Posturing and positioning between the various factions of the Angolan conflict began before the ink had even dried on the agreement for independence. July 1975 saw the expulsion of FNLA-aligned fighters from Luanda by the MPLA. All sides acknowledged that the force that controlled the capital would have the strongest claim to leadership. The Alvor Accords, which had been signed in January and had encouraged the creation of a coalition government, was thrown on the pyre before it ever had a chance to be honoured. By August, the MPLA controlled 11 of 15 provincial capitals, although the FNLA and UNITA remained in control of wide swathes of the countryside. Angered by MPLA support for the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) and concerned about the possible establishment of Soviet military bases in Angola in the event of a total MPLA victory, South African forces intervened on 23 October. The bulk of South African forces were in Task Force Zulu composed of Combat Group Alpha which, alongside South African special forces, also included detachments of formerly Portuguese-commanded
flechas, the "Caprivi Bushman" battalion of Khoisan troops from South West Africa, armoured cars, a mortar platoon and a 140mm artillery battalion; and Combat Group Bravo under the command of Biafran War veteran Jan Breytenbach which included a battalion of forces loyal to Daniel Chipenda, whose Eastern Revolt had defected to the FNLA, as well as armoured cars and 25mm and 140mm howitzers. Alongside Task Force Zulu the South Africans also deployed three independent combat groups: Foxbat, the bulk of which was made up of several hundred UNITA infantrymen, alongside armoured cars, 3 anti-tank missile vehicles and two .50 cal machine gun-equipped Landrovers; Orange, which had a UNITA battalion, a South African motorised infantry company, a South African medium machine gun platoon, 140mm artillery and an armoured car squadron; and X-Ray, the most lightly-armed of the combat groups, with one UNITA battalion, a SADF infantry company and supporting armoured cars without artillery support.
SADF artilleryman posing with howitzers during Operation Savannah
Crossing into Angola from near the Cubango river, Task Force Zulu drove north through FNLA and UNITA territory, heading north to Menongue and then west to Capelongo, before heading south and capturing Ondjiva with no resistance. Zulu then drove northwest, entering Lubango and then driving westward towards the coast, to Moçâmedes and Porto Alexandre. Zulu had now taken virtually the whole south of Angola without having to engage in battle with the MPLA forces, which had withdrawn north and avoided battle against the well-trained and equipped South African-led forces. Task Force Zulu returned to Lubango before marching north towards Benguela. Task Force Zulu first met enemy resistance at the town of Catengue, on the road southeast of Benguela. MPLA defenses were quickly broken and Zulu entered Benguela on 5 November. A day later they entered Lobito to the north of Benguela, linking up with Foxbat. Combat Group Foxbat had been deployed deep into UNITA-held territory at the beginning of the South African intervention, and had been tasked with defending Nova Lisboa. It repulsed an MPLA offensive and then countered, seizing Balombo and moving west where it rendezvoused with Task Force Zulu. Meanwhile, in the northern enclave of Cabinda, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (
Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, FLEC) with the assistance of Biafran mercenaries, mounted an assault on the besieged MPLA garrison. Managing to repulse the initial attack, the MPLA garrison survived, and the FLEC were suddenly swept up by a cross-border incursion by Congo to aid the MPLA [187]. The FNLA, concerned at Congo's cross-border intervention in Cabinda, and feeling cornered between the socialist giant to the north and the MPLA to the south, redoubled their efforts to push south and link up with UNITA and South African forces. On 10 November, FNLA forces struck south from Caxito along the highway towards Luanda. Entrenched MPLA forces met the FNLA forces at the bridge at Quifangondo. The FNLA forces were personally commanded by Holden Roberto, who sought a triumpant entry into the capital. His troops were supported by a handful of medium artillery pieces manned by South African crews. A squadron of SADF English Electric Canberra medium bombers provided air support for the FNLA. Whilst the initial artillery barrage and bombing runs against the defenders were ineffective, the FNLA troops did manage to take the bridge, albeit with fairly heavy casualties which slowed their advance towards Luanda[188]. Despite victory in the battle, almost all of the FNLA vehicles were destroyed, and the defenders were successful in delaying the FNLA long enough for the independence date to be reached with Neto's MPLA still in control of Luanda. At 6 P.M, Portuguese high commissioner Leonel Alexandre Gomes Cardoso announced that Portugal was transferring sovereignty to "the Angolan people" and departed Luanda by sea. At midnight, Neto announced the independence of the "People's Republic of Angola"(
República Popular de Angola, RPA) which was immediately recognised by several nations, including the Soviet Union, Congo and many non-aligned nations. In response, Jonas Savimbi and Holden Roberto mounted a joint declaration of the People's Democratic Republic of Angola (
República Popular Democrática de Angola, RPDA). No nations recognised the RPDA immediately, not even their allies in South Africa and the Central African Federation.
As the fighting had raged at Quifangondo, Task Force Zulu continued their drive up the coast, capturing Novo Redondo on November 13th. By this time FNLA troops had reached the outskirts of Luanda, but were having difficulty making any headway. Their artillery was of limited use, and the dug-in MPLA forces were better-equipped with superior small arms procured from the Warsaw Pact nations. The MPLA forces were also equipped with BM-21 "Grad" 122mm rocket launchers, the spiritual successor to the famed
Katyusha mounted rocket batteries of the 'Great Patriotic War'. These rockets were effective at damaging soft targets like enemy infantry as they attempted to push into Luanda using ineffectual and poorly-coordinated human wave attacks. Their morale waning after a number of unsuccessful pushes, FNLA forces established a cordon to the north of Luanda, deciding to wait to link up with South African and UNITA forces. Roberto would have preferred to take Luanda himself so as to establish himself as the senior of himself and Savimbi, but he couldn't risk his offensive turning into a rout. Roberto's position was made more tenuous as, without announcement, Congolese troops crossed the border at two points: Noqui and Maquela do Zombo on November 19th. Riverine forces of the Congo also captured Soyo at the estuary of the Congo river. Marching south rapidly, Congolese motorised infantry met only mild resistance as they captured M'banza Congo, one of the most significant cities of the north and the traditional capital for the Kongo people in Angola. In an attempt to delay the South African advance until the Congolese intervention could take pressure off Luanda, MPLA forces at several points inland made probing attacks into UNITA territory, which were repulsed by combat groups Foxbat and X-Ray. Foxbat then pushed northward parallel with Task Force Zulu's advance along the coast, seizing Ebo [189], then Gabela, then Quilenda. Combat Group Orange would cover Foxbat's eastern flank, taking Quibala and Conde before linking up with Foxbat again north at Dondo on the Cuanza river. Task Force Zulu took Port Amboim, before swinging inland to Mumbundo to enable support for the independent combat groups if necessary. Foxbat and Orange once again pushed north, this time seeking to take Vila Salazar, opening the roads to the FNLA territory in the north and isolating Luanda from the MPLA's inland territory. Here South African-led forces would experience the most dogged resistance yet; MPLA forces which had been stationed around Malange had pushed west to support the defense of Luanda (or, if possible, to mount a counter-attack into FNLA territory) and to prevent potential isolate by the fast-moving South African combat groups. It appeared that a decisive phase of the conflict was looming; whoever was in control of Vila Salazar would have the upper hand in the battle for the capital; but for the FNLA-UNITA-SADF forces, this victory needed to be quick. By this point Congolese forces had reached the outskirts of Carmona. By the new year, they would certainly be at Luanda, threatening a complete annihilation of FNLA forces. If Vila Salazar was taken, it would be possible for South African forces to stabilise the front at Vista Alegre and prevent a Congolese outflanking of FNLA troops. If the MPLA successfully rebuffed the South Africans, Roberto's only hope would be a retreat via Catete, where his troops would be harassed and vulnerable until linking up with SADF-UNITA forces. This would also require a complete abandonment of the traditional Kongo territory to Congolese occupation, without even the capture of Luanda to show for it. FNLA as a military force would be preserved, but its political influence would be severely reduced, and Holden Roberto would have to kiss his dreams of the presidency goodbye in that scenario, accepting having to play second fiddle to Savimbi. The Congolese intervention had turned the reality of the conflict on its head; from a near certain victory over an MPLA which was under attack on all sides, Roberto now found himself increasingly cornered. As any boxer will tell you, often the best course of action when cornered is a massive, decisive, fully-committed attack.
In the inland eastern regions of Angola, UNITA had failed in several attacks to seize territory from the MPLA. The relative low intensity of the conflict in the east relative to the hotly-contested western coastal regions enabled the lightly-equipped combat group X-Ray to play a key role in proceedings. Seeing that the UNITA forces were unable to mount effective offensive action in this sector, X-Ray was committed to an attack on Vila Luso, which it captured with little issue. X-Ray and UNITA troops continued their advance to the east and north. UNITA forces with some difficulty managed to capture Henrique de Carvalho [190], whilst X-Ray seized the only useful crossing from Congo into eastern Angola at Teixiera de Sousa. X-Ray would remain in eastern Angola for the rest of its deployment, keeping surveillance on the border with Congo and engaging in small-scale skirmishes with MPLA militants. Back in the west, the fighting at Vila Salazar raged. The initial attack by the joint combat groups of X-Ray and Orange inflicted heavy casualties but were unable to dislodge the MPLA militants from Vila Salazar in the initial assault. Instead they wheeled around to the east of the town, intercepting and engaging with MPLA forces attempting to reinforce Vila Salazar. This succeeded in keeping much of the MPLA reinforcements from reaching the more defensible township. With the arrival of Task Force Zulu, the town was eventually taken after being softened up with artillery and air bombardment. As this fighting was going on, Holden Roberto's FNLA forces had driven east. Leaving some forces outside of Luanda, the bulk of FNLA forces redeployed to Vista Alegre where a tense stand-off occurred upon the arrival of Congolese troops marching south from Quitexe.
As a new year commenced, there was a temporary halt in the fighting as diplomats flew back and forth between capitals attempting to prevent a major regional war. South African involvement in the Angolan civil war had become obvious to the outside world, and the already internationally-unpopular white supremacist government in South Africa was receiving criticism for their intervention. The US State Department and intelligence services were split on policy; the intelligence services seeking to support the apartheid regime as a means to prevent socialist or communist black African-led governments from taking over the whole of Southern Africa, whereas the State Department saw white minority rule in South Africa as highly-problematic for the United States' international reputation. It wasn't long since segregation had been outlawed in the United States; supporting an openly racist white supremacist state wasn't a good look when espousing the values of liberty and equality. The Congolese and South African interests in the conflict were both fundamentally realpolitik in motivation, however. South Africa wanted to cut off support for the SWAPO. Congo didn't want another right-wing nation threatening its southern border; Rhodesia-Nyasaland was already positioned uncomfortably close to the valuable Katanga province. A temporary ceasefire was brokered as negotiations were underway between representatives of the three Angolan factions, the Congolese, South Africa and with the United States who sought to act as mediators. It was agreed that peace in Angola necessitated the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country, but neither of the major interventionist states would withdraw without the other also doing so as well as guaranteeing that certain preconditions were met: the Congolese government wanted the expatriation of members of ABAKO-R (
Alliance des Bakongo - Résistance), a fringe splinter group from ABAKO which sought the secession of Bakongo regions from the DRC as well as free elections, which they believed that MPLA would win. The South Africans claimed that they would be willing to cease involvement in the internal affairs of Angola if assistance to SWAPO ended.
Flag of Angola after Moroni Accords, chosen as not to favour any one of the major parties
By April 1976, a temporary solution was achieved with the Moroni Accords. All parties agreed in principle that free elections would occur in the future after a vague "period of stabilisation". Congolese and South African troops would be withdrawn from the country. The 200 or so ABAKO-R operatives in northern Angola would be sent back to Congo and support for SWAPO would cease immediately. Any SWAPO operatives attempting to cross the border into Angola were to be arrested and immediately turned over to South African authorities. A provisional government would be established with a weak executive branch, with a presidency which would be turned over after a mere two years as long as free elections had not yet been held. According to the agreement, Neto would be the first president, to be followed by Roberto in 1978 and Savimbi in 1980. One of the biggest bones of contention, about the interior minister position, was papered over by a poor short-term solution: Nito Alves, a notable MPLA leader who had been active in organising "popular power" committees in the slums of Luanda, was assigned to the position. In order to convince Savimbi and Roberto to agree, both the FNLA and UNITA were allowed to maintain their armed militia forces and
de facto governance of the territories they held prior to the foreign interventions. A number of key issues were left unaddressed, most notably how exactly free elections were supposed to be held in a country with three separate parties which maintained armed militia forces. The primary concern was putting a halt to the immediate threat of escalation and a regional conflict, which it can be said was partially successful.
The fragile peace in Angola would be again tested, this time by internecine power struggles within MPLA. Having seen Nito Alves slowly accumulate more influence within the party, Agostinho Neto sought to limit his power by suspending him in October 1976, accusing Alves and Chief of Staff José Van-Dunem of "fractionalism". Alves was an ultra-left figure within the MPLA, but had actively suppressed the Maoist Organisation of Angolan Communists and promoted partnerships with the Soviet Union. Where he had been outspoken and broke with the consensus amongst other leading MPLA members was his hostility towards white and mestizo Angolans, even going so far as to state that mestizos should have to apply for citizenship, and that whites should only be given membership if they had been voluntarily part of the independence struggle (like Van-Dunem's wife). Alves and Van-Dunem claimed that a commission of enquiry should be created around the issue of "fractionalism" so that they could plead their case that the suspensions had been unjust. José Eduardo Dos Santos, another leading MPLA figure, headed the commission of enquiry and drew out the proceedings. After 12 hours of debate, it was decided that Alves and Van-Dunem's suspensions would stand. Alves and Van-Dunem immediately began plotting a seizure of power in secret. In the early morning of 27 May 1977, forces of the 8th Brigade commanded by Jacobo Caetano and loyal to Alves seized key points throughout Luanda, including the radio station, presidential palace and a prison, where supporters of Alves were freed. Caetano's forces expected to find Neto in the palace, but concerned about the possibility of a coup, he had moved his operations to the Ministry of Defence building. 8th Brigade troops, after executing a number of political figures they had captured in their initial attack immediately besieged the Ministry of Defence building[191]. Neto was captured after attempting to escape through secret tunnels built underneath the Ministry of Defence building. On threat of harm being done to his family, Neto was forced to make a phony public confession to being a "counter-revolutionary, a bourgeois nationalist and a traitor to the international revolutionary struggle". Neto would be shot in the head immediately after the broadcast finished. The putschists made calls over the radio to the people of Luanda, encouraging them to take to the streets to support the coup and referring to themselves as the "MPLA Action Committee". Dos Santos, seeing the writing on the wall, made an unprompted public statement in support of the Action Committee, and falsely claiming that his past political moves against Alves were made under duress from Neto and his supporters. This transparent opportunism likely saved his life, however, and he would be granted the position of Vice President after the declaration of a new government with Alves as President of the Republic. As news of the coup spread throughout the country, the FNLA and UNITA were on edge. But peace prevailed, at least until April 1978, when Roberto was supposed to, according to the Moroni Accords, take office as President. Alves refused to relinquish power, essentially daring the FNLA to march once again on Luanda. Since the end of the post-independence hostilities, the national army (which was entirely composed of MPLA forces) had gradually strengthened itself with the import of Soviet weaponry. Whilst lacking some of the more advanced weapons held by the USSR's European allies, the Angolan army had been provided with two state of the art Mil Mi-24 'Hind' attack helicopters. A handful of pilots had also been trained in the Soviet Union to allow for the deployment of these extremely useful military assets. The small arms of MPLA-aligned forces also tended to be of a higher quality, and they had greater stockpiles of ammunition and other key supplies. Knowing that his forces would be unsuccessful in an unsupported attack on MPLA forces, Roberto reached out to Savimbi's UNITA. After some deliberation with their South African patrons (who told Savimbi that they would consider a renewed intervention in the event of an MPLA-initiated attack on UNITA, but would not in the event of a UNITA-FNLA offensive action), UNITA refused to join in on a march on Luanda, and as such an enraged Roberto stood down. Frustrated by South Africa's intransigence and clear favouritism for UNITA, Roberto began to send feelers out to pro-Western states in the Gulf of Guinea for future support.
Nito Alves, President of Angola after the ousting and murder of Agostinho Neto
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[187] Historically, the FLEC was supported by Mobutu Sese Seko's regime in Congo, which sought to take control of the offshore oil resources of Cabinda. IOTL, the FLEC was supported by Zairean mercenaries. ITTL, a left wing Congo isn't opposed to the MPLA like Mobutu was, but they will likely still seek recompense for their support.
[188] There are a couple of reasons for the different outcome of the Battle of Quifangondo ITTL. The first is that there was no Cuban intervention, and as such the MPLA defenders weren't assisted by Cuban advisors. Additionally, and more importantly, IOTL Holden Roberto kept his most reliable and strongest units in reserve in Zaire, rather than committing them to battle in Angola. As such, despite the FNLA nominally maintaining the largest armed force of the three Angolan combatant groups (despite being probably the least well-trained and organised), their forces weren't as strongly committed. Why did Roberto keep his strongest units in Zaire? Its uncertain. My thoughts is that he probably felt in the case of a loss in Angola he could live in exile there and that his private army would be an effective bargaining chip with Mobutu, able to be used to suppress Mobutu's political enemies and making it less likely for Mobutu to outright kill him if his relationship with the Zairean dictator soured. But ITTL, without a friendly Zaire to reside in, more of the FNLA's forces (and the better elements of it) being "in-country" lead them to be committed to the push to Luanda.
[189] IOTL, the advance on Ebo was repulsed due to Cuban troops bolstering the defenders.
[190] IOTL, the MPLA was able to prevent the UNITA attack due to being reinforced by the Katangese Tigers, the armed wing of the Congolese National Liberation Front, which opposed Mobutu and was comprised of former members of the Katangese gendarmerie. ITTL, this group is not present as a result of aforementioned butterflies from no Mobutu in Congo.
[191] IOTL the coup was suppressed by Cuban troops. They really came in clutch for Neto a
LOT IOTL.