names like Gabriel Dumont and Ambroise-Dydime Lépine were selected, as all the captains were expected to be firm leaders and good hunters. He had roughly 700 men under his command. He dispatched them as normal on a buffalo hunt. This served two purposes, it allowed them in July and August to conduct the annual Buffalo hunt, bringing in food for themselves and their families, and it allowed them to scout the American forces.

Sibley simply did not have enough men to track the 1,400 Métis men and women who fanned out in search of buffalo. They talked with family and friends south of the 49th parallel, observed the comings and goings in Pembina, and surrounded it to the degree that the commander of the detachment there stated he was under siege. However, they did not attack, and merely waited. The hunt continued into August…

By September Sibley had arrived with his full force. Attempts to recruit local Métis as guides and settlers failed, as none would take up arms against their extended families and their people. Instead he recruited local traders and hunters to act as his guides and collected a long baggage train of carts and a herd of cattle. His hopes of chartering a steam boat from St. Paul were dashed by the need for one to be dismantled and carried overland, which he did not have time for. Instead, on September 7th, 1863, he prepared to march.

However, on the night of the 6th, he had been approached by a delegation of Métis. Led by Riel himself, they informed Sibley that by crossing the frontier he would be committing an unfriendly act against the Métis nation. Having little patience for ‘damned half-breeds’ he rebuffed them and informed them that any violence against his column would be seen as an act of war, and a state of war would exist between the United States and the Métis. Riel tried to convince them to not cross the border, but Sibley threatened their arrest and Riel and his party departed.

The expedition set out to cover the 71 miles between Pembina and Fort Garry on the 7th. It was 71 miles of hills, coulees, river beds, and prairie which the Métis knew intimately. After a modest march of six miles through wild and hilly country, they made camp for the night. That night, a group of Métis under Dumont, snuck in and killed two guards before stampeding the cattle. There was much confusion, loss of horses, and destruction of property before the situation was under control, and before the night was out the Métis had killed five more men before galloping off for the loss of none of their own.

Sibley ordered Hatch’s cavalry to the flanks, and constant skirmish was the result. By the second day the column had only moved eight nine miles and lost fifteen men dead or wounded. They arrived at the Letellier Coule and prepared to camp. That night they were left alone, but in the morning a skirmish broke out. 300 Metis had dug rifle pits, and used their carts as cover, along the hills of the coulee. They opened a murderous fire on the American camp, killing horses, men, and teamsters. By the time Lt. Darling had unlimbered his guns the Métis were gone. Sibley issued orders that the column would stand to every morning…

Another week of murderous skirmishing would follow, men lost in small pointless skirmishes. The Métis ambushing them from cover. Whenever the men would form a skirmish line to engage the Métis would fight them for a time, but then simply fall back. The guns brought forward were used ineffectually to blast after their assailants…

Finally the column reached the point of no return. Having left over one hundred dead and wounded behind them, as well as two companies to garrison points on the river to hopefully bring supplies forward later, the column had shrunk to just under 1,200 men. They reached the last natural obstacle to their advance on Fort Garry, the River Sale. Finally reaching the parishes of the major Métis settlements. Along the way the soldiers had stopped to revenge themselves on Métis farmsteads. They never found any Métis but looted and burnt to soothe their frustrations.

It was here though, that Riel and his chiefs had planned their last ditch stand. He had gathered all 700 of his men here, and would mount a do or die defence. Like at the Battle of Grand Coteau in 1858, the Métis would dig rifle pits and use their own carts as cover. But they laid a clever trap and had a secret weapon. They placed some of their men in the open, hoping to look like settler Volunteers guarding the fords across the river. Sibley however, smelled a rat and opted to bombard the apparent settlers, which caused them to run. Sibley then ordered the veteran 7th to shake into a skirmish line and advance under the cover of guns to the river.

The Métis, though startled by the barrage, stayed in their rifle pits and picked off the advancing men with well placed shots. Before the 7th had reached the fords, they had fallen to murderous fire. They fell back, and tried again. On the third attack Sibley brought his entire force, and dismounted a company of cavalry and they attempted a charge. Though under shot and shell, the Métis had their priests go behind them carrying crosses, giving comfort and absolution to their wounded. Any men who might have fled were met by their wives who were with the main wagons and shamed into returning…

In the subsequent charge Sibley was wounded, and Col. Miller was killed...

That was when the secret weapon appeared.

Mactavish had been persuaded by Schultz that the two steamers under Company control could be armed and used to harass the Americans on the river. Mactavish had agreed, and four guns had been dismounted from Lower Fort Garry and mounted two each on the Anson Northrup and the International. Schultz, fancying himself a war hero, led the effort and stood on the bridge of the Northrup to guide her to battle. Unfortunately, his lack of experience and the low water level meant all he managed to do was guide the Northrup to the banks of the Red River and ground her[3]. In the end only the International would appear at the head of the river and ineffectually cast shot at the Americans.

Her appearance though, broke the American ranks. They withdrew, any sense of safety shattered.... They were harassed by Riel’s men until they returned to Pembina on September 29th…

...The American column, flush from its victory over the poorly armed Sioux, had assumed that fighting the ‘half breeds’ would present no great challenge. Their lack of respect for the foe or general knowledge of the terrain made the outcome almost inevitable. Including dead, wounded, sick and deserters the American force suffered some 537 losses before returning to American territory. The Métis losses were estimated at just over 100 dead and wounded, most of those killed at the Battle of the River Sale...

In lessons which should have been learned in 1863, the American Army would instead have to go on to learn the lessons all over again against Red Cloud, Crazy Horse, and Lone Wolf…”- The Red River Expedition, Maxwell Fischer, Friedrichsburg State College, 1969

-----

1] He will feature prominently once we move on in the story though, I can say that much!

2] Ironically this very march was led by none other than Charles F. Smith who ITTL commanded the invasion of Canada West!

3] In truth she actually grounded over the winter of 1861-62 OTL, but I couldn’t resist ending the first steamboat on the Red River like this!

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 66: The Gates of Heaven​

“Now I hate to tell such a plain truth, but I must -- the bulk of San Francisco's liberality seems sometimes actuated by a love of applause. She don't always take kindly to a good deed for a good deed's sake, but pat her on the head, and flatter her, and say Bully, bully, bully, is the great Metropolis of the Pacific, and she will break her neck trying to accomplish that good deed. You get Dr. Bellows to glorify her princely liberality in ten telegraphic sentences, at forty cents a word, and down they come with $20,000 for the Sanitary Fund! They always respond when 'Glory' calls but they are sometimes slow to respond when they are not going to be applauded.” - Mark Twain, The Dramatic Chronicle, January 16th 1866

"GOD OUR COUNTRY AND LIBERTY. TYRANTS OFFEND THEM" - Flown from the mizzenmast of the USS Essex at the Battle of Valparaíso.

“Since the British landing at Olympia in summer 1862, the war on the Pacific had taken on aspects of a stalemate. Too remote for the Americans to consider retaking, and unable to counter the British power at sea, the war had settled down into a familiar pattern of blockade across the winter of 1862-63, punctuated by the occasional brief skirmish in the woods of the Washington Territory between the opposing pickets.. The Americans, largely content behind their fortifications at San Francisco, while also skirmishing with the Apache, Paiute, and other hostile bands in the south and west, were under no illusions about sortieing out and fighting the British on slopes of the Pacific Northwest

Wright, satisfied he could hold his position and that there was no British army waiting to pounce on San Francisco, would send telegraphs to Washington assuring them that all was well. He would request more supplies, but in return would only receive the news that there was none to send…

In London, there had been discussion of what to do about that Pacific slope. Douglas’s plan of seizing Olympia and points overland had contained merit. However, it was seen as something of a distraction for an entire battalion of infantry. Somerset had been vocal in arguing that the Navy alone could have defended British Columbia, and some in the War Cabinet were inclined to agree with him. With emerging problems with the lords of Japan and the simmering unrest in New Zealand, it might have been argued that the dispatch of British troops on an overseas expedition was a waste of men and material.

The war with America though, took precedence over all other considerations. That San Francisco was the only major port and entrepot on the Pacific Coast (and more importantly, the most advanced anchorage north of Callao) made it a valuable target. Palmerston’s demand for an expanded war merely added incentive for the planners in London to at least consider a strike against it. As much for the benefit of the fleet and another piece at the negotiating table as anything else.

With the seeming inaction and incapability of the American navy after the occupation of Olympia, the British decided that it was high time to do something…” To Arms!: The Great American War, Sheldon Foote, University of Boston 1999.

“For their part the Americans were faced with a number of immediate problems. The terrible flooding over the winter of 1861-62 had bankrupt the state of California with the government unable to pay its own employees, let alone spare funds for emergency spending on defence. There was also the matter of the gold so desperately needed for the war effort; unable to be shipped overseas it now had to be shipped overland and it would be necessary to furbish volunteers to guard these convoys. There was also a conflict between state and federal government over the matter of paying both volunteers and civilian contractors. The common means of exchange had been the use of specie in the economy, but the Federal Government had suspended the use of specie in transactions and civilian contractors refused to take paper money, of which there was precious little to spare in the state to begin with. Announcements that the Army could only pay in government notes had led to walk offs on the construction of batteries and fortifications, so in the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of war precious little work was done on the defences.

Wright correctly assumed that any attack on the Pacific slope would be, by necessity, aimed at San Francisco. With the Mare Island Navy Yard, the Benicia Arsenal, and the gold reserves, it was a natural target. To defend the city four companies of the 9th Infantry Regiment were moved from the North West overland to San Francisco, with some companies of local volunteers replacing them. In San Francisco the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th regiments of California Volunteers were concentrated, while the 4th Regiment was posted along the frontier at Fort Yuma. Two further regiments (the 6th and 7th) were being trained and organized through the spring.

Wright for his part was optimistic writing “The General Government has but a small amount of funds at present available for defensive works on this coast, but I apprehend no embarrassment on this account, not for a moment doubting that the loyal and Union-loving people of California will most cheerfully respond to any call which may be made on them, whether for money or men to defend their State from foes without or traitors within.” And this seemed to be true. Governor Leland Stanford’s call for men had produced over 2,000 men under arms to augment the Federal forces in the region, the other governors followed suit and throughout the spring Wright was able to move over 3,000 men to San Francisco. He realized that “In case of war with a maritime nation, the immediate attention of the enemy would most certainly be directed to this city, the great entrepot of our possessions on the Pacific coast.” and as such directed his efforts to the protection of the city. By July he had gathered some 5,000 regulars and militia in entrenchments around the city. Batteries were established at Lime Point and Raccoon Straight, with supporting batteries at Angel and Yerba Buena islands and at Point San Jose. These combined with the guns at Fort Point and Alcatraz brought the total number of guns to 154, covering in basic necessity all the methods of entry through the Golden Gate.

However, these defences were not quite as solid as their builders might have hoped. Training with the 8inch Columbiads on Alcatraz had to be suspended when one exploded seriously damaging a second gun in the process as the artillery commander there, Major Henry S. Burton, feared his guns might be further damaged by repeated firing. Fort Points guns were not all mounted and the supporting earthworks turned out to be the primary supporting batteries as the emplacements to mount guns on the fort itself were not yet complete. The state of the defences were so poor by June that Bell gloomily wrote “The British have amassed a substantial squadron based out of Esquimalt and the French are steadily strengthening their presence off the Mexican Pacific shore. In the present state of the defences of this harbor one half of this force could command the city of San Francisco, and take possession of this yard.”

Bell though, despite his pessimism, he was not lethargic in attempting to expand his force. The great channel of the Golden Gate could not be closed by booms and chains, or blocked by torpedoes, but it could be contested by a dedicated squadron. He had, by December 1862, put together a not unrespectable force. Though the warship Narragansett had been lost in the opening months of the war to a skirmish, he had collected the warships Lancaster(22), Wyoming(6), and Saranac(9) at the harbor alongside the old coastal gunboat Schubrick and Active with two guns each. Then, at not inconsiderable cost, also outfitted the steamships Moses Taylor(4), St. Louis(5), and Hermann(5) as extemporized warships. They had, between them, cost the government upwards of 400,000$ to purchase outright and improve, largely by raiding guns from the old sailing warships Cyane and St. Mary’s for weapons. He had also taken the old hulk of the USS Independence, and fitted her out as a floating battery alongside a pair of other old hulks. Her sisters Warren and Decauter had been deemed incapable of mounting heavy guns however...

...Stuck in the waters of the Bay as they were, Bell was not eager to come to grips with his Royal Navy antagonists. Throughout 1862-63 he largely kept to his waters, and merely responded to British ships coming in close…” - The World on Fire: The Third Anlgo-American War, Ashley Grimes, 2009, Random House Publishing

“Arguments for a scaled up raid were made, largely by Newcastle and the Colonial Office, but Palmerston insisted on an expedition against San Francisco proper. In this he was supported by the Army, but few others. The Admiralty considered a blocking force enough, but the need for a firmer negotiating position seemed it would be necessary to mount some kind of assault, and so the rather tentative compromise was reached. It would be a division sized force supported by the navy which would sail against the Union’s greatest Pacific possession.

Planning went on well into 1862 and early 1863, when the orders went out and the slow process of gathering and shipping these troops was laboriously undertaken. The main strength of the expedition would come from India while a battalion would be detached from New Zealand and Mauritius. The force consisted of six infantry battalions, two from Bengal the 1/6th Regiment of Foot and the 75th, the 83rd From Bombay and the 99th from China. From New Zealand the 65th Regiment of Foot was detached to take part in the expedition as well. Finally, the 24th was detached from Mauritius to bring the force up to a full two brigades. The force also received cavalry support from the 2nd Dragoon Guards from India and artillery from the 14th Brigade Royal Artillery (A and D batteries). The force would also include some 400 sailors and Royal Marines acting as a naval brigade bringing the force to over 5,000 men.

It was to be commanded by Major General Arthur Cunynghame. The fifth son of Col. Sir David Cunynghame, he joined the forces in 1830, purchasing a lieutenancy in the King’s Royal Rifles. He served in the First Opium War as aide-de-camp to Major-General Alexander Fraser, Lord Saltoun, and was present at the Battle of Chinkiang. In 1845, he was promoted to Major and in November 1846 he was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of the 13th Light Infantry. Within a month he transferred as Lieutenant-Colonel in the Grenadier Guards. He joined the 20th Regiment in 1849 and the 27th Regiment in 1852. In 1853–54, he served as aide-de-camp to his father-in-law, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces Viscount Hardinge, until returning to action in the Crimean War. In 1854, Cunynghame served as Assistant Quartermaster-General to the first division, and was present at Bulganac and the battles of the Alma, Balaclava, Inkerman, Chernaya, and at the Siege of Sevastopol, receiving numerous mentions in the dispatches.

In 1855 he was given the local rank of Major General and he took command of 10,000 Ottoman troops to occupy Kerch and cut off the final overland supply route to Sevastopol and maintained the position over the winter. He commanded an Infantry Brigade at Dublin from 1856–60, and was promoted to Major General in 1861. Leaving for India, he commanded forces at Bombay to 1863 before being chosen for the California Expedition by the War Office. He joined his forces at Honolulu.

The Pacific Division was formally organized in June 1863. It’s organization was as such:

Commanding the Division: MG Arthur Cunyngham

ADC: Lt. B. L. Foster, RA

Chief of the Staff: Lt. Col Robert Carey, 40th Foot

Deputy Adjutant General: Captain William V. Munnings, 24th Foot

Quartermaster General: (bvt.) Major F.G. Warren, Bengal Artillery

1st Brigade (Col. Augustus H. Ferryman, 75th Foot) 83rd Regiment of Foot, 75th Regiment of Foot, 1/6th Regiment of Foot

2nd Brigade (Col. Charles H. Ellice, 24th Foot) 99th Regiment of Foot (4 cos), 65th Regiment of Foot, 24th Regiment of Foot

2nd Dragoon Guards (Lt. Col. William H. Seymour)

14th Field Brigade Royal Artillery(A and D batteries)(Lt. Col. Peter P. Faddy)

Support Troops:

21st Company, Royal Engineers, Naval Brigade, Royal Navy Artillery

The main force set out from India with the transports HMS Adventure and HMS Urgent each carrying a battalion and local shipping pressed into service to carry another as well as the cavalry and artillery under escort from HMS Alert. The convoys met at Honolulu where they took the forces from New Zealand under their wing where they would shepherd them to British Columbia.” – Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV

Sir Arthur Cunynghame​

“The Kingdom of Hawaii was in 1860, in a state of flux. Though the islanders at this point still outnumbered the American settlers their population was decreasing almost yearly thanks to foreign diseases. Kamehameha IV was well aware of this fact and sought to attempt to limit the influence of the American settlers and missionaries on the island....

The King had long had an anti-American sentiment ever since his travels as a teenager. In his travels he had visited the nations of Europe and on the return trip travelled across America. There he experienced unbridled racism even in spite of his royal status which caused him great consternation. Writing after his trip recalling one such experience he said "I found he was the conductor, and took me for somebody's servant just because I had a darker skin than he had. Confounded fool;[this is] the first time that I have ever received such treatment, not in England or France or anywhere else...in England an African can pay his fare and sit alongside Queen Victoria. The Americans talk and think a great deal about their liberty, and strangers often find that too many liberties are taken of their comfort just because his hosts are a free people." Alexander’s anti-American feelings were well known amongst the populace, and as such the American settlers on the island had in 1856 attempted to organize to get an annexation treaty signed but had failed in doing so.

This had only further increased his distrust of the American population of the islands. He sought to limit his dependence on the United States by seeking out ties with other foreign nations, especially Britain. It was at first in small ways that the king sought to curry favor with the British, extending preferable trade rights to British merchants, and by encouraging Anglican settlers to the islands, even writing to England to summon an Anglican bishop to come in order to facilitate the growth of the British settler population.

The arrival of the British fleet in 1863 however, caused great consideration...

Though these British warships and British soldiers were only pausing to take on supplies and allow the men to stretch their legs and pursue various venereal diseases while they waited for the remainder of the fleet, but the American settlers on the island saw it as the first step to British annexation. The king however saw it in a different light. This overt show of strength made him thoughtful and he saw an excellent opportunity to rid himself of the American threat once and for all.

The American commissioner to the kingdom, Thomas Dryer, complained bitterly of the British presence, formally requesting the king demand they move on. He pointed out that the kingdom had already declared neutrality in the war between the Federal government and the rebellious states, and that as a neutral he was honor bound to throw the British out. The king ignored this protestation, even then glancing on the assembled warships and transports with undisguised interest…” - The House of Kamehameha, Brandon Somers, Oxford Press, 1987

King Kamehameha IV​

“The American forces in California had grown by the summer of 1863, largely through their own resources. The arsenals had been raided and weapons distributed amongst the new volunteers and militia companies. This had allowed a strong force to be assembled in San Francisco proper.

With the dispatch of the 6th to the frontier to guard the lines of communications, the overland routes, and the Nevada mines, the troops in the city were organized into two brigades. The 1st Brigade was under the command of Colonel Caleb Sibley of the 9th Infantry Regiment commanded the field brigade of the 1st, 2nd and 5th California Volunteer Infantry, while Colonel James H. Carleton commanded the second brigade composed of the 3rd and 7th California Volunteer Infantry and a composite battalion of local militia. Four companies of the 9th Infantry Regiment acted as garrisons at the fortifications alongside some 1,600 men enrolled as gunners with the fortifications. Attached to each brigade were squadrons from the 1st and 2nd California Cavalry Regiments, who had half their strength in San Francisco, and the rest scattered at various postings.

All told, this gave the garrison some 6,000 men to defend the city…

The most exciting event for the garrison in March 1863 was the capture of the attempted pirate vessel the schooner Chapman. Having been purchased by the Confederate sympathizer Asbury Harpending, he had been recruiting Southern sympathetic men to first offer the ship as an auxiliary to the US navy, but then sail to the British blockaders in an attempt to sell their secrets to the Royal Navy. While Harpending did succeed in purchasing the Chapman, his planned betrayal fell apart when a member of the garrison overheard one of the conspirators boldly proclaiming he was to ‘go pirate for the South’ and informed Col. Sibley. So when the crew of the Chapman prepared to sail in March, they were instead arrested and interned in Alcatraz.” – Empire and Blood: British Military Operations in the 19th Century Volume IV

Colonel James H. Carleton​

“…by the end of June the expedition had arrived in British Columbia and the men and animals were given a few weeks to rest and regain their land legs after a long voyage and the brief stopover in Hawaii. Cunynghame took command and organized his forces while preparing to leave as soon as his men were rested.

The plan was, in accordance with information provided by the navy, to seize Fort Point on the outer edges of the city's defences, and thereby open the Golden Gate to the fleet to proceed unmolested to either engage or bottle up the American squadron. The land defences being made untenable, it was assumed the city would have no choice but to capitulate...

...on August 27th the British appeared off the coast at Golden Gate. The appearance of British warships near the bay was not unusual, Maitland had previously tested the defences in short forays against the outer batteries and so the appearance of British warships did not cause much alarm at first. As the size of the fleet became evident and the transports peeled away general alarm set in and the defenses were mobilized in earnest.

Maitland brought his ships steaming through the bay firing as they came. In the lead was Tartar, with Maitland’s larger frigates and his flagship, the mighty Waterloo, the two remaining corvettes following, and the gunboats taking up the rear. The transports angled away from the fleet heading towards the sandy beaches at Land’s End where the expeditionary force began landing in good order unopposed save for occasional gunfire from skirmishers from the fort.

Though the landings got off to a good start with the infantry and cavalry landing in good order, they struggled to bring the artillery ashore, especially the heavier muzzle loading pieces and the naval artillery with the Naval Brigade, and although they made good time in the morning, under the soft sands the artillery became difficult to move up hill.

Cunynghame had come ashore with the first boats, overseeing the placement of his division and sorting them landing troops into formations. The first brigade under Ferryham was already in position by noon, with the cavalry not far behind. Worrying about a sortie from the defenders, Cunynghame determined to march without his full second brigade. He would advance inland against Fort Point while Maitland’s squadron would bombard the position from the sea.

The infantry and cavalry advanced in a staggered order with skirmishers leading behind the cavalry up the narrow roads from the beach. They did manage to reach the earthworks defending the landward side of the fort by 1pm however, the artillery was still being escorted to this position. The British made the best of it gathering into a battle line, when the American forces, the First Brigade, under Sibley marched from the entrenchments of San Francisco to meet them. Wright reasoned his only chance was to drive the British back to their boats before they could set up a proper siege...

The Dragoons and Sibley’s cavalry skirmished repeatedly giving the British time to prepare...

In the opening stages of the fight the two sides met with roughly equal numbers (some 3,000 each) as the remainder of the division moved to land. The opening skirmishing heavily favored the British who opened fire from 300 yards as the blue coated infantry marched into battle across the dunes. It was in the opening skirmishing that Sibley was killed, decapitating the command of the mixed force of regulars and militia. In the confusion his second in command was also slain and the blue coated infantry milled about unsure of its orders. As the 24th arrived from the shore, the weight of fire soon sent the American Volunteers retreating towards the defences of the city. The cavalry prevented a close pursuit and the British instead turned their attention to Fort Point...

In the Bay Maitland’s squadron steamed past the guns of the supporting batteries and opened fire on Fort Point. Maitland, a gunnery expert, had his squadron drilled extremely well and the British fire was murderously effective. On the American side, though they had the range, the reverse was true. The gunnery from Alcatraz was poor causing gaining more misses than hits, and true to the fears of her commanding officer the stress of repeated firing caused two more Columbiads to burst killing two men and wounding several others. The gunnery from Fort Point was somewhat better, managing a number of hits on Maitland’s squadron, but they were no match to the skill of the Royal Navy who pelted the fortifications with shot.

Bell’s squadron then intervened in an attempt to save the fortifications, and by 3pm the action had become a general engagement. In the melee that followed Bell himself was killed as Lancaster was pounded by the big frigates, Clio had run to ground and was burning and Topaze was severely damaged, losing several of her guns. However, the outcome was never seriously in doubt, the skilled gunnery of the Royal Navy and the overwhelming advantage in guns they possessed over their foes meant that Bell’s squadron was either forced to strike, or flee to the second line of defence near the city proper. Maitland’s squadron cruised past and were able to silence the second line batteries and placed the city under his guns and demanded its surrender.

At Fort Point the British infantry and Naval Brigade had settled in and were bombarding the incomplete fortifications, drawing away the defenders from the naval action to the defense of their own fortification...

With no fleet to speak of, his ground forces in disarray, and the city under the guns of the Royal Navy, Wright was forced to enter into negotiations with Maitland. It was agreed that the garrisons of Fort Point and Alcatraz would be surrendered, while the infantry, cavalry, and artillery within the city would be allowed to withdraw to Sacramento (Cunynghame and Maitland lacking the numbers to compel the surrender of the trenches without bombardment and Wright was unwilling to surrender his entire force) with their arms. The city was surrendered in a solemn ceremony aboard Bacchante on the 30th, with both Maitland and Cunynghame in attendance as both Wright and the mayor, Henry F. Teschemacher, formally surrendered the city to the enemy.

Wright’s forces withdrew from the city in good order the next morning, watched over by British troops who were soon occupying the earthworks the Americans had abandoned. On land Wright had lost some 1,300 men wounded, killed, and captured with the complete capture of the US Pacific Squadron, save for those cruisers still at large on the seas. Cunynghame and his expedition had lost 900 wounded and killed in the fighting while Maitland had lost some 200 at sea. Through that though he had now erased the threat of more cruisers floating across the Pacific and had seized the one great outpost on the US West Coast as well as the US Mint.

However, he was in no position to threaten the rest of the state, and although Cunynghame recommended a raid against Sacramento once the temporary truce ended Maitland felt that inland operations could not be considered. There was no immediate source of reinforcement available to him, and with the British needs expanding across the Pacific rather than shrinking it was unlikely they would receive support for some time. As such they began occupying the positions the Americans had vacated, and settled in to repulse the expected American counterattack.

For the Americans part, they set about gathering the strength to retake the city, or at least bottle up the British forces there.... ” - A World on Fire: The Third Anglo-American War, Ashely Ledger, Random House, 2010

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 67: Guns of June​

Bladensburgh, Maryland, June 15th 1863

The occasional crack of rifle fire and the continuous dull thump of artillery echoed all around the position. The scream of shells and thunder of explosions was evident all along the line despite the day. It occasionally disturbed the waters of the Anacostia River which flowed into the Eastern Branch of the Potomac. That stretch of water too, marked the dividing line between the Confederate siege lines and those of the defending Union Army of the Potomac. In the last two weeks thousands of men had been waiting for a crossing of that line, and today they just might see it.

Robert E. Lee reached down and pat Traveller’s neck as he watched the men of Holme’s division form up behind their own entrenchments. Nearby another of the big guns, a gift of war from General McClellan after the Battle of the Rappahannock last year, gave another loud belch of fire and smoke sending shot hurtling into the Federal works across the water. From the corner of his eye he saw Armistead Long, his chief military secretary, casting an approving look toward the gun.

“Something interesting about that gun Armistead?” Lee asked. The man blinked that his commander would notice and turned back to the lines.

“Nothing quite so special sir. Merely admiring our luck at having them. General Pendleton has been very put out we don’t have a proper siege train. It’s only that one battery of heavy Armstrong guns purchased last year.”

Internally Lee sighed, externally he nodded. “Yes, the lack of heavy guns is indeed an impediment, but with our navy and the Royal Navy in the Chesapeake, what can Washington do but tremble before our encirclement?” He saw the remainder of his staff smiling at the remark. It was good for a general to give his men confidence.

Armistead nodded. “Quite so sir, and God willing we make them tremble today.” One of his aides, Lt. Peterkin, a severely devout Episcopalian, nodded fervently at that. He believed God was on their side in this fight.

“We have driven those people back to their entrenchments. They have been bombarded for weeks now, and I mean to test their resolve today gentlemen. Perhaps end this siege once and for all.”

Lee looked again past the clouds of gunsmoke to where the lines of men, all seventy-five hundred of them, were arraying for the assault. They would be the first wave to crash upon the weaker Federal lines here. Lee had determined the position the week prior. Observing the Federal lines since he had arrived a few weeks ago, he felt that this was the weakest portion. The least covered by water, and with the fewest fortifications facing them. They had not really expected an attack from Annapolis. Maybe one in the direction of Alexandria and perhaps one from the north, but the planners had not nearly been as vigilant as they might have been.

That did not mean they were slovenly in their duties though. Concealed now through the smoke were zigzagging lines of entrenchments, covered by batteries and the guns of Fort Lincoln, Fort Thayer, and Fort Bunker Hill. Those were the strongholds his own guns sought to silence. However, they were spaced far apart, and Fort Lincoln was a lone bastion covering the rail lines from the city. If they fell though, the way to Washington was open, and of course, so was the surrender of the city.

Even if his face didn’t show it, Lee was tense. The battle flags of the regiments and divisions formed up, men gathering in lines as neat as could be in the trenches. Shouted orders from the officers and quiet commands which somehow filtered over the cannonade. It was hoped the Union men would not hear, and certainly Longstreet and Jackson’s diversionary assaults to the north and west would draw off McClellan’s attention. If all went well he would have no reserve to plug the gap Holmes would create, and his men could stream through into the city, taking the capital and compelling the surrender of the Army of the Potomac.

Well, not truly the capital. Lee thought ruefully. The newspapers said that President Lincoln and his government had all fled north when the British naval assault on Baltimore had begun. There were rumours too that the city had almost rose in rebellion learning his army was close, but no one could substantiate that. They already had the state capital of Maryland in hand, if they could take the de-facto national capital, and the greatest army assembled by the Federal government, the war would end. Lincoln’s presence was of no consequence.

He sketched out the armies in his mind as he waited. Up north the British were threatening Albany, while his old war friend Albert Sidney Johnston sat similarly besieged, though not nearly so completely, at Corinth. The Federals also maintained an ineffective presence along in Mississippi along that great river with their army menacing Grenada. He knew the Union was stretched thin, so no relief army could be forthcoming without giving up their gains or positions elsewhere. All in all, he felt firm in his assessment that it was merely a matter of time and mathematics for the city to fall. They had no supply line, and no matter how great the warehouses and depots in the city, they could not sustain ninety-thousand men and whatever civilians remained indefinitely.

That didn’t mean he might not hurry along their surrender however.

Checking his pocket watch, he saw it was nearly eleven o’clock. Almost time. He beckoned to an aide.

“You will informed General Whiting he may begin at his leisure.” The man saluted and rode off through the noise to the generals headquarters in the town. Whiting knew his orders, would probably resent Lee sending that missive, but Lee needed to be sure the men knew he was watching. It would give them heart, knowing their general, who had led them out of Virginia, smashed the Federal army and brought them to the gates of Washington, was with them.

“The smoke is going to be horrendous.” Long muttered, probably assuming Lee couldn’t hear him. Lee chose to ignore the statement of the obvious and instead concentrated his field glasses forward. With a startling finality the guns on the Confederate lines ceased firing, though the Federal artillery still made a few shots back. The world felt still for a moment, and then the order sounded from and seventy-five hundred men leapt from their trenches and marched towards the Federal lines.

A familiar apprehension leapt into Lee’s heart, his stomach tightening as he watched the men go forward. The flags flew proudly, the marching tramp of boots could be heard even here, and he watched as the fine grey uniforms went relentlessly forward. For a few moments, there was nothing but the occasional boom of a Federal gun, the steady tramp of Confederate feet in British boots, and the barks of officers.

As the men in grey pressed closer though, he saw the eruption of fire and smoke from the tops of the Federal breastworks and a cloud of fog seemed to sweep out from them, reaching with fiery fingers to law waste to the ranks of men. The guns finally began to reorient themselves to face the oncoming rush of Southern soldiery. They added their own fire to the new din and smoke was covering the scene. Lee strained to hear through the fire, but all that could be heard was the guns, and screams which could have been orders, fury or pain.

“General.” Loring said, he indicated over his shoulder to where another group of horsemen approached. Lee turned his head to see Whiting, his staff, and a color bearer, riding towards him. He bit off a flash of irritation. Of course the man would want to see what his commanding general was seeing. He was hovering over the Fourth Corps like a mammie over an infant.

Whiting reigned in beside him and saluted. “General Lee sir, you honor us with your presence.”

Lee returned the salute. “I merely came to observe the main thrust, General Whiting. There’s no need to accompany my sightseeing.”

“Nevertheless sir, I should like to see what you see, hopefully we can see the same things.”

Lee nodded as a messenger rode up and reigned in. He looked from Lee to Whiting for a moment as if unsure who to report to, then turned to the commander of the Fourth Corps.

“General Hood sends his compliments sir! He reports all three brigades ready for action when requested!”

Whiting nodded. “Very good, send my compliments to General Hood and have him keep his men in readiness. Once Holmes has made an impact on the Union line Hood must carry the breakthrough into the city.”

Lee personally would have recommended Hood drive the assault and let Holmes have the support. Hood had done so well at Stafford Heights the year previous, Lee didn’t think that he could find a more aggressive leader in the whole army. His mind briefly wandered to his old foe from that fight, General Mansfield. He hoped the General was comfortable in Richmond, having been cut off and compelled to surrender his command the week previous when he realized he was stuck in hostile territory. It had been a fine morale builder to put the Union I Corps in a barrel like that.

He was brought from the pleasant image by the appearance of another courier. The man reigned in grinning and saluted. “General Longstreed sends his compliments to General Lee and informs him Early’s men have carried the attack. They have mounted their flags on the earthworks!”

Lee’s eyebrows shot up. This was unexpected indeed. Jubal Early was a rising fighter that was certain. Quite the bad old man he could swear most persuasively, and he seemed quite popular with his troops. He’d been the rock that held the line at the Rappahannock last summer.

Turning, Lee scanned the smoke for any sign that a similar banner rose above the Federal trenches. He scowled. This is taking too long. Have I been to clever and the Yankees seen through my work and weakened their lines elsewhere? It was an infuriating thought that his preparations might have been noticed and this was instead the strongest

“General Whiting, I would advise you to dispatch Hood’s brigade now.” He turned to the messenger. “Send my compliments to General Longstreet and inform him that he will support General Early’s lodgement with all his strength.” The man nodded and rode off. Whiting was already giving orders to his own men so Lee called another courier over. “Ride to General Jackson and inform him to give as much aid as possible to General Longstreet, if this attack can succeed we may drive them from the earthworks.”

Galloping off the courier moved with remarkable speed and Lee was satisfied. Speed would be essential. He dare not move from this spot now that the couriers could report where to find him. He breathed deeply and looked back towards the trenches, scanning desperately for some sign of Holme’s men on the top.

Hood’s men were up over the trenches now. He saw them going forward and smiled. If anyone could drive this assault home, they could. It wasn’t long before they reached the lines and a familiar banshee like wail went up. The keening rebel yell had yet to kill anyone, but hopefully it would unnerve their opponent.

Trickles of wounded men and stretcher parties were appearing now. Some walking wounded moving to the rear under their own strength, others supported by friends and comrades. That was a good sign, it showed the fight was still in earnest. Peering into the smokey haze ahead of the Confederate trenches, Lee could see occasional flashes through the blue gray fog. Snatches of action, men huddled at the base of an earthen embankment, ladders overhead. On others he saw men leaning over to shoot their attackers, some shooting back up, and line of smartly deployed infantry firing volleys over their fellows heads to keep the enemy down, and on one point, where the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad entered the city, he saw active fighting on the earthworks.

His heart soared, but the scene was swallowed by another bank of gritty gunsmoke. Lee frowned and kept watch. Another courier rode up and reported Jackson faced stiff opposition, and Lee responded the men should keep pushing. An hour ticked by, and he saw a standard waving above the earthworks. It was the battleflag of the Army of North Virginia!

“Look there William!” He said using Whiting’s Christian name “They have it! The banner flies on the earthworks!”

His staff all immediately turned their gazes on the ground behind Fort Lincoln where the struggle was in earnest. They all cursed the smoke as well, but a wind finally showed the whole scene in its full glory. Men in gray were in evidence all across the earthen parapet, though a frightful number of bodies carpeted the ground in front of it, they seemed in earnest all along the line. A brigade was moving in support of them and Lee fervently hoped he could soon call the rest of Hood’s division to action.

The guns on Fort Lincoln were sweeping the line with fire though, and Lee saw a shell burst amongst the advancing line of gray clad troops. They didn’t scatter though, and advanced at a run, seeking to bolster the breakthrough.

“Order General Hood to send all available troops to the support of the line there!” Whiting shouted. Lee couldn’t have agreed more. Here was their chance!

Another bloody hour continued the fray, and Lee scarcely looked away. As he watched, another flag appeared atop the earthworks, one on either side of the railroad bed, like banners proclaiming a new management to the line, opening a gateway to the city. More men in gray were advancing, stepping over the line. It was a hopeful sign that he saw smoke flying above the parapet now, fighting inside the Union works.

Movement on his right turned his eye. A man in blue was climbing the parapet, he was carrying an enormous United States flag, and he drove it into the ground with force, and picked up the battle flag of the Army of Northern Virginia, and hurled it like a spear into the ranks of Confederate soldiers below. The man looked horrendously dirty, hands and face covered in black, like he hadn’t bathed in weeks. Another man with a rifle popped up beside him as he jumped down from his exposed position, and another. A flag soon waving behind them.

“General Whiting, I confess, I do not recognize that flag there. Could you perhaps enlighten me?” A silence. “General?” Lee looked to where the general was staring at the fight, and he saw the man holding his field glasses with white knuckled fury. He took a breath.

“That is the flag of Saxton’s Negroes sir.” Whiting hissed.

Lee was shocked, and turned his gaze back to the parapets. Yes, now that he looked those men did look like negroes. Of course he had heard the reports of Annapolis Junction, even the news that there were Nego regiments out West in garrison. But actually fighting on the front lines? They must have been truly desperate.

“Send the rest of Hood’s men! Destroy the enemy here!” They must be weak, he thought, elsewise why use substandard troops?

As the hours ticked by, the fighting didn’t cease. The trickle of wounded became a steady flow. Still though, the negroes did not break. The assault was repelled once, begun again, repelled a second time, but even Hood’s men did not manage to retake the Federal earthworks. It was a grim slogging match as men pushed, shot, and bayoneted their way forwards and backwards. But no Southern battle flags flew over the Federal works again that day.

Finally, as three o’clock neared, the men began a slow retreat. Lee looked on grimly. As evening wore on the reports became clear. Longstreet’s assault had been stopped by a division of reinforcements sent to keep Early out, and Jackson had made no headway against the fortifications at all. The Battle of Fort Lincoln was over, but the Siege of Washington continued.


Rogers House, Essex County, New York, June 27th 1863

The sun was high and murderously warm. In the not too far distance Wolseley could hear the grumble and thunder of the siege train. The American lines around Fort Ticonderoga were damnably resilient. It had been a weeks hard skirmishing and scrabbling in unpleasant terrain to even establish proper siege lines. Now though, the army artillery was doing its level best to blast the Yankees from their positions along the river. The mortar boats there were adding to the cacophony, but not as well as Wolseley would have liked. The remaining Yankee ironclads lurked like sharks above the boom, inviting the boats closer. He cast a frustrated glance in the direction of the Yankee lines and entered the headquarters of the Army of Canada.

The Rogers House was a fine little building, good enough for the commanding general and his staff. The original occupants had all fled south, presumably towards safety lower in the state. The Field Marshal had made the kitchen his office, and he sat there now, drinking tea from a set he’d received as a gift from the Duke of Argyle for his work well done. There were reports, and a rough map of the current lines spread out in front of him. The Chief of Staff, Patrick MacDougall, stood beside him alongside some other staff members. Field Marshall, Viscount, Henry Dundas looked up as Wolseley entered.

“Ah Colonel Wolseley, please come in. How are the lines today?” He said, offering tea.

Wolseley accepted. “Much the same as yesterday I’m afraid, my lord.” Cradling the cup and saucer in hand, he sipped contently. It was quite good, imported directly from England, and something of a luxury on the front lines.

Dundas grinned at him. “I was blisteringly unpopular in London society for some time you know. Now there’s members of Cabinet sending me tea and writing to thank me for a job well done.”

“I’m sure the Cabinet is well aware of your efforts to win the war.”

Dundas snorted. He was never shy about sharing his opinions. “I’m afraid Lord Cupid writes to demand news of my progress. They’re all afraid of another Sevastopol or Saratoga.” He gestured expansively out the window. “I ask you Colonel, does it seem the Yankees are liable to spring a trap on me sometime soon?”

“I would confess no sir.”

Wolseley frankly doubted the Yankees could do much more than hold their positions. Though they were devilishly well sited positions. The Army of the Hudson was dug in along the lake and La Chute Creek, using the old French works to bolster their new ones. Guns were emplaced in and around the town of Ticonderoga which in turn were supported by batteries on the aptly named Mount Defiance and Mount Independence. The Americans also had a strongpoint across the creek from Ticonderoga on a hill named Mount Hope, which the infantry had jokingly taken to calling Mount Forlorn Hope. Jokes aside, it was damnably difficult to crack, and an attack on the 18th had been repulsed with severe losses. If it fell though, the town might become untenable. The guns on Mount Defiance would be a harder nut to crack. Then across Lake Champlain the guns on Mount Independence provided a further headache.

“Four and a half, miles of fortifications and probably over thirty-thousand Yankees manning them, and a damn mobile brigade on the far shore.” Dundas shook his head. “It’s a bloody ugly position to besiege.”

“The Yankees use the ground quite well.” MacDougall observed. “According to our maps they have lines of retreat and communication further into the state. Even should we crack this position, they can withdraw.”

“Ah but if they do withdraw MacDougall, they have nowhere left to stop us, and it’s on to Albany.” Dunsas said with a self satisfied smirk.

“Even so sir, I don’t envy another hundred mile march. Especially away from the waterways.”

Dundas waved a hand. “If the ground opens up away from this highland fastness I dare say we will be in Albany before the end of July. But we have to crack this nut first. I confess, I know little of the place.” He craned his head towards the window. Though you couldn’t see the old fort from here, you could see the town itself. There had been an abundance of trees when the army had first arrived at the start of the month, there were now remarkably fewer. It were as though a vast army of beavers had descended on the land. But instead of building dams they built earthworks, abatis, cleared fields of fire, and made pontoons and bridges.

For all that work though, little had been accomplished.

“Another week of pounding might do it sir.” MacDougall was saying.

“I quite doubt it sir.” Wolseley interjected. Both men looked over. If the Field Marshall was cavalier in his opinion Wolseley would be in his. “When we invested Sevastopol we bombarded them for two years and finally at great cost made the Russians withdraw. We have thus far overcome all the American lines with superior firepower and that great spirit that British troops show. However, we have yet to face a line like this, dug in so firmly on the mountains. This will, I fear, be a long siege.”

It was plain from his face that this was not the pronouncement Dundas wanted to hear. “What do you suggest then, Colonel?” He asked somewhat tersely.

Wolseley realized this was one of the moments in a man’s career where he might make or break himself. His own tongue was sharp, but Dundas’s was remarkably sharper and he had the ear of London. If he angered the man too much or, God forbid, attempted to undermine him, he might never reach another staff position. Pondering his word choice carefully he readied himself.

Reaching over Wolseley tapped one point with his finger. Mount Hope. “This point here, my lord, is the lynchpin to the American line. Without it the town falls and we may invest the earthworks from the flank on that old French fort. In doing so they must either retreat or stand and die. Elsewise, we will be here for many more months trying to batter their lines to Kingdom Come. We may be cautious and batter them for a few more months, or a daring stroke my undo their whole army.”

Both MacDougall and Dundas studied that point. MacDougall with a small crease of distaste in his gaze, and Dundas frowning at it like a particularly vexing letter. Wolseley felt no fear in the face of the enemy, but at this moment he wondered if he had finally said too much too freely. Finally, Dundas nodded.

“Very well, Colonel. We shall begin preparations to drive the Yankees off their forlorn hope.” Outside, the cannonade continued.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Chapter 68: The Siege of Washington
​

“If war consisted merely in not taking risks, glory would be at the mercy of very mediocre talent.” - Napoleon Bonaparte

“Lee’s June 15th attack had failed to breach the defences, and an angry general was forced to settle down into a lengthy siege…

The second assault on Fort Lincoln on June 29th fared no better than the first and Lee found himself sticking to the strategy decided upon remaining in the entrenchments…

The Second Battle of Fort Lincoln [1]​

Inside the city, the Army of the Potomac, once the grandest in the whole Union, was facing privation. Though over half the city’s population had fled when the government did in early May, some 25,000 civilians were still in the city with the remaining government clerks and soldiers. This made the issue of billeting soldiers and maintaining order difficult. Soldiers biovacked in tents, dugouts, and abandoned civilian homes when not on trench duty. Constant shelling and skirmishing started fires, and forced the preemptive destruction of some buildings. The destruction was so great that after the siege one commentator would remark “The City took on the visage of some great classical ruin, and one was forced to bring to mind the Sack of Rome or the Great Fire of London as a comparison.”

McClellan himself made his headquarters at the Wilkes House, not far from Secretary Stanton’s home. He was seen almost constantly in activity, usually cloistered with his Chief of Staff Marcey, and in and about the lines, or conferring with Stanton through the early months of May and June…” - The Siege of Washington, Jeremiah Dutton, University of Philadelphia, 1993

“McClellan was described in this period as ‘inexhaustible’ in his energy. By day he was ahorse riding through the lines, visiting the troops, and inspecting fortifications. He was even directly at the line directing men during Lee’s attack on the 15th. However, by night he was a different man. Deprived of the ability to communicate with his beloved Ellen, he was in despair, only consoling himself through letters he thought he might never be able to send.

Tellingly each letter he wrote throughout the siege, and there was one almost nightly, began with “I doubt this letter may ever reach you,” which was a clear indicator of his many anxieties and frustrations. In these letters he speaks of his staff, his commanders, and his hopes and aspirations for the war. In early May his letters are confident that he can break Lee’s siege, if the I Corps and XII Corps would be able to march to his relief. Their lack of appearance in May, and then June, sunk his morale. He then seemed to believe that the army was somehow reforming in Baltimore, but when he learned of the surrender of I Corps outside Fredericksburg through Pinkerton’s spies he fell into melancholy.

Through these letters he lay early blame upon himself for not immediately attacking towards Annapolis. However, this self-recrimination faded as May wore into June, and he would lay blame on alternatively Lincoln and Stanton, or both, for his present circumstances. “Stanton has no desire to win the war when he may use me as a scapegoat for the government’s defeat,” he would write on June 29th after the Second Battle of Fort Lincoln. “I am to shoulder the burden of defending the nation while he and the great gorilla, now safely in Philadelphia, make excuses and plot for my downfall. They expect me to fall on my sword, but I shall not give them the satisfaction!”

His acrimonious relationship with the Secretary of War, who had stayed behind to provide some government oversight, deteriorated as the siege went on. Stanton openly did not trust McClellan, and McClellan in turn distrusted Stanton and his judgement. Their relationship had suffered across the summer of 1862, and now in the summer of 1863 all the mistrust and disagreement came to a head. It was said in July that while touring the biovaucks of the army, a companion expressed disbelief that still so large a force should sit immobile. Stanton laughed and said “Oh that sir is merely General McClellan’s personal bodyguard.” He paused for thought. “I am told the nations of Europe did not declare war on France, but Napoleon’s person during their many wars. Perhaps if I convinced the South to declare war upon McClellan he may be inclined to move in order to defend his person from the wrath of the secesh.”[2]

Stanton in his own writings would constantly accuse McClellan of plotting a coup, and surrounded himself with officers who he summarized would be more loyal to the government than the ‘McClellanite’ faction within the Army of the Potomac. These men were McClellan’s rivals, Hooker and Rosecrans, who both had little and less to say of their commanding officer. Hooker in particular managed to distinguish himself in Stanton’s eyes as the III Corps held the line facing off against Lee’s worst attacks in June…” - I Can Do It All: The Trials of George B. McClellan, Alfred White, 1992, Aurora Publishing

“By the beginning of July, the army was in poor shape. The army had been on half rations since the start of June to conserve supplies. McClellan’s announcement that this would hold true for the whole population nearly caused a riot, but tensions were diffused by the simple expedient that soldiers outnumbered the remaining civilians by a factor of three to one. Though there were certainly grumblings, no one was foolish enough to hassle the soldiers in the streets.” - The Siege of Washington, Jeremiah Dutton, University of Philadelphia, 1993

"Unity at the top between the few political figures left in Washington and the command of the Army of the Potomac had all but evaporated. Though Stanton had congratulated McClellan in seeing off the attacks by Lee in June, he harshly criticized the commander of the army for failing to follow up with a counterattack which might have broken the Confederate lines. McClellan balked at that idea, declaring “This army must be maintained for the defence of the city in anticipation of its relief. Were it to be thrown away there could be nothing left for the government of the nation to do but surrender.”

These words, spoken to Stanton on the 9th of July, shook Stanton to his core. For whatever reason, and the reasons remain murky to this day, he began to believe that McClellan meant to surrender the army to Lee. This was probably not discouraged by regular (and some have said drunken) reports from Joseph Hooker’s headquarters which spoke ominously of ‘defeatism’ from amongst units with known ‘McClellenite’ commanders. Indeed, it was said that Daniel Sickles, using his pre-war connections with the man who had saved him from a murder charge, wove particularly lurid tales of intrigues and plans of a coup to place Stanton under arrest in order so that McClellan might ‘save the army from starvation’ and ‘the politicians.’ Stanton could have been under no illusions about who ‘the politicians’ meant in that case.

Thanks to Ellen’s release of the correspondence after her husband’s death and the voracious defence of his father’s record by George B. McClellan Jr. shows, without a doubt, that McClellan made no plans for surrender, much less a coup. His own post-war correspondence, and his long suffering and self-serving 1864 “Report” do indeed spell out that he had no intent to surrender the city, as do the very public attempts to sue Stanton for libel until the latter’s death in 1870. All the evidence then, would bear out that this rumoured coup and surrender is nothing but slander carried out by politicking generals. That does make Stanton’s actions in order to counter this feared overthrow of civilian authority seem extremely harsh in hindsight…” - I Can Do It All: The Trials of George B. McClellan, Alfred White, 1992, Aurora Publishing

George McClellan and his wife Ellen, in 1864​

“The preparations were undertaken in the utmost secrecy, and by July 11th, all was in readiness. Stanton ordered that men from Syke’s Regulars be used to created a perimeter around the President’s Park and Lafayette Square, where the Wilke’s House was located. ‘Politically reliable troops’ from Hooker’s command and under Butterfield’s supervision, were then placed in attendance to ‘prevent any trouble from officers or men adverse to a change of command’ on the outskirts of this perimeter.

Stanton would surprise McClellan and his chief of staff at the Wilkes home that morning. Accompanied by Lt. Col. Robert Buchanan of the 4th Infantry, alongside Rosencrans, Stanton approached the general as he was having breakfast.

“Mr. Secretary,” McClellan said. “May I ask the meaning of this morning intrusion?”

“You may General.” Stanton replied. “Unreasonable reports have reached my ears that you mean to surrender the city. Do you deny it?”

McClellan was wholly taken aback. “Of course I deny it!” The General replied. “Tell me who brings such lies to your ears and I will see them brought before a court martial for insubordination. I am loyal to my country sir.”

“Be that as it may General, I find your work uninspiring. While you have finely commanded this army, I find myself with no choice but to relieve you of your command. As the ranking member of government present, I hereby relieve you of your duties and shall order you confined to this house until the conclusion of the present siege.”

McClellan of course, was completely shocked. As the allegations against him were utterly false, he could only accept civilian authority in the person of Stanton. That he was effectively under house arrest made matters all the worse for him. His staff was only informed of the change of command after the fact. The news spread to the whole of the army very slowly, and it wasn’t until the 18th that the majority of the rank and file even fully understood what had happened.

In his place, Stanton elevated Major General William Rosecrans to the head of the Army of the Potomac. This caused a private outrage among the officers loyal to McClellan. The effect though, was immediate. Both Fitz John Porter and William B. Franklin offered their resignations over the matter, which caused Stanton to similarly detain both men on suspicion of ‘collaborating’ with the now deposed McClellan. In their places Edward Ord was promoted to the command of IV Corps and Daniel Sickle’s in command of the XIV Corps.

The shake up was shocking to the rank and file, and did much to damper spirits among the Army of the Potomac. Though there was some talk of a ‘counter-coup’ to undo what many in the ranks regarded as a coup against their commander, the talk was just that, talk. The men were no more eager to topple the government than they were to surrender. The chaos in the ranks however, caused confusion in command and many speculated that the next Confederate attack might break them…” - The Siege of Washington, Jeremiah Dutton, University of Philadelphia, 1993

“Stanton’s heavy-handed treatment of McClellan’s rumoured conspiracy would have heavy ramifications for Lincoln in Philadelphia. That he acted even when out of effective communication with the President still reflected poorly on him when the news became known to the world. McClellan, still a darling of the Democratic Party, would serve as a martyr for all the increasingly angry voices against Lincoln and his cabinet. The cries of ‘tyranny’ would float higher, especially in the states of New York and New Jersey…” Snakes and Ladders: The Lincoln Administration and America’s Darkest Hour, Hillary Saunders, Scattershot Publishing, 2003

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1] As a note, the soldiers TTL do look more like those from the old drawings from the 1880s. Fewer shabby Southern soldiers with enormous beards and no shoes, many more in worn grey uniforms and British boots.

2] Attributed to Lincoln OTL, but better from Stanton TTL.