No World Wars world in 1945 and beyond
- Thread starter basileus
- Start date
I believe the USA would be more highly populated, agrarian, and class oriented.
Population would be bigger because without the Wars the Pre-WWI attractiveness of the USA to Eastern Europe continues and there are many fewer deaths, particularly in WWII.
The USA would probably be more agrarian, because we would not have had the huge stimulus of the wars, and the move to the cities after the war.
Class oriented because we would not have the great leveler of the GI Bill which provided so much education to returning vets.
Population would be bigger because without the Wars the Pre-WWI attractiveness of the USA to Eastern Europe continues and there are many fewer deaths, particularly in WWII.
The USA would probably be more agrarian, because we would not have had the huge stimulus of the wars, and the move to the cities after the war.
Class oriented because we would not have the great leveler of the GI Bill which provided so much education to returning vets.
I guess...
I'd expect a very different decolonisation - either gradual and largely peaceful, on the Anglo-Caribbean model, or much more cloak-and-dagger and bleak oppression, as the rebel movements have no ideological friends among the great powers. If we are going to be optimistic, I'd expect far-flung spheres of influence and economic domination attached to Britain (the Indian Ocean rim, significant chunks of Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Australasia), France (Southeast Asia, Northwest Africa, Madagascar/Mauritius), Germany (Namibia, Tanganjika, New Guinea, big chunks of the Baltic), the United States (Pacific Oceania, Philippines, Caribbean, Central America), and secondary powers. A reasonably friendly relationship (which, as Britain and India have shown, can be maintained even after a fairly far-reaching conflict) could lead to more intense cross-immigration and economic cooperation. Of course, if westand this on its head we get a perpetuation of a far more brutal exploitation than was practised OTL - because they can.
Much smaller militaries. Without two world wars, the whole 'huge conscript army' idea is liable to atrophy. Technology would still be developed, though probably not at the same speed, but I can'rt see any nation splurging on 10,000 tanks. OTOH the existing militaries are liable to be used more readily. Two or three limited conflicts a year seem a reasonable enough estimate - restoring order in Ashanteland or putting the Nouveau Caledoniens in their place.
A more traditional society. More class consciousness, more conservative approaches to art and music, more repressive policing, more generally accepted divisiveness ('Jews need not apply' 'No dogs, no Irish' etc.) Without the deep cultural shock of WWI I don't see Dadaist Art, Surrealism, or Modernism taking off as they did. Something like it would probably happen, but in a more limited fashion and with less influenhce. The world our fathers left us has stood the test of time, after all. Victorian certainties *were* certain. Our kings, dukes and rulers *did* lead us into a golden future. No need to change horses in midstream...
There may well still be a notional gold standard. Money definitely is appreciated more, and business practises are liable to be more traditional (if no more honest - see Credit Mobilier
)
A less dominant cultural and economic role for the United States, without the twin peaks of being the world's largest creditor nation (post WWI) and its sole surviving industrial nation (post WWII). French and German film production, British and Anglo-Indian visual arts, Anglo-Caribbean music, Russian philosophy, or any other such constellation is liable to find wider distribution and appreciation without the capital concentrating in Hollywood. Avoiding the brain drain of two world wars and various persecutions and purges also must help.
But egad, pity the Chinese...
I'd expect a very different decolonisation - either gradual and largely peaceful, on the Anglo-Caribbean model, or much more cloak-and-dagger and bleak oppression, as the rebel movements have no ideological friends among the great powers. If we are going to be optimistic, I'd expect far-flung spheres of influence and economic domination attached to Britain (the Indian Ocean rim, significant chunks of Africa, Argentina, Brazil, and Australasia), France (Southeast Asia, Northwest Africa, Madagascar/Mauritius), Germany (Namibia, Tanganjika, New Guinea, big chunks of the Baltic), the United States (Pacific Oceania, Philippines, Caribbean, Central America), and secondary powers. A reasonably friendly relationship (which, as Britain and India have shown, can be maintained even after a fairly far-reaching conflict) could lead to more intense cross-immigration and economic cooperation. Of course, if westand this on its head we get a perpetuation of a far more brutal exploitation than was practised OTL - because they can.
Much smaller militaries. Without two world wars, the whole 'huge conscript army' idea is liable to atrophy. Technology would still be developed, though probably not at the same speed, but I can'rt see any nation splurging on 10,000 tanks. OTOH the existing militaries are liable to be used more readily. Two or three limited conflicts a year seem a reasonable enough estimate - restoring order in Ashanteland or putting the Nouveau Caledoniens in their place.
A more traditional society. More class consciousness, more conservative approaches to art and music, more repressive policing, more generally accepted divisiveness ('Jews need not apply' 'No dogs, no Irish' etc.) Without the deep cultural shock of WWI I don't see Dadaist Art, Surrealism, or Modernism taking off as they did. Something like it would probably happen, but in a more limited fashion and with less influenhce. The world our fathers left us has stood the test of time, after all. Victorian certainties *were* certain. Our kings, dukes and rulers *did* lead us into a golden future. No need to change horses in midstream...
There may well still be a notional gold standard. Money definitely is appreciated more, and business practises are liable to be more traditional (if no more honest - see Credit Mobilier
)A less dominant cultural and economic role for the United States, without the twin peaks of being the world's largest creditor nation (post WWI) and its sole surviving industrial nation (post WWII). French and German film production, British and Anglo-Indian visual arts, Anglo-Caribbean music, Russian philosophy, or any other such constellation is liable to find wider distribution and appreciation without the capital concentrating in Hollywood. Avoiding the brain drain of two world wars and various persecutions and purges also must help.
But egad, pity the Chinese...
I think this would be world where there were a series of crises that just never boiled over into a Big War. Small proxy wars connected with colonialism as unavoidable. Maybe something like the Spanish Civil War. American industrialization is slower but not very slow. Not sure about conscription ending. A naval arms treaty would possibly set an example for the other countries. AustroHungary is likely to break up anyway. Austria may get absorbed into Germany. Speaking of which I see a series of measures to reeduce the power of the Kaiser in Germany. Ottoman Empire would probably survive but would have some problems. Pressure in Russia for a reduction in the Tsar's powers will cause tension as well.
Space is interesting. I could envision a world where increasing war is viewed as the unthinkable horror (unless colonials are on the receiving end of course) but which needs some form of competition between its empires so I could see a space race developing in the 1970's where America, Britain, France and Germany are spending big bucks to outdo each toher (imaybe Tsarist Russia as well). The Moon may get divided into French, American, British and German zones.
I think faddish culures of the new will still happen but more slowly and have a different feel to them.
Space is interesting. I could envision a world where increasing war is viewed as the unthinkable horror (unless colonials are on the receiving end of course) but which needs some form of competition between its empires so I could see a space race developing in the 1970's where America, Britain, France and Germany are spending big bucks to outdo each toher (imaybe Tsarist Russia as well). The Moon may get divided into French, American, British and German zones.
I think faddish culures of the new will still happen but more slowly and have a different feel to them.
With out any World Wars, the popualtion would be bigger, and technology might be about 15 years behind, and armored vehicles are herdly ever seen. Nuclear weapons might not be invented, and aeroplane technology would definitley be behind, and there still would be Pax Britana.
Socialism fifty years earlier
A richer civilisation with a larger European population till 1950 when it would stop increasing as social security cut down on children's desirability as support in old age. Better medical technology, more advanced science, smaller government military sectors as the problems of colonisation made armed forces less attractive, and decolonisation would be primarily a problem with the white population being upset about being 'abandoned', a la Northern Ireland.
A richer civilisation with a larger European population till 1950 when it would stop increasing as social security cut down on children's desirability as support in old age. Better medical technology, more advanced science, smaller government military sectors as the problems of colonisation made armed forces less attractive, and decolonisation would be primarily a problem with the white population being upset about being 'abandoned', a la Northern Ireland.
Redbeard
Banned
wow!
The effect of no WW's is difficult to underestimate!
In short the positive but perhaps also rather naïve belief in progress and technology from the so called “belle epoche” will continue. In some places combined with gradual social reforms in other places the old class society will keep people chained as strong as ever. Socialists and communists will be everywhere, and in some places rise to revolt, but without a major world war, their chance of ultimate success is very small.
In world politics the biggest difference will be the European powers not being drained for blood, gold and self-confidence. The British Empire will be as vivid as ever, and with positive prospects for the future as new technology like wireless and aeroplanes bring down costs of running the Empire. Now and then revolts are to be put down, but basically the biggest issue is the demand from dominions to be taken more serious. Alongside this the overseas investments from Europe to the 3rd world are far above the level from OTL. On top of the receiving end is India and Malaya, but gradually also other parts are seeing a growing infrastructure, educational systems etc. Malaya and Singapore are probably the first candidates for new Dominions.
In Europe the old monarchies are becoming constitutional; a process much speeded up after the landslide socialdemocratic election victory in Germany 1916. Germany now much focuses on social reforms, but keep up a strong army while anxiously watching the Russian juggernaut and the French hothead. The German naval programmes have been downgraded to “France and Russia only”. The Habsburgs have additional problems with all their different nationalities, but basically the Empire consolidates in a union giving much “home rule” to also Slaw provinces, and thus in reality cornering the Hungarians, who since 1848 had been the biggest destabilisator in the Empire. A revolt among Hungarian regiments in 1928 is put down by loyal Bohemian and Austrian regiments, but in general economy is thriving, and Vienna is increasingly becoming the cultural capital of the world.
I Russia the old landowner class is a tough nut to crack, but after the (natural) death of Zar Nikolaj II in 1931 the industrialists succeed in gaining control over the court but timesof unrest and revolt follow. On one side is the “new party” of industrialists, liberals, intellectuals (the cities) etc. wanting thorough reforms and are more or less openly financed by the British and Germans. On the other side are traditionalists run by the landowners and the church, and with broad support in rural areas. Their main claim is to close Russia from foreign influence, but still need a charismatic leader.
In France the dominant feeling is frustration over the humiliation of 1871 never being avenged and over UK and Germany so unopposed manipulating the natural ally of France – Russia. A movement wanting a strong centralised government and national re-birth is gaining support, both popular and among powerful circles. A young officer, Charles de Gaulle is working hard on consolidating power over the movement.
Italy is directing her interest towards the tempting bites of the Ottoman Empire, this Empire having all the internal troubles of a multinational Empire but only a fraction of the economical and industrial power of the other Empires – they simply look like easy prey! So much that the British in order not to have some upstart rival take too much arrange an international coalition to roll over the Ottoman Empire in 1919 and establishing a number of protectorates and with the Lions share going to UK (the casus belli being reports of massacres on Christians in Armenia and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire). A Turkish state is erected around the Bosporus in order to keep that strait shut (for the Russians).
USA is thriving economically and culturally, but with a larger degree of British capital. Politically it has become a firm principle not to get involved outside the American continents, although the Pacific is growingly becoming the exception from that. China is the really hotspot, and might take the role of the Balkans in OTL pre WWI. UK, Japan and USA are the major rivals, but Russia and to a degree France will join if/when they get their internal matters settled. Japan will start out as a British vassal, but will increasingly follow an independent course (like in OTL). But without the British Empire (twice) involved in a major European war there isn’t much the Japanese or any other “upstart” power can do to push back the British from being the only true global power. But sooner or later the British Empire, as all other Empires before that, will fall apart. If not by the hand of outside enemies then by itself, but it might very well outlive all the followers we usually would point to with background in OTL. With 50+ more years of British Empire investment etc. I think India would be a good bid for a 21st century superpower – a kind of 1 billion people Byzans.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
The effect of no WW's is difficult to underestimate!
In short the positive but perhaps also rather naïve belief in progress and technology from the so called “belle epoche” will continue. In some places combined with gradual social reforms in other places the old class society will keep people chained as strong as ever. Socialists and communists will be everywhere, and in some places rise to revolt, but without a major world war, their chance of ultimate success is very small.
In world politics the biggest difference will be the European powers not being drained for blood, gold and self-confidence. The British Empire will be as vivid as ever, and with positive prospects for the future as new technology like wireless and aeroplanes bring down costs of running the Empire. Now and then revolts are to be put down, but basically the biggest issue is the demand from dominions to be taken more serious. Alongside this the overseas investments from Europe to the 3rd world are far above the level from OTL. On top of the receiving end is India and Malaya, but gradually also other parts are seeing a growing infrastructure, educational systems etc. Malaya and Singapore are probably the first candidates for new Dominions.
In Europe the old monarchies are becoming constitutional; a process much speeded up after the landslide socialdemocratic election victory in Germany 1916. Germany now much focuses on social reforms, but keep up a strong army while anxiously watching the Russian juggernaut and the French hothead. The German naval programmes have been downgraded to “France and Russia only”. The Habsburgs have additional problems with all their different nationalities, but basically the Empire consolidates in a union giving much “home rule” to also Slaw provinces, and thus in reality cornering the Hungarians, who since 1848 had been the biggest destabilisator in the Empire. A revolt among Hungarian regiments in 1928 is put down by loyal Bohemian and Austrian regiments, but in general economy is thriving, and Vienna is increasingly becoming the cultural capital of the world.
I Russia the old landowner class is a tough nut to crack, but after the (natural) death of Zar Nikolaj II in 1931 the industrialists succeed in gaining control over the court but timesof unrest and revolt follow. On one side is the “new party” of industrialists, liberals, intellectuals (the cities) etc. wanting thorough reforms and are more or less openly financed by the British and Germans. On the other side are traditionalists run by the landowners and the church, and with broad support in rural areas. Their main claim is to close Russia from foreign influence, but still need a charismatic leader.
In France the dominant feeling is frustration over the humiliation of 1871 never being avenged and over UK and Germany so unopposed manipulating the natural ally of France – Russia. A movement wanting a strong centralised government and national re-birth is gaining support, both popular and among powerful circles. A young officer, Charles de Gaulle is working hard on consolidating power over the movement.
Italy is directing her interest towards the tempting bites of the Ottoman Empire, this Empire having all the internal troubles of a multinational Empire but only a fraction of the economical and industrial power of the other Empires – they simply look like easy prey! So much that the British in order not to have some upstart rival take too much arrange an international coalition to roll over the Ottoman Empire in 1919 and establishing a number of protectorates and with the Lions share going to UK (the casus belli being reports of massacres on Christians in Armenia and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire). A Turkish state is erected around the Bosporus in order to keep that strait shut (for the Russians).
USA is thriving economically and culturally, but with a larger degree of British capital. Politically it has become a firm principle not to get involved outside the American continents, although the Pacific is growingly becoming the exception from that. China is the really hotspot, and might take the role of the Balkans in OTL pre WWI. UK, Japan and USA are the major rivals, but Russia and to a degree France will join if/when they get their internal matters settled. Japan will start out as a British vassal, but will increasingly follow an independent course (like in OTL). But without the British Empire (twice) involved in a major European war there isn’t much the Japanese or any other “upstart” power can do to push back the British from being the only true global power. But sooner or later the British Empire, as all other Empires before that, will fall apart. If not by the hand of outside enemies then by itself, but it might very well outlive all the followers we usually would point to with background in OTL. With 50+ more years of British Empire investment etc. I think India would be a good bid for a 21st century superpower – a kind of 1 billion people Byzans.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
Another major aspect of no world wars by 1945 would specifically relate to the US, in that the civil rights movement would probably have stagnated without the impact of WWI and WWII on promoting the consciousness for racial equality among African-Americans and other minorities. With no largescale mobilisation of all sectors of American society and economy required by total war, blacks and other colored ppl wouldn't have had the opportunities (however limited they were) they had OTL to contribute to the war effort on the homefront and in battle, hence wider American society wouldn't have recognised their contributions as fellow citizens and the cause of desegregation and equality wouldn't have been given the same impetus as exists OTL. Any US military involvements would've been of the limited magnitude of the 1916 Mexican Punitive Expedition and US Marine interventions in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, etc, which would've had blacks either relegated to separate units mainly for noncombat purposes (as per the Army and Navy), or totally excluded (a la USMC and Air Corps) since the existing armed forces could've handled these small-sclae insurgencies on their own without the wholesale recruitment of large nos. of blacks as occurred OTL. Other minorities would've been similarly overlooked despite being allowed to enlist as individuals in all branches, and there probably wouldn't have been the recognition of such Hispanic, Indian or Asian-American heroes as Guy Gabaldon, Ira Hayes, the Navaho Codetalkers, or 442nd RCT. Accordingly, without the tangible contribution of minorities to a collective fight, building on what Carlton stated, racial discrimination and inequality would continue to have been widely accepted without challenge as part and parcel of life by the wider society, plus 'separate but equal' would probably not have been challenged in the courts, and lynchings would have still occurred on a relatively frequent basis as pre-WWI.
Grey Wolf
Donor
Russia is an interesting question - the imponderable is whether Alexei lives (like Leopold son of Victoria did, and Alphonso son of Alphonso XIII lived) and sires children, even if his own reign is short, or whether he dies young (like Prince John of Britain did, albeit not high in the line of succession or from the same thing) and is succeeded by Michael. Michael II's accession would be intriguing - is his son eligible ? After a few years consolidation of power I can well imagine the Russian Patriarch arguing that he is because he is, kind of thing.
You could see a similar situation in Austria-Hungary where Franz Ferdinand wanted to reverse the edict barring his children from the succession and after a consolidated period in power was likely to have been successful with the Pope
Grey Wolf
You could see a similar situation in Austria-Hungary where Franz Ferdinand wanted to reverse the edict barring his children from the succession and after a consolidated period in power was likely to have been successful with the Pope
Grey Wolf
Abdul Hadi Pasha
Banned
I don't think the arts will be conservative; in music at least, several radical directions had been taken prior to WWI - Stravinski's "The Rite of Spring" premiered in 1913.
Contrary to Steffan's Orientalist view of the Ottoman Empire, without WWI there is very little chance of it disappearing, and certainly not organized by the British, who are not going to sacrifice their dominant economic influence there. By 1914 it was a parliamentary state and having lost all its Christian-majority territories, was a very stable polity as proved by its weathering 12 years of continuous warfare. Whatever economic issues it had would soon be solved by oil revenue; by 1945 it would be on its way to becoming a serious regional power, and by 2004, a very rich nation indeed, controlling the oil revenues of today's Saudia Arabia and Iraq, and perhaps Kuwait.
Armenian massacres are not going to happen. Between 1895-1915 there was no ethnic conflict, and without a war I don't see any developing.
The United States will not be adrarian, it was already the greatest industrial power by WWI, and that trend would have continued.
South Slavic nationalism was too much for the Hapsburg Empire to handle, I think. It's hard to imagine the Slavs being content with a federal structure - the Austro-Hungarian empire was not capable of the repression necessary to make such a thing work (although Hungary might have been).
I see it breaking up in the 1920s and the German areas joining the German Empire. Hungary would hold onto its portion for some time, but would be wracked with seperatist ethnic conflict - Seribia would grab Bosnia and the Muslims would all be massacred or expelled, the survivors finding refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Montenegro would be absorbed into Greater Serbia.
Contrary to Steffan's Orientalist view of the Ottoman Empire, without WWI there is very little chance of it disappearing, and certainly not organized by the British, who are not going to sacrifice their dominant economic influence there. By 1914 it was a parliamentary state and having lost all its Christian-majority territories, was a very stable polity as proved by its weathering 12 years of continuous warfare. Whatever economic issues it had would soon be solved by oil revenue; by 1945 it would be on its way to becoming a serious regional power, and by 2004, a very rich nation indeed, controlling the oil revenues of today's Saudia Arabia and Iraq, and perhaps Kuwait.
Armenian massacres are not going to happen. Between 1895-1915 there was no ethnic conflict, and without a war I don't see any developing.
The United States will not be adrarian, it was already the greatest industrial power by WWI, and that trend would have continued.
South Slavic nationalism was too much for the Hapsburg Empire to handle, I think. It's hard to imagine the Slavs being content with a federal structure - the Austro-Hungarian empire was not capable of the repression necessary to make such a thing work (although Hungary might have been).
I see it breaking up in the 1920s and the German areas joining the German Empire. Hungary would hold onto its portion for some time, but would be wracked with seperatist ethnic conflict - Seribia would grab Bosnia and the Muslims would all be massacred or expelled, the survivors finding refuge in the Ottoman Empire. Montenegro would be absorbed into Greater Serbia.
Grey Wolf
Donor
Its well known that I wouldnt agree with this In 1914 the armies went to war as united Habsburg armies and this included the Italian ethnics and the Slavics. IMHO you need an external influence to create the change and getting one short of war is not likely
Also if you look at the actions of Hungary OTL in the 1930s it was gobbling up non-Hiungarian regions (on the back of Nazi victories) and I am not at all convinced that it would not have been able to hold on to the same - i.e. Slovakia is not very highly nationalistic, Transylvania is divided with a large Hungarian populatyion and without a war is going nowhere...Only Croatia had a real potential (see the Ustase) but even there it has been a historical vassal of Huingary for so long that I don't see it going anywhere, and its certainly not in Hungary's interests to let it cnsidering that the entire coastline is Croat
Grey Wolf
In 1914 the armies went to war as united Habsburg armies and this included the Italian ethnics and the Slavics. IMHO you need an external influence to create the change and getting one short of war is not likelyAlso if you look at the actions of Hungary OTL in the 1930s it was gobbling up non-Hiungarian regions (on the back of Nazi victories) and I am not at all convinced that it would not have been able to hold on to the same - i.e. Slovakia is not very highly nationalistic, Transylvania is divided with a large Hungarian populatyion and without a war is going nowhere...Only Croatia had a real potential (see the Ustase) but even there it has been a historical vassal of Huingary for so long that I don't see it going anywhere, and its certainly not in Hungary's interests to let it cnsidering that the entire coastline is Croat
Grey Wolf
Abdul Hadi Pasha said:
Abdul Hadi Pasha
Banned
I said that I thought Hungary could hold onto its minorities, but Russia is not going to lay off provoking minority rebellions. Slovakia might not be highly nationalistic, but see what happens when Bohemia gains independence - and it borders on Russia. I stand by my statement that Hungary will have enduring ethnic problems. And Hungary will gace pressure in Croatia not only from Croatian nationalism but from Serbian intrigues, Italian ambitions, and Russian pan-Slavism.
Grey Wolf said:Its well known that I wouldnt agree with this
Also if you look at the actions of Hungary OTL in the 1930s it was gobbling up non-Hiungarian regions (on the back of Nazi victories) and I am not at all convinced that it would not have been able to hold on to the same - i.e. Slovakia is not very highly nationalistic, Transylvania is divided with a large Hungarian populatyion and without a war is going nowhere...Only Croatia had a real potential (see the Ustase) but even there it has been a historical vassal of Huingary for so long that I don't see it going anywhere, and its certainly not in Hungary's interests to let it cnsidering that the entire coastline is Croat
Grey Wolf
Grey Wolf
Donor
Uh, sorry if I came across as harsh, don't know how. I just don't sdubscribe to inevitabilities
I also don't see Croats and Serbs as natural partners unless thrown together by war. Look at the different competing South Slav political organisations in WW1 and you can see that only the war brought them together.
As for Hungary, why would not an iron fist suffice to keep down its minorities? And are you sure Bohemia would get independence and not become a kingdom of the German Empire ?
Also I don't think Russia is going to be conspiring against Hungary - it would probably try an alliance and to use it, ignoring any Slav minorities for its greater aims which fits the pattern of Russian pan-Slavism q well
Grey Wolf
I also don't see Croats and Serbs as natural partners unless thrown together by war. Look at the different competing South Slav political organisations in WW1 and you can see that only the war brought them together.
As for Hungary, why would not an iron fist suffice to keep down its minorities? And are you sure Bohemia would get independence and not become a kingdom of the German Empire ?
Also I don't think Russia is going to be conspiring against Hungary - it would probably try an alliance and to use it, ignoring any Slav minorities for its greater aims which fits the pattern of Russian pan-Slavism q well
Grey Wolf
Abdul Hadi Pasha said:
Abdul Hadi Pasha
Banned
I don't subscribe to inevitabilities, either, just high probabilities. The ethnic balance the Hapsburg Empire was based upon was inherently unstable and growing more so by the day - there are just too many things that can go wrong and send it crashing down. I would give Hungary a very good chance of lasting a long time, though.
Grey Wolf said:
Redbeard
Banned
Abdul Hadi Pasha said:
Pasha - I kind'a guessed we wouldn't agree on the Ottomans or the Habsburgs, and I hesitate to repeat what has been said numerous times before, but in short (!):
The strength/extension of the pre-1914 slav nationalism is usually wildly exagerated, because that same nationalism to a very large degree was a product of WWI, and thus appear very dominant from a post WWI point of view. So no WWI will mean no boost for slav nationalism (I don't say it won't exist, there are also people nowadays wanting to reunite Scania with Denmark), and the Habsburg Empire will be given a good chance to let the good times go on. The industrialisation of the Habsburg Empire was not at least in Bohemaia and Moravia, which very much would be contributing to pushing the Hungarian landowning nobles away from control for the benefit of core (industrialised) Slaw areas. This is not even special for the Habsburg Empire, but was bascially what happened all over Europe in these years (pre 1914) - landowners giving way to industry. WWI didn't speed this this process, but mainly paused it in the victoríous nations and among the loosers it was stopped and shifted into something completely different and mostly totalitarian.
The British having economic interest in Ottoman areas will not necessarily have them fight for the Ottoman Empire, but they will fight for their economic interests - as allways and as they should. Even if it was true, that the Ottomans were not as bad off as it is usually depicted (which won't tell us much), then it is a fact that the Ottomans were seen as easy prey, and as soon as a major power looks like moving, the British will be forced to be proactive - sort of: robbing the bank before anybody else does it. Or more precisely arranging a co-ordinated plunder/bank-run were all the other bullies (except the one being plundered) gets their part of the loot. In that way the level of conflict would be low and it would all appear to be in best possible taste! And it really isn't of any importance what the formal reason for the action is - you can allways find and spin something. But I agree that no WWI makes events in a magnitude like the Armenian genocide less likely.
The next question is how much of a fight will the Ottoman be able to put up? They are hopelessly behind the other powers in economy, infrastructure and industry and will not be stronger than in OTL, as they are less likely to have strong natural allies (Germany being more introvert, the Habsburgs and Russians are natural enemies, Italy is plainly greedy, France could be an option, but she is too weak and can be bought with a share of the loot). So no chance of defending the Empire outside the Turkish populated core. If the allies try a landing like Gallipoli, they will, if still being as ill prepared and ill performing, be in trouble, but they might also succeed and Istanbul risk sharing the fate of her predecessor Konstantinople. But anyway I don't think the difference will be big, as not at least UK needs a relatively strong power as a plug to keep the Russians inside the Black Sea.
I will be much surprised if we agree on anything concerning these subjects - but I do like suprises!
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
Grey Wolf
Donor
There is of course the question of Russia where the Ottoman Empire is concerned. In fact it is by and large the ONLY real question remaining after the Second Balkan War as the Ottomans can face off the Arabs on their own, and maybe even bring Ibn Saud to heel in time.
Its always a difficult and nebulous affair to base an understanding of plans on scenarios drawn up by the general staff, but there does exist a detailed revision of a 19th century plan which basically has a Russian attack on the Bosphorus and a war by c 1920
Looking for evidence to back this up as being realistic and not some Plan Orange or what-have-you, there are several things mostly naval which can be pointed to :-
1. Russia acquired a lease on facilities at Bizerta (Tunis) from the French
2. Russia was going to establish a Mediterranean Squadron akin to Germany's
3. Russia was trying to get the Greeks to lease them Lemnos
4. Russian plans for 16"-gunned battleships were going to go before the Duma in late 1914, with the first ones planned for the Black Sea
This is indicative of a build-up for a purpose, and it can be seen from Russian actions and also the promises exacted from Allies in The Great War that Russia was definitely still gunning for direct ownership and annexation of the Straits, inclusding Constantinople/Istanbul
Therefore, if by 1920 there is no war, and especially if the Austro-Hungarian Empire is undergoing some sort of internal tumult, then one could certainly look for a Russo-Turkish war in the pattern of the several 19th century conflicts, but this time intended to end it once and for all
Grey Wolf
Its always a difficult and nebulous affair to base an understanding of plans on scenarios drawn up by the general staff, but there does exist a detailed revision of a 19th century plan which basically has a Russian attack on the Bosphorus and a war by c 1920
Looking for evidence to back this up as being realistic and not some Plan Orange or what-have-you, there are several things mostly naval which can be pointed to :-
1. Russia acquired a lease on facilities at Bizerta (Tunis) from the French
2. Russia was going to establish a Mediterranean Squadron akin to Germany's
3. Russia was trying to get the Greeks to lease them Lemnos
4. Russian plans for 16"-gunned battleships were going to go before the Duma in late 1914, with the first ones planned for the Black Sea
This is indicative of a build-up for a purpose, and it can be seen from Russian actions and also the promises exacted from Allies in The Great War that Russia was definitely still gunning for direct ownership and annexation of the Straits, inclusding Constantinople/Istanbul
Therefore, if by 1920 there is no war, and especially if the Austro-Hungarian Empire is undergoing some sort of internal tumult, then one could certainly look for a Russo-Turkish war in the pattern of the several 19th century conflicts, but this time intended to end it once and for all
Grey Wolf
National Listing
Austria-Hungary
The ethnic groups are divided between R and K, between people that have more children than money, and people that have more money than children. In terms of taxes they are about the same. R people have more kids in school, more young criminals in jail, more young mothers on welfare, etc, but K people have more old people on social security, in insane asylums, in old peoples homes, and in hospitals.
The dependency ratio and cost is the same, especially since K kids go to better schools where more money is spent on the teachers. Hell, even when K and R kids go to the same schools, the better, senior, more expensive teachers teach the K kids. This is not a racial thing in white ubiquity areas, and it isn't even a class thing, really. You can change classes easily in this country.
So the K people like the Bohemians, Slovenians, and urbanised Jews go with the Germans by choice. The R peoples fight over land and government jobs. Hungarians individually outnumber the Slovaks, the Rumanians, the Ukrainians, the Serbs, and the Croats. They will draw the borders so that there are more ethnic minorities inside their borders than Hungarians outside.
They are also organised and that gives them the advantage that they know that they are benefitting from the system, while the ethnic minorities don't know that they will benefit, or whether all the confiscated Hungarian land and cushy government jobs will go to someone else.
In fact, in WWI most minorities just surrendered instead of joining the enemy armies of their coethnic groups. The Czech legion was an anomaly, not a common occurence.
Italy is big enough and coherent enough that they may get the Tyrol up to the mountain crests by just buying the German lands at a reasonable price. It's cheaper than a war with Austria. Everyone else will have to fight or to accept the boundaries that Hungary draws. If Hungary is smart they will do a quiet ethnic cleansing by realator where they simply pay the landowners and everyone else to leave, financing the effort by selling the lands of the Hungarians on the other side of the new border. Otherwise they are R people and they will just have lots of kids until there is a large minority again. That's what annoys the Serbs about the Albanians. You massacre them today and in thirty years they are back again. I would just have given them Kosovo in 1912.
Unfortunately the Hungarians that are smart tend to go into education, science, and inventing. Politically Hungarians are not the brightest people in the world. Not militarily, either.
Austria-Hungary
The ethnic groups are divided between R and K, between people that have more children than money, and people that have more money than children. In terms of taxes they are about the same. R people have more kids in school, more young criminals in jail, more young mothers on welfare, etc, but K people have more old people on social security, in insane asylums, in old peoples homes, and in hospitals.
The dependency ratio and cost is the same, especially since K kids go to better schools where more money is spent on the teachers. Hell, even when K and R kids go to the same schools, the better, senior, more expensive teachers teach the K kids. This is not a racial thing in white ubiquity areas, and it isn't even a class thing, really. You can change classes easily in this country.
So the K people like the Bohemians, Slovenians, and urbanised Jews go with the Germans by choice. The R peoples fight over land and government jobs. Hungarians individually outnumber the Slovaks, the Rumanians, the Ukrainians, the Serbs, and the Croats. They will draw the borders so that there are more ethnic minorities inside their borders than Hungarians outside.
They are also organised and that gives them the advantage that they know that they are benefitting from the system, while the ethnic minorities don't know that they will benefit, or whether all the confiscated Hungarian land and cushy government jobs will go to someone else.
In fact, in WWI most minorities just surrendered instead of joining the enemy armies of their coethnic groups. The Czech legion was an anomaly, not a common occurence.
Italy is big enough and coherent enough that they may get the Tyrol up to the mountain crests by just buying the German lands at a reasonable price. It's cheaper than a war with Austria. Everyone else will have to fight or to accept the boundaries that Hungary draws. If Hungary is smart they will do a quiet ethnic cleansing by realator where they simply pay the landowners and everyone else to leave, financing the effort by selling the lands of the Hungarians on the other side of the new border. Otherwise they are R people and they will just have lots of kids until there is a large minority again. That's what annoys the Serbs about the Albanians. You massacre them today and in thirty years they are back again. I would just have given them Kosovo in 1912.
Unfortunately the Hungarians that are smart tend to go into education, science, and inventing. Politically Hungarians are not the brightest people in the world. Not militarily, either.
Abdul Hadi Pasha
Banned
Steffan, outside of a general European War there is zero chance of Britain grabbing any Ottoman territory, with the possible exception of a Russian attack upon the Ottoman Empire on a scale that causes it to fall, which is a dubious prospect at best. In the entire history of the Ottoman Empire, the British did not once grab an integral part of the empire other than WWI, and the "lease" of Cyprus after the 1877-78 War, which was negotiated with the Ottomans and was intended specifically to provide them with a base to defend them against further Russian incursion. And, the terms of the treaty, which remained in effect until WWI, the Ottomans retained control over all the domestic administration, and all revenue surplus to paying for the British presence was remitted to the Ottoman treasury (or toward the Ottoman debt).
Egypt, which was largely independent, was occupied by Britain in 1882 against the will of the British government, which had wanted the Ottomans to occupy it with British assistance, and for several years afterwards the British tried to get the Ottomans to assume control.
France was allowed to occupy Tunis by the British as a quid pro quo for accepting British control over Cyprus, and Italy was allowed its free hand in Libya for largely the same reason and had to spend decades preparing the diplomatic grounds for this.
So, that leaves us with the military dimension. Which powers were capable of defeating the Ottomans 1 on 1? Here is a list of possible powers:
Italy
France
Russia
Greece
Britain
Italy wasn't even able to defeat the Ottomans in Libya; on the mainland, they would have a zero chance of beating the Ottomans in an invasion.
Ditto France.
Greece was crushed by the Ottomans in a couple of weeks when Greece invaded in 1897; in 1922 they lasted longer, but the Ottoman army had been demobilized and Anatolia was being simultaneously invaded by Armenia, Greece, France, Italy, Britain, and Russia.
Britain could probably muster the military strength to win, but I would say would have no chance to generate the casus belli or public opinion to do so, nor would the possible rewards be worth the effort - after all, what is to be gained? They have economic interests, which are already settled, and the Suez Canal, which is already under control.
That leaves Russia. A seaborne invasion has no chance. Yes, they planned it, but where Britain and France failed miserably, Russia will not do better. The only other route of invasion is through the Caucasus. In WWI, while the Russians were invading, the Ottomans were having to deal with Gallipoli, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. Nevertheless, the Russians never got more than a hundred or so miles across the border, largely due to the failure of an insane winter offensive launched by Enver. In order to plow across the mountainous Anatolia, through the Ottoman heartland, Russia would have to expend enormous resources, and I'm not sure Russia had the stability to pursue an offensive war at this time for gains that would not be important to the Russian populace.
Also, by the 20th c, the tables were turning; the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan Wars had become religiously homogeneous and no longer had any territory containing a seperatist majority, whereas the Russian Empire was suffering from severe instability. The Ottoman army was in the process of totally restructuring when WWI began, so the window of opportunity for Russia would have been very small, and after the Balkan Wars, its hard to imagine any source of casus belli.
The Orientalist view of the Ottoman Empire as some feudal state that reached its peak under Suleyman and went steadily downhill after that is a relic of the 18th century that dies hard. First of all, the Ottoman Empire was never a feudal state, and it continuously evolved over time, it didn't freeze in place in 1550. In the middle of the 19th c it began a furious program of reform that by WWI had produced a relatively modern polity with a secularist outlook and a representative parliament. Modern Arab nationalist states tend to downplay the Ottoman period as one of stagnation and oppression, but Syria, Arabia and Iraq were very much an integral part of the Ottoman polity, not occupied colonies; a large portion of the army defending Gallipoli was Arab, as was a large part of the Ottoman ruling class, including the Grand Vizier. The "Arab Revolt" consisted of a few thousand beduin tribesmen, the vast majority of the empire's Arabs (and Kurds) remaing loyal to the end, even though promised independence (they were not naive about this). In case of a naked imperialist grab by Italy, their defense would be furious.
As to the overall powers of resistance of the Ottomans in the WWI period, you need look only at WWI. After losing half the army in the Balkan Wars (due to a stupid strategic plan and an inexplicable decision to reduce the standing army by 1/3 just prior, plus the fact that the army was undergoing a massive restructure at the time and most of the best officers were in Libya resisting the Italians), the Ottomans were still able to fight on seven fronts simultaneously and manage to hold on more or less intact until 1918, even then conquering the entire trans-Caucasus, and never enduring any civil disturbance in the process, then going on to defeat all comers in the invasions after the war, after having demobilized - that's 12 years of total war against and enormous array of enemies. That's pretty impressive, given the resources of the empire. And those resources would only have increased as time passed, given the oil.
With regard to Slavic nationalism, all I can say is, whaaa? Serbian ambitions for a Greater Serbia began in 1830 when they gained autonomy, and they had been feverishly eying Bosnia since that time. This did not begin with WWI; if anything Serbian ambition CAUSED WWI. Actually, my principle problem with this WI is that Serbian ambitions would eventually have led to a showdown with Austria-Hungary, and the alliance system would still have done its thing. AH specifically occupied BH to forestall its falling into the hands of Serbia.
Egypt, which was largely independent, was occupied by Britain in 1882 against the will of the British government, which had wanted the Ottomans to occupy it with British assistance, and for several years afterwards the British tried to get the Ottomans to assume control.
France was allowed to occupy Tunis by the British as a quid pro quo for accepting British control over Cyprus, and Italy was allowed its free hand in Libya for largely the same reason and had to spend decades preparing the diplomatic grounds for this.
So, that leaves us with the military dimension. Which powers were capable of defeating the Ottomans 1 on 1? Here is a list of possible powers:
Italy
France
Russia
Greece
Britain
Italy wasn't even able to defeat the Ottomans in Libya; on the mainland, they would have a zero chance of beating the Ottomans in an invasion.
Ditto France.
Greece was crushed by the Ottomans in a couple of weeks when Greece invaded in 1897; in 1922 they lasted longer, but the Ottoman army had been demobilized and Anatolia was being simultaneously invaded by Armenia, Greece, France, Italy, Britain, and Russia.
Britain could probably muster the military strength to win, but I would say would have no chance to generate the casus belli or public opinion to do so, nor would the possible rewards be worth the effort - after all, what is to be gained? They have economic interests, which are already settled, and the Suez Canal, which is already under control.
That leaves Russia. A seaborne invasion has no chance. Yes, they planned it, but where Britain and France failed miserably, Russia will not do better. The only other route of invasion is through the Caucasus. In WWI, while the Russians were invading, the Ottomans were having to deal with Gallipoli, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. Nevertheless, the Russians never got more than a hundred or so miles across the border, largely due to the failure of an insane winter offensive launched by Enver. In order to plow across the mountainous Anatolia, through the Ottoman heartland, Russia would have to expend enormous resources, and I'm not sure Russia had the stability to pursue an offensive war at this time for gains that would not be important to the Russian populace.
Also, by the 20th c, the tables were turning; the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan Wars had become religiously homogeneous and no longer had any territory containing a seperatist majority, whereas the Russian Empire was suffering from severe instability. The Ottoman army was in the process of totally restructuring when WWI began, so the window of opportunity for Russia would have been very small, and after the Balkan Wars, its hard to imagine any source of casus belli.
The Orientalist view of the Ottoman Empire as some feudal state that reached its peak under Suleyman and went steadily downhill after that is a relic of the 18th century that dies hard. First of all, the Ottoman Empire was never a feudal state, and it continuously evolved over time, it didn't freeze in place in 1550. In the middle of the 19th c it began a furious program of reform that by WWI had produced a relatively modern polity with a secularist outlook and a representative parliament. Modern Arab nationalist states tend to downplay the Ottoman period as one of stagnation and oppression, but Syria, Arabia and Iraq were very much an integral part of the Ottoman polity, not occupied colonies; a large portion of the army defending Gallipoli was Arab, as was a large part of the Ottoman ruling class, including the Grand Vizier. The "Arab Revolt" consisted of a few thousand beduin tribesmen, the vast majority of the empire's Arabs (and Kurds) remaing loyal to the end, even though promised independence (they were not naive about this). In case of a naked imperialist grab by Italy, their defense would be furious.
As to the overall powers of resistance of the Ottomans in the WWI period, you need look only at WWI. After losing half the army in the Balkan Wars (due to a stupid strategic plan and an inexplicable decision to reduce the standing army by 1/3 just prior, plus the fact that the army was undergoing a massive restructure at the time and most of the best officers were in Libya resisting the Italians), the Ottomans were still able to fight on seven fronts simultaneously and manage to hold on more or less intact until 1918, even then conquering the entire trans-Caucasus, and never enduring any civil disturbance in the process, then going on to defeat all comers in the invasions after the war, after having demobilized - that's 12 years of total war against and enormous array of enemies. That's pretty impressive, given the resources of the empire. And those resources would only have increased as time passed, given the oil.
With regard to Slavic nationalism, all I can say is, whaaa? Serbian ambitions for a Greater Serbia began in 1830 when they gained autonomy, and they had been feverishly eying Bosnia since that time. This did not begin with WWI; if anything Serbian ambition CAUSED WWI. Actually, my principle problem with this WI is that Serbian ambitions would eventually have led to a showdown with Austria-Hungary, and the alliance system would still have done its thing. AH specifically occupied BH to forestall its falling into the hands of Serbia.
A few thoughts
There's a lot of good points, and I'm not going to try to postulate a timeline of my own here. I may eventually, thought.
I see a few things that will come into play, though.
1. The Ottoman Empire, if it doesn't get dismembered, has a great potential to become quite rich in the 1920's. Control of the Middle East oil fields will insure this. By 1916 or so, the Ottoman Navy will have 3 dreadnoughts, one with 14 12" guns and 2 more with 10 13.5" guns. I wouldn't be surprised to see them purchase more, and later, as the money flows in from oil, develop facilities to build their own.
2. Some sort of Naval Understanding will have to be worked out between Germany and Britian before they bankrupt themselves. Either that, or the Reichstag and Parliament simply stop voting money for the fleets. I'd expect Britain to end up with a significant lead over Germany. There was an attempt, IIRC, by Britain and Germany to end up with such an agreement at one point. Perhaps this ends up being the POD that keeps Britian less threatened by Germany.
3. Without the wartime pressure on aircraft development, they will, IMHO, develop slower. As a rsult, the battleship remains queen of the seas for longer--probably right up to the 1945 landmark for the proposed no World Wars.
A Washington treaty may or amy not occur. If the naval race peters out in the early 20's, probably not. I certainly find no Washington Treaty more interesting. Battleships continue to grow--perhaps the US gets a pair of Lexingtons and a pair of South Dakota's (the ones cancelled by the treaty)
The US may become the number one naval power, but more likely simply overtakes Germany. Britain's two-power standard will be history.
Also, the potential of the submarine will remain uncertain.
Oh, yes--the volatility of British cordite remains undiscovered for some time to come.
Just a few random thoughts, make what you will of them.
There's a lot of good points, and I'm not going to try to postulate a timeline of my own here. I may eventually, thought.
I see a few things that will come into play, though.
1. The Ottoman Empire, if it doesn't get dismembered, has a great potential to become quite rich in the 1920's. Control of the Middle East oil fields will insure this. By 1916 or so, the Ottoman Navy will have 3 dreadnoughts, one with 14 12" guns and 2 more with 10 13.5" guns. I wouldn't be surprised to see them purchase more, and later, as the money flows in from oil, develop facilities to build their own.
2. Some sort of Naval Understanding will have to be worked out between Germany and Britian before they bankrupt themselves. Either that, or the Reichstag and Parliament simply stop voting money for the fleets. I'd expect Britain to end up with a significant lead over Germany. There was an attempt, IIRC, by Britain and Germany to end up with such an agreement at one point. Perhaps this ends up being the POD that keeps Britian less threatened by Germany.
3. Without the wartime pressure on aircraft development, they will, IMHO, develop slower. As a rsult, the battleship remains queen of the seas for longer--probably right up to the 1945 landmark for the proposed no World Wars.
A Washington treaty may or amy not occur. If the naval race peters out in the early 20's, probably not. I certainly find no Washington Treaty more interesting. Battleships continue to grow--perhaps the US gets a pair of Lexingtons and a pair of South Dakota's (the ones cancelled by the treaty)
The US may become the number one naval power, but more likely simply overtakes Germany. Britain's two-power standard will be history.
Also, the potential of the submarine will remain uncertain.
Oh, yes--the volatility of British cordite remains undiscovered for some time to come.
Just a few random thoughts, make what you will of them.
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