The death of Adolf Hitler on August 20, 1939 - the consequences...

[Petr K.]

What if Adolf Hitler died on August 20, 1939 of natural causes..., heart attack, cardiac arrest.

What will be the policy of Hermann Göring, who would become his rightful successor?

Will the agreement with the USSR still be signed, will the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact be implemented?

Or there will be an attempt by Göring to make some form of agreement with Poland and its government. Hermann Göring, who was always skeptical of Hitler's war plans. He would probably, as at the beginning of August, send an unofficial confidant, the Swedish businessman Birger Dahlerus, to London on August 25 to assure the British government of Germany's willingness to reach an understanding... Would it be realistic if he now had the power in his hands? Would the British and French be willing to make another concession regarding Gdańsk?

What would Göring's later policy be regarding the Baltic States and Eastern Europe in general?

How would he deal with his political opponents, or with people he hated - Julius Streicher, Odilo Globocnik and many others... Would there be a purge in the form that happened during the Night of the Long Knives?

Would the Wehrmacht swear to Göring the absolute obedience it had previously given to Hitler, or would the Heer defy itself in this respect?

How would the relationship between Göring and Kriegsmarine Commander-in-Chief Raeder turn out? Would Göring have a strong enough position and influence to remove him from office and replace him with someone more politically suitable?

What would be the fate of the German navy if Göring ruled? There could be a large-scale halt to naval construction programs and the subsequent sale of many warships. I can think of the possibility of selling twins to the Netherlands and heavy cruisers to the USSR. How would the British and the RN react if something like this happened. Could this have been a gesture on the part of Göring to reconcile with the British?

These are just some of the questions that came to mind, there would be a huge number of changes. What would the world be like if there was no war and the Nazis still held power in Germany, at least for the next 10 years?

 

[Lee-Sensei]

All I’ll say is that if Hitler died before WW2, he might have been remembered as the greatest German statesman since Bismarck.

 

[Sekhmet_D]

Barbarossa does not happen.

 

[Aisha Clan-Clan]

Cold war begins several years earlth with it being UK/france/netherlands/spain/OTL axis powers against the ussr.

US stays out of this. Probably significant domestic anticommunist purges during 40s even without US participation in the *cold war.

 

[Petr K.]

All I’ll say is that if Hitler died before WW2, he might have been remembered as the greatest German statesman since Bismarck.

I understand that, but I'm more concerned with Göring's new role and his actual de facto power. I know he was the official heir, yet I can't quite imagine him having the same status and powers that Hitler had. I'm not sure about Heer's dedication and also that OKH will just accept him and give him a personal oath of allegiance.

It is obvious that Göring's foreign policy will be quite different, however flawed this man may have been, he was no gambler. What Germany controlled in August 1939 he considered more than sufficient. However, I would like to know, or try to understand, what options Göring had in foreign policy in the late summer of 1939. Hitler destroyed his credibility by breaking the Munich Agreement and terminating the non-aggression pact with Poland, canceling the naval treaty with Britain. How and what can Göring realistically do to correct these mistakes. What room for political maneuvering does he have...

What is more advantageous for Germany at that time, better relations with the USSR or with Poland and Britain+France. Is it possible to get both, or is it completely out of the question?

 

[Mark E.]

By 1939, didn't Germany already have its war machine? If Hitler passes away in 1936, after the Olympics, would there be less preparation for war? Hopefully, the antisemitism would decline rather than accelerate.

 

[NoMommsen]

What if Adolf Hitler died on August 20, 1939 of natural causes..., heart attack, cardiac arrest.

...

Will the agreement with the USSR still be signed, will the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact be implemented?

Or there will be an attempt by Göring to make some form of agreement with Poland and its government. Hermann Göring, who was always skeptical of Hitler's war plans. He would probably, as at the beginning of August, send an unofficial confidant, the Swedish businessman Birger Dahlerus, to London on August 25 to assure the British government of Germany's willingness to reach an understanding... Would it be realistic if he now had the power in his hands? Would the British and French be willing to make another concession regarding Gdańsk?
...

With the date of death of AH the 20th August ... at least ONE important german-soviet agreement would already be signed:

on 19th August the German-Soviet Commercial Agreement (in anglophone literature often German-Soviet Credit-Agreement termed and with its expansion of 11th February only called German-Soviet Commercial Agreement) with its negotiations starting in February/March 1939 already.​

Knowing the dire economical need of the german side the soviets used these negotiations also as a means to forward negotiations for a 'political' aka militarily agreement Stalin was looking all around but what earned only a cold shoulder with the western powers.
OTOH they made a 'successfull' conclusion of said economical treaty a precondition for finishing negotiations of the political pact whichs 'general' content was already - by 'n large - agreed upon by both side through diplomatical notes between 15th and 17th August.

Question now would be:

Did Hitler ITTL still manages on 20th August to send his 'emergency' telegram to Stalin comnplaining about the unbearable situation between Germany and Poland with the 'outbreak of crisis any moment'.​

In his answer Stalin hinted at the pact being the prerequisit the liquidation of the polish tension.

Göring IMHO would doubtlessly stay to the economical agreement as he rather well knew about germanys economical situation (at least than the plethora of orther even high ranking Nazis). And having 'learned' to like the power a piolitical dictator of a steered economy has he would also NOT immediatly 'return' to austerity adhering only/mostly profit-orientated Schachts version of liberal free trade.

But ... what thought Stalin of Göring at this point of time?
AFAIK he looked at Hitler with ... some 'respect' as an himself in ruthlessness at least nearing dictator.
IF ... Stalin would 'accept' Göring as someone similarly 'equal' he might go on offering the pact as IOTL he did to Hitler.

Görings reaction would IMHO VERY much depend on how the Allies approach him.
His maneuvering space in diplomatics would to the largest degree depend on how he would be perceived esp. in contrast to Hitler. If ... esp. London aka Chamberlain sees Göring with his known 'melleability' (not to forget that he mostly forwarded the german-polish non-agression pact of January 1934) as a means to still avoid the war and 'offers' to accept something like the last minute 'compromise' with some extraterritorial transit routes and similar IOTL offered by Ribbentrop (despite Hitler already having given orders to invade) ... Göring might let the negotiations with Stalin die.
... if Chamberlain would go/stay confrontative ... or the polish leaders decide on a preemptive strike or express their non-participation on any 'compromise ... then Göring might evenly be happy to shake hands with Stalin.

About Paris I have to admit I have no idea how they would react.

 

[Petr K.]

With the date of death of AH the 20th August ... at least ONE important german-soviet agreement would already be signed:

on 19th August the German-Soviet Commercial Agreement (in anglophone literature often German-Soviet Credit-Agreement termed and with its expansion of 11th February only called German-Soviet Commercial Agreement) with its negotiations starting in February/March 1939 already.​

Knowing the dire economical need of the german side the soviets used these negotiations also as a means to forward negotiations for a 'political' aka militarily agreement Stalin was looking all around but what earned only a cold shoulder with the western powers.
OTOH they made a 'successfull' conclusion of said economical treaty a precondition for finishing negotiations of the political pact whichs 'general' content was already - by 'n large - agreed upon by both side through diplomatical notes between 15th and 17th August.

Question now would be:

Did Hitler ITTL still manages on 20th August to send his 'emergency' telegram to Stalin comnplaining about the unbearable situation between Germany and Poland with the 'outbreak of crisis any moment'.​

In his answer Stalin hinted at the pact being the prerequisit the liquidation of the polish tension.

Göring IMHO would doubtlessly stay to the economical agreement as he rather well knew about germanys economical situation (at least than the plethora of orther even high ranking Nazis). And having 'learned' to like the power a piolitical dictator of a steered economy has he would also NOT immediatly 'return' to austerity adhering only/mostly profit-orientated Schachts version of liberal free trade.

But ... what thought Stalin of Göring at this point of time?
AFAIK he looked at Hitler with ... some 'respect' as an himself in ruthlessness at least nearing dictator.
IF ... Stalin would 'accept' Göring as someone similarly 'equal' he might go on offering the pact as IOTL he did to Hitler.

Görings reaction would IMHO VERY much depend on how the Allies approach him.
His maneuvering space in diplomatics would to the largest degree depend on how he would be perceived esp. in contrast to Hitler. If ... esp. London aka Chamberlain sees Göring with his known 'melleability' (not to forget that he mostly forwarded the german-polish non-agression pact of January 1934) as a means to still avoid the war and 'offers' to accept something like the last minute 'compromise' with some extraterritorial transit routes and similar IOTL offered by Ribbentrop (despite Hitler already having given orders to invade) ... Göring might let the negotiations with Stalin die.
... if Chamberlain would go/stay confrontative ... or the polish leaders decide on a preemptive strike or express their non-participation on any 'compromise ... then Göring might evenly be happy to shake hands with Stalin.

About Paris I have to admit I have no idea how they would react.

Thanks for the answer, so I'll ask the question in a different way. What if there was an agreement between Berlin and Warsaw, with London's tacit support for Gdańsk. What is meant is the compromise agreement proposed by von Ribbentrop, and Göring would consider such a result sufficient. From his point of view, this would be a great political victory, avoiding war and bringing peace. What interests me, however, is that the talks with Stalin could have continued even after the Polish question had been at least partially resolved from the German point of view. The economic agreement has already been signed, but nothing stands in the way of further rapprochement between Moscow and Berlin. There are still plenty of points of contention that can be resolved mutually. Germany was interested in Lithuania, the USSR was interested in asserting its influence in Estonia and Latvia. Could Göring offer such a deal to Stalin and succeed? This would be a significantly more moderate version of the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact, but still not completely unrealistic. The time frame of events would certainly shift, but both sides would very likely be looking for an agreement.

Another question I have... If negotiations between Berlin and Warsaw had failed and Göring had to turn to Stalin, would he really have risked war? Something like that doesn't really fit his character. It seems like a huge risk to me, Göring was not a fatalist.

 

[CaptainCalvert]

By late Agust, Germany was pretty much committed to war with Poland, mostly because they never really wanted a deal. If Goering tried to call it off, he would risk recriminations for failing to respect Hitler's legacy, or for lack of moral fibre, and might well annoy the army. So even if he wanted to avoid war (and I'm doubtful he did), there's a lot of pressure to continue, and he may not have enough time to stop it if the transfer of power doesn't go smoothly, and if he did, there is a possibility that Goering has a rapid - and likely fatal - fall from power.

It's hard to see how a change of leadership would affect the military outcome in Poland, but it could well affect choices afterwards. But then you have the Soviets taking on the Baltic states and siezing parts of Romania, which makes life difficult and can't easily be ignored.
Then you have the problem that Lebensraum is fundamental to the nazi party, so unless Goering can purge that substantial faction, he's under pressure to head east, which in turn requires France to be broken to avoid being attacked during Barbarossa.
I'm not saying that these things can't be changed, but more wondering whether Goering has enough support or vision to change the course of events set up by Hitler.

 

[Petr K.]

By late Agust, Germany was pretty much committed to war with Poland, mostly because they never really wanted a deal. If Goering tried to call it off, he would risk recriminations for failing to respect Hitler's legacy, or for lack of moral fibre, and might well annoy the army. So even if he wanted to avoid war (and I'm doubtful he did), there's a lot of pressure to continue, and he may not have enough time to stop it if the transfer of power doesn't go smoothly, and if he did, there is a possibility that Goering has a rapid - and likely fatal - fall from power.

It's hard to see how a change of leadership would affect the military outcome in Poland, but it could well affect choices afterwards. But then you have the Soviets taking on the Baltic states and siezing parts of Romania, which makes life difficult and can't easily be ignored.
Then you have the problem that Lebensraum is fundamental to the nazi party, so unless Goering can purge that substantial faction, he's under pressure to head east, which in turn requires France to be broken to avoid being attacked during Barbarossa.
I'm not saying that these things can't be changed, but more wondering whether Goering has enough support or vision to change the course of events set up by Hitler.

I do not think that the German public, or the ordinary citizen, was in any way devoted to the war. According to the public mood, which was monitored by the Gestapo, the German people were not enthusiastic about the war and there was great fear. The fact that the situation was completely different 10 months later does not mean that in August 1939 ordinary Germans wanted and looked forward to war.

Göring certainly had many enemies in the NSDAP and the Heer, but he was extremely popular with the public and the people liked him. Yes, it is surprising, but he was popular among ordinary people. I very much doubt that there would be any pressure from below that would force him to go to war with Poland. I think it would be the other way around, Hitler was the most popular among ordinary Germans right after Munich, when the crisis was calmed down and ended. It was the same with Heer, who in the fall of 1938 was willing to stage a coup (at least part of it) and get rid of the Nazis.
In August 1939, many high Nazi officials, not only Göring, did not want war, his peace efforts in OTL were sincere, he did everything he could to prevent it. He provoked Hitler so much that he sent him on vacation, he didn't want another Munich. Yes, it's August 20, 1939, but it's still not too late.

The Wehrmacht and its desire for war is a complicated question, not everyone wanted it. Perhaps Raeder didn't want her because the Kriegsmarine wasn't ready, he said: "Our ships can only prove that we can die with honor..."
This is not to say that he was some kind of peacemaker, but he simply knew that conflict was coming too soon and therefore did not want it. He was originally promised that war would not come until 1944...

Heer probably felt differently, I think the generals believed that now was the last chance to win. But again I am not willing to accept the claim that there was 100% support for war with Poland. OKH would probably settle for some form of agreement that would save Germany's face. So something like Munich.

The relationship between Göring and the Heer was generally poor, certainly not helped by Göring's desire to become commander-in-chief of the Wehramcht and the Fritsch affair dating back to 1938. It had happened recently and the memories of it were too fresh. In addition, Fritsch is still alive and it is possible that after Hitler's death there may be substantial personnel changes at OKW and OKH. The people that Hitler favored: Keitel and von Reichenau and many others will lose their influence. And Werner von Fritsch and Ludwig Beck, for example, will return to high positions, neither of whom was a friend of the Nazis.

However, my knowledge of the inner workings of the OKW and OKH is not that good, yet I believe that Hitler's death means major personnel changes and less Nazi influence. I will return again to the question of the personal loyalty oath, it is possible that Göring will get it, but also not. It all depends on behind-the-scenes negotiations. It is a question of what Göring will be able to offer the Heer generals. It is likely that only bribes from account 5 will not be enough...

 

[Tolkiene]

. And Werner von Fritsch and Ludwig Beck, for example, will return to high positions, neither of whom was a friend of the Nazis.

Actually von Fritsch was fine with the Nazi regime, as a letter he wrote after he was forced to retire shows. To be precise, he wrote said letter on 11 December 1938, about a month after Kristallnacht, to Baroness Margot von Schutzbar:

"It is very strange that so many people should regard the future with growing apprehension, in spite of the Führer's indisputable successes in the past.... Soon after the War, I came to the conclusion that we have to be victorious in three battles, if Germany were again to be powerful:
(1) The battle against the working class. Hitler has won this;
(2) Against the Catholic Church, perhaps better expressed as Ultramontanism and
(3) Against the Jews.
We are in the midst of these battles, and the one against the Jews is the most difficult. I hope everyone realizes the intricacies of this campaign".

He just didn't want the Party or the SS to meddle in army affairs. As the German historian Wolfram Wette writes, Fritsch, while conservative and highly nationalistic rather than an outright Nazi, supported the Nazi regime and accepted Hitler as its supreme leader because their views were overall compatible despite their differences.

He voiced doubts about Hitler's war course in 1938...but that was because he feared Germany was not ready for war. By the way, Göring and Hess had the same doubts, and both were unambiguously Nazis. Göring simply wanted Fritsch out of the way because he wanted to become war minister, and viewed the general as a rival since the commander-in-chief of the Heer was the obvious candidate to succeed Blomberg. Ulrich von Hassell, a German diplomat and a member of the conservative resistance, tried to recruit Fritsch, but the former general refused to get involved.

As for Beck, I'm very doubtful about him returning to high command. He was marginalised following his resignation. Beck naively believed that it would trigger a 'general strike' of the generals, but then Hitler persuaded him not to immediately announce it...which of course meant the effect was zero. His leadership of the conservative resistance was far from energetic. Indeed, quite a few complained about the lack of decisive leadership, though in all fairness to him trying to run these guys was like herding cats.

As for the loyalty oath, Hitler's decrees on the succession in December 1934 and March 1938 stipulated that the military, civil service and Party would swear allegiance to Göring upon his accession. Of course, succession orders matter only as much as you can enforce them, but for the time being he lacks credible rivals with the power to challenge him. Keitel is Keitel and neither Brauchitsch nor Halder have the spine to try and stage a coup. Heer Supreme Commander Brauchitsch was weak-willed and while his Chief of General Staff Halder flirted with the idea of a coup in 1939 - 1940, he lacked the will to commit to it and as his leading role in the criminal orders of the Operation Barbarossa shows, he was fine with Nazi atrocities. And Beck has no troops to command.

Göring's not the ideal candidate for them or many in the Party...but he's also the big tent candidate who offends the least people, is personally popular with the plebs, has a firm power base, the rep of an Old Fighter who was at Hitler's side practically from the start and is not shy about making bribes and grandiose promises. Or having his minions arrange some 'accidents'. Himmler's in no position to stage a coup and is smart enough to know it, Goebbels is frankly pretty weak and not popular, Hess will be happy running the Party and Bormann is still Hess' minion, and completely unknown to the public. No one cares about Rosenberg. Of course, the tides may turn if Göring messes up big time and the sharks smell blood.

It's pertinent to note that at the time many members of the conservative resistance, such as Johannes Popitz, still thought Göring would be acceptable as a 'moderate alternative'. This was, of course, delusional, but Göring was good at schmoozing, and the draft constitution Popitz, Hassell and Jens Jessen wrote was, as Hans Mommsen writes, basically the völkisch Führer state without Hitler and with some woolly promises about legality.

 

[Petr K.]

He just didn't want the Party or the SS to meddle in army affairs. As the German historian Wolfram Wette writes, Fritsch, while conservative and highly nationalistic rather than an outright Nazi, supported the Nazi regime and accepted Hitler as its supreme leader because their views were overall compatible despite their differences.

He voiced doubts about Hitler's war course in 1938...but that was because he feared Germany was not ready for war. By the way, Göring and Hess had the same doubts, and both were unambiguously Nazis. Göring simply wanted Fritsch out of the way because he wanted to become war minister, and viewed the general as a rival since the commander-in-chief of the Heer was the obvious candidate to succeed Blomberg. Ulrich von Hassell, a German diplomat and a member of the conservative resistance, tried to recruit Fritsch, but the former general refused to get involved.

So there is a chance that at least Werner von Fritsch could return in some way and hold a higher position again. It may not be his original role, but could he perhaps replace Keitel? It doesn't seem very likely to me that Keitel could keep his position, he was widely unpopular. Moreover, Göring despised him immensely and hated him.

As for Beck, I'm very doubtful about him returning to high command. He was marginalised following his resignation. Beck naively believed that it would trigger a 'general strike' of the generals, but then Hitler persuaded him not to immediately announce it...which of course meant the effect was zero. His leadership of the conservative resistance was far from energetic. Indeed, quite a few complained about the lack of decisive leadership, though in all fairness to him trying to run these guys was like herding cats.

So I understand correctly that Ludwig Beck is now completely marginal and will no longer be reactivated. I believed he was respected and revered by his colleagues and might have a chance to regain some influence.

Göring's not the ideal candidate for them or many in the Party...but he's also the big tent candidate who offends the least people, is personally popular with the plebs, has a firm power base, the rep of an Old Fighter who was at Hitler's side practically from the start and is not shy about making bribes and grandiose promises. Or having his minions arrange some 'accidents'. Himmler's in no position to stage a coup and is smart enough to know it, Goebbels is frankly pretty weak and not popular, Hess will be happy running the Party and Bormann is still Hess' minion, and completely unknown to the public. No one cares about Rosenberg. Of course, the tides may turn if Göring messes up big time and the sharks smell blood.

Could the Heer, or rather the major players in the OKH, be pressuring Göring to further limit Himmler's influence? By August 1939, the SS was relatively weak, but disagreements between it and the Heer were already occurring. Werner von Fritsch personally hated Himmler (and he was certainly not alone), even much more than Göring. Could the death of Hitler also mean the end of Himmler?

Yet, even if you write that he was not an ideal candidate, would he have had enough power to stop war preparations and avoid war? Another thing that interests me is he could push his own people into the OKW, instead of those who served Hitler, eg Albert Kesselring instead of Keitel. Would Heer accept such a change? Would Heer support possible purges in the party when he wanted to have Göring "remove" some of his enemies, or would Heer demand something like that himself...

Then I wonder what will happen to the generals who were loyal to Hitler, like von Reichenau, they will be retired. With Keitel I believe so, with von Reichenau I am not so sure, however he was also very unpopular.

 

[Tolkiene]

Then I wonder what will happen to the generals who were loyal to Hitler, like von Reichenau, they will be retired. With Keitel I believe so, with von Reichenau I am not so sure, however he was also very unpopular.

The generals were, ultimately, all loyal to Hitler, with a few notable exceptions, who ended up being purged after 20 July. And while there were exceptions, many of those only became totally disillusioned with him during the war because the Nazi regime was leading the Reich, which they'd dedicated themselves to, to its doom. General Hoepner, for example, was very enthusiastic about the 'war of annihilation' in the Soviet Union. Hence why the 20 July coup was literally crushed by the Heer without any involvement from the SS or the Party. German officers and rank and file followed the chain of command, and that didn't lie with Witzleben or Beck.

Guderian and Manstein argued with Hitler about military strategy...but did as he told them to do because they were fine with Nazi politics. Guderian and Rundstedt literally sat on the 'Court of Honour' that expelled officers who'd participated in the 20 July plot from the army so that they could be tried by Freisler's People's Court. Rommel's career was to a large degree built on Hitler's favour, since he wasn't even a general staff officer. In other words, there's no strict, ironclad divide between generals who are, for want of a better word, Hitlerians and those who are 'just normal Prussians'. Reichenau himself was noteworthy for how enthusiastically he embraced the Nazi state. But according to the German military historian Johannes Hürter his main aim was to secure an influential position for the Heer in the new state. Of course, he issued the 'Severity Order' and exhorted his troops to massacre Jews...but then Manstein and Hoepner gave orders that were all but identical. I don't recall senior generals in the Heer not wanting him to hold command. After all, no one doubted his skill. Many just didn't want him as the new commander-in-chief of the Heer because he was viewed as too close to the Party.

As for Keitel, he'd promptly suck up to Göring the way he sucked up to Hitler. That's what he did to Dönitz during the latter's farcical 'presidency'. He's a sycophant with no power base of his own. Whether Göring keeps Keitel around is another question. Also keep in mind that the men running the Heer are Brauchitsch and Halder. Neither is particularly strong-willed or energetic. And they definitely don't want to give up their jobs to other generals.

As for Himmler, he might be purged or he might not. By 1939 the SS was a powerful force and, contrary to what popular history might suggest, it wasn't widely hated by the German public. The Gestapo was seen as a legitimate police force. The SS' military arm is weak though. The Blomberg-Fritsch Crisis is still pretty fresh and while Göring instigated the whole affair, it was the Gestapo that took point. In theory, marginalising Himmler, while it would require some arm-twisting, would not be that difficult in 1939 because the Führer could simply decouple the post of Chief of German Police title from that of Reichsführer-SS. See, while Himmler essentially held both posts in personal union, strictly speaking being head of the German Police was a state office that was theoretically subordinate to the Reich Minister of the Interior. Except said minister was Frick, and thus useless. Of course, there'd still be indirect links since many SS officers assumed senior posts in the police apparatus and in turn many senior police officers held SS commissions. But it would weaken him considerably. That would of course be a declaration of war between Goering and Himmler, but Goering has legal options in his arsenal, and there are enough ambitious cutthroats in the SS-Police such as Nebe, Daluege and Gestapo-Müller. Alternately Göring clips Himmler's wings by telling him that the SS getting its own army is a no-go or simply tries to coopt the Reichsheini. The two had a strange relationship characterised by both rivalry and cooperation, but that applies to most of the Nazi bigshots. Himmler could use his control over the security services to help Göring or hurt him, but he couldn't get rid of him on his own. Himmler staging a poorly conceived coup the moment Hitler dies is a bit of a meme in AH timelines, but he was a canny politician and skilled infighter. He just happened to have horrid and absurd beliefs.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

Cold war begins several years earlth with it being UK/france/netherlands/spain/OTL axis powers against the ussr.

Why? The USSR wasn't a threat as much as Nazi Germany was in 1939 and Stalin had done no moves that could potentially anger anyone.

 

[The Banker]

Hello. Can anyone tell me the outcome of this discussion.

1)Was war with Poland inevitable?
2)Assuming it doesn't happen, was war with the USSR inevitable?
3)Assuming both 1 and 2 are not inevitable, where do you see USSR and Germany by 1950? What would the future of Eastern Europe be like?
Would USSR gobble up Latvia, Estonia and Germany place a puppet state in Lithuania?
4)Assuming 3 happens, would Stalin also get chancy enough to invade Romania?

How would Mussolini factor in all this?
If WW2 doesn't happen in the west, then how would events in Asia play out? Would Japan still go to war with the UK and France?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

One long term consequence:

If this waives away WWII US economic recovery from the Depression is not only a bit slower, but the destruction of a large part of the worlds industrial base does not occur. Between that destruction and the massive government subsidized revitalization of US industry during WWII the US gained a huge step ahead for the next 2-3 decades. Without that it is definitely not as economically dominant post 1945.

Neither does the US Army and Navy undergo the massive expansion and experience of WWII. Even if a war with Japan occurs the US military will be very different in 1945 or 1950 from OTL.

Economically Britain and France, and the other European states are in a different place for the next decade, vs OTL.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

If WW2 doesn't happen in the west, then how would events in Asia play out? Would Japan still go to war with the UK and France?

Only if the Europeans/US put enough pressure on Japan. OTL the Japanese treated war with the major powers as a abstract hypothetical. The Europeans and the US had taken very weak actions against Japan over its war with China over four years, neither had they taken strong military preparations for war with Japan. It was not until the US and Britain rapped up preparations and action in 1941 the japans leaders made practical preparations for war, and considered the decision seriously June through October 1941.

Economically Japan was on the verge of losing the war with China circa 1941. They could have continued militarily for some years, but it would have bankrupted Japan. Had the leaders recognized this and reached a agreement with China, then Asia sees a peace for a few years.

 

[Post]

Depends on the government in Germany, IMO the most likely continuation is the Weimar Republic surviving and in that case the status quo is preserved except for Spain, if fascists then they would try to do annex Austria and re-militarize the Rhineland but it would happen over a longer period of time.

The OP is about Hitler dying 20 august 1939. The Weimar Republic is already dead and buried.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

The OP is about Hitler dying 20 august 1939. The Weimar Republic is already dead and buried.

Oh I confused with another TL, sorry.

 

[CaptainCalvert]

Hello. Can anyone tell me the outcome of this discussion.

1)Was war with Poland inevitable?
2)Assuming it doesn't happen, was war with the USSR inevitable?
3)Assuming both 1 and 2 are not inevitable, where do you see USSR and Germany by 1950? What would the future of Eastern Europe be like?
Would USSR gobble up Latvia, Estonia and Germany place a puppet state in Lithuania?
4)Assuming 3 happens, would Stalin also get chancy enough to invade Romania?

How would Mussolini factor in all this?
If WW2 doesn't happen in the west, then how would events in Asia play out? Would Japan still go to war with the UK and France?

1 War with Poland was part Nazi philosophy and part Hitler's choicd. Stopping the war isn't impossible, but there's not much time - an anti-war replacement would have little time to act, and would therefore need to be strong enough to defeat pro-war factions within a week and a half. It's not impossible, just very difficult to see how it could be done.
2 War with the Soviet Union is inevitable from anti-communist side of the nazis and because adjoining spheres of influence will generate friction. Lebensraum requires defeat of the soviet union, coexistence virtually guarantees conflicts.
3 and 4 It's not impossible for them to come to an accommodation, but both parties mistrusted each other and had inherent political differences. The Molotov Ribbentrop Pact would result in Soviet Estonia, Latvia and (most of) Lithuania excep thd Memel pocket. Then thrre's Bassarabia and other parts of Romania. Conflict is, if not inevitable, very likely.
Mussolini would most likely stick with Africa and the Balkans - he only moved of France (and tbus UK) when he thought France was beaten. Here - who knows? My thoughts are that Barbarossa is unavoixable due to Lebensraum, which means France has to be neutralised first - and soon enough to prevdnt the soviet rearmament from advancing too much.

No or limited western Europen conflict allows stronger opposition to Japanese expansion. They may suffer badly for this, wjether through troop numbers, equipment availability (notably tanks, AT weapons and aircraft) and commanders - Singapore, for example was on a knife edge and could have been saved (at least temporarily) with only a few minor changes, and Percival backed by or supporting Auchinleck or Montgomery might have seen a very different outcome.
The big question is the USA, but Japan was aware of the danger the US and Phillipines posed to supply lines, and could well do more or less as OTL.