This, especially in African nations that are rich in resources and future population monsters, bringing countries like Congo, Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa into communism will make Marxism much more attractive to African revolutionaries as it will be linked with independence movements and self rule without western interests and shares in the countries resources, especially given the alternatives of Apartheid/White minority rule or Western backed dictators
Red Alert - Our 1953 USSR
- Thread starter panpiotr
- Start date
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- communism soviet union ussr
We should also create/support Eco-Socialism after we close to/fully recovered economically.
I mean I doubt this would be on anyone's mind at the moment or even have a general understanding of what that is. Seems like something that might appear in the 70s once people gain a greater understanding of pollution.
That could also work since I'd like us be the ones that pushes against pollution and decreasing atmosphere...
Imperador Pedro III
Banned
We should thread these waters carefully. Nuclear parity with the US is paramount for the survival of our whole civilization. We can't give ourselves the luxury of catching up to the US only during the 80s. Remember that in the early stages of the Cold War MAD was far from guaranteed. If the Cuban Missile Crisis turned hot the USSR would've been genocided for example.
If there's some military spending that is essential, its nukes, specially considering we are taking a defensive position in Europe as far as conventional warfare goes. Nukes should be our trump card.
Lets it be clear to the US that we aren't planning to overhelm the US in the nuclear arms race, but just catching up to them. This will make them less anxious to build their own arsenal.
If we want peace, we need to prepare for nuclear war, and make it clear to the US as soon as possible that they can't win a nuclear conflict. That they will be washed away from the map completely just like us.
Today's China has few nukes because it knows that Russia has its back against the US. Our USSR can't count on annyone. It needs to protect itself.
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I'll start voting with the next move, but I have to note something.
According to some historians, the catalyst for the uprising was precisely the rejection of Socialism. At the May meeting of the Council of Ministers, economic problems in the GDR were discussed. Beria believed that it was necessary to abandon the “Building of Socialism” and prepare Germany for unification - Molotov, although he supported a change in economic policy, believed that unification would not happen and only proposed to improve the financial situation of the Germans. As a result, Beria’s point of view prevailed and a course was set for the speedy reunification of Germany (Beria was a supporter of a united neutral Germany, he was not even against “selling the GDR”). As a result, Beria’s point of view won, despite the fact that Molotov and Khrushchev expressed strong disagreement with his position. On June 3, at negotiations in Moscow, the leadership of East Germany, led by Walter Ulbricht, was harshly criticized and faced with the need to change its socio-economic and political course. Rushing to immediately carry out the order “from above,” the leaders of the GDR on June 6 proclaimed the “New Deal” - the pace of building socialism was significantly reduced, and many excesses of an economic and political nature were abolished. However, there was no waiver of production standards.
According to some historians, the catalyst for the uprising was precisely the rejection of Socialism. At the May meeting of the Council of Ministers, economic problems in the GDR were discussed. Beria believed that it was necessary to abandon the “Building of Socialism” and prepare Germany for unification - Molotov, although he supported a change in economic policy, believed that unification would not happen and only proposed to improve the financial situation of the Germans. As a result, Beria’s point of view prevailed and a course was set for the speedy reunification of Germany (Beria was a supporter of a united neutral Germany, he was not even against “selling the GDR”). As a result, Beria’s point of view won, despite the fact that Molotov and Khrushchev expressed strong disagreement with his position. On June 3, at negotiations in Moscow, the leadership of East Germany, led by Walter Ulbricht, was harshly criticized and faced with the need to change its socio-economic and political course. Rushing to immediately carry out the order “from above,” the leaders of the GDR on June 6 proclaimed the “New Deal” - the pace of building socialism was significantly reduced, and many excesses of an economic and political nature were abolished. However, there was no waiver of production standards.
Chapter Four: Back to the roots (August - October 1953)
(Mostly peaceful resolution of the protests in East Germany, allowed the government and SED to partially regain people's trust for the time being)
In response to the escalating protests and strikes in East Germany, the Soviet government in Moscow issued instructions to the East German government to address the grievances of the demonstrators while maintaining party dominance and control. The East German government, under the leadership of Walter Ulbricht, took several steps to quell the unrest and appease the protesters. Firstly, government representatives initiated dialogue with the leaders of the protesting workers. This dialogue aimed to establish a direct channel of communication between the authorities and the demonstrators, allowing for a better understanding of the workers' demands and grievances. By engaging in direct conversation with the protesters, the government hoped to de-escalate tensions and find common ground for resolving the issues at hand. During these discussions, the government acknowledged the concerns raised by the workers regarding their heavy work quotas and the high cost of living. As a concession to the protesters, the government agreed to lower work quotas and implement price cuts to alleviate the economic burden on the workers. These measures were intended to address the immediate economic hardships faced by the population and demonstrate a willingness to respond to their demands. However, while making these concessions, the government also sought to ensure the continued dominance of the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED). Despite agreeing to lower work quotas and price cuts, the government maintained strict control over the negotiation process to prevent any challenge to its authority. The concessions were carefully managed to maintain the party's control over the state and prevent any erosion of its power. In addition to addressing the immediate economic concerns of the workers, the government also pledged to review the most inefficient and unpopular policies contributing to the economic hardship and dissatisfaction among the population. This policy review aimed to identify areas for improvement and reform to address the root causes of the protests. By committing to reassess its policies, the government signaled a willingness to listen to the grievances of the workers and take concrete steps to address their concerns. As negotiations progressed, an official agreement was reached between the East German government and the workers' representatives, outlining the conditions for ending the strike. This agreement represented a crucial step towards resolving the crisis and restoring stability in the country. Both parties agreed to uphold their respective obligations and work towards resolving grievances through cooperation. Furthermore, recognizing the need for continued efforts to improve living standards in East Germany, the government established a committee comprising representatives from the working class. This committee was tasked with focusing on initiatives aimed at enhancing living standards and addressing the economic challenges faced by the population. By involving representatives from the working class in the decision-making process, the government aimed to foster greater collaboration and trust between the authorities and the workers.These measures were aimed at de-escalating the protests, addressing the grievances of the workers, and maintaining stability in East Germany while ensuring the continued dominance of the ruling party. The government sought to strike a delicate balance between responding to legitimate concerns and preserving its authority and control over the socialist state. Through dialogue, concessions, and policy reforms, the government aimed to restore peace and stability while addressing the underlying economic issues facing the population.
Following days of intense negotiations, an agreement emerged from the fraught discussions between government officials and representatives of the protesting workers in East Germany. This pivotal moment marked a turning point in the ongoing crisis, offering a glimmer of hope for resolution and reconciliation amidst the simmering tensions. The agreement, though not without its compromises and complexities, represented a delicate balancing act between the demands of the protesters and the imperatives of the ruling authorities. After protracted deliberations and heated exchanges, both sides managed to find common ground on several key issues, paving the way for a tentative peace. For approximately 80% of the protesters, the terms of the agreement were deemed satisfactory, prompting them to disperse and return to their homes. These individuals, buoyed by the prospect of tangible change and emboldened by the concessions secured through negotiation, viewed the agreement as a promising step towards addressing their grievances and improving their quality of life. In their eyes, the agreement signaled a willingness on the part of the government to listen and respond to the concerns of the populace, instilling a sense of cautious optimism for the future. However, despite the majority's acceptance of the terms, a stubborn minority comprising around 20% of the protesters remained steadfast in their defiance. Whether motivated by lingering skepticism, unresolved grievances, or a steadfast commitment to their cause, these dissenters refused to yield and continued to voice their discontent. Their reluctance to acquiesce posed a formidable challenge to the authorities, prolonging the uncertainty and instability gripping East Germany. To quell the remaining pockets of dissent and restore order, the East German government and Soviet Forces in Germany ,deployed forces to restore control and enforce compliance with the terms of the agreement. With tensions still running high and the specter of further unrest looming, these forces assumed a critical role in preserving stability and upholding the authority of the state. Their presence served as a visible deterrent, underscoring the government's resolve to uphold law and order and prevent any further escalation of the crisis. Despite the complexities and challenges inherent in the aftermath of the agreement, its significance as a milestone towards resolution and reconciliation cannot be overstated. By engaging in dialogue and negotiation, both the government and the protesters demonstrated a willingness to seek peaceful avenues for addressing grievances and forging a path forward. As attention turned towards implementing the terms of the agreement and addressing the underlying causes of the unrest, the hope remained that East Germany could emerge from this tumultuous period stronger than ever before.
(Anton Ackermann - new General Secretary of SED)
In August 1953, the political landscape of East Germany underwent a seismic shift as General Secretary Walter Ulbricht found himself summoned to Moscow for a pivotal meeting with General Secretary Zhukov and the Soviet leadership. The atmosphere crackled with tension as Ulbricht faced a barrage of scrutiny and accusations regarding his leadership during a period of profound political and economic turmoil in East Germany. Zhukov, with his characteristic directness and steely resolve, wasted no time in confronting Ulbricht with the harsh realities of the situation. Drawing upon detailed assessments and intelligence reports, Zhukov leveled accusations of inefficiency and mismanagement against Ulbricht, holding him directly responsible for the deepening crisis that had engulfed East Germany in recent months. With unflinching candor, Zhukov chastised Ulbricht for his failure to address the underlying grievances of the populace and his inability to prevent the outbreak of widespread protests that had rocked the foundations of the East German state. As Ulbricht stood before the formidable assembly of Soviet leaders, he found himself in the unenviable position of defending his tenure and justifying his actions in the face of mounting criticism. However, under the relentless scrutiny of Zhukov and his counterparts, Ulbricht's arguments rang hollow, his explanations falling short of convincing the skeptical audience assembled in Moscow. In a decisive and momentous decision, Zhukov announced Ulbricht's dismissal from his position as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), effectively signaling the end of Ulbricht's reign and ushering in a new era of leadership in East Germany. The choice of his successor was not taken lightly, with Zhukov meticulously weighing the options before settling on Anton Ackermann as the individual best suited to navigate the turbulent waters of East German politics. Zhukov's announcement signaled a seismic shift in the balance of power and heralding the dawn of a new chapter in East Germany's history. For Ulbricht, the moment marked a precipitous fall from grace, a stark reminder of the unforgiving nature of politics and the swift hand of fate. For Ackermann, the mantle of leadership came with immense responsibility and daunting challenges, as he stepped into the formidable shoes vacated by his predecessor. Tasked with steering East Germany through the treacherous waters of political unrest and economic uncertainty, Ackermann faced an uphill battle to restore stability and regain the trust of a disillusioned populace. As the sun set on Ulbricht's tenure and rose on Ackermann's ascendance, the winds of change swept through East Germany, carrying with them the promise of a new beginning and the hope of a brighter future. Yet, amidst the tumult and upheaval, one thing remained clear: the legacy of Ulbricht's downfall would cast a long shadow over the turbulent landscape of East German politics for years to come.
In mid-August 1953, a historic meeting took place in Moscow between General Secretary Zhukov and Chairman Mao, two towering figures of the global communist movement. Against the backdrop of a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape, the outcome of their deliberations would have far-reaching implications for both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. At the heart of their discussions were a series of economic agreements aimed at fostering mutual cooperation and facilitating the recovery and reconstruction efforts in both nations. Recognizing the shared challenges and aspirations of their respective countries, Zhukov and Mao forged a path of collaboration, pledging to pool their resources and expertise to bolster economic development and improve the standard of living for their citizens. In addition to their economic partnership, Zhukov and Mao reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to supporting communist, anti-imperialist, and independence movements across Asia. With a shared vision of liberation and self-determination, they vowed to stand shoulder to shoulder in solidarity with revolutionary forces fighting against colonial oppression and foreign intervention. Foremost among these movements was the Viet Minh in Vietnam, whose struggle for independence resonated deeply with both leaders. As a testament to their burgeoning alliance, Zhukov and Mao agreed to embark on a series of military games and scientific competitions between their respective nations. These exchanges, intended to stimulate innovation and foster camaraderie among their armed forces and scientific communities, served as a symbol of the burgeoning friendship and cooperation between two great nations. Furthermore, the meeting yielded a landmark agreement for Soviet-Chinese joint efforts to help rebuild North Korea in the aftermath of the devastating Korean War. Recognizing the importance of solidarity and support for their socialist ally, Zhukov and Mao pledged to combine their resources and expertise to aid in the reconstruction of North Korea's war-ravaged infrastructure and economy. In a gesture of goodwill and solidarity, the Soviet Union also committed to providing industrial and infrastructural assistance to China, further bolstering their burgeoning partnership and laying the groundwork for future cooperation. Through joint ventures and technological exchanges, the two nations aimed to harness the collective strength of their economies to drive progress and prosperity for their peoples. As Zhukov and Mao bid farewell, their meeting marked a pivotal moment in the history of Soviet-Chinese relations, heralding a new era of collaboration and friendship between two of the world's largest communist states. With their shared commitment to socialism and solidarity, they stood poised to chart a bold course forward, shaping the destiny of their nations and the course of history in the years to come.
(Location of Gulag forced labor camp system across the USSR in 1953)
Amidst the shifting tides of post-Stalinist Soviet society, one of the most pressing challenges facing General Secretary Zhukov's administration was the daunting task of addressing the legacy of the Gulag forced labor camp system. With an estimated 2.5 million individuals languishing in these brutal institutions across the vast expanse of the USSR, urgent action was required to rectify the injustices of the past and chart a more humane course forward. Recognizing the urgent need for reform, the Soviet government embarked on a gradual process of releasing prisoners from the Gulag system. This marked a significant departure from the repressive policies of the Stalin era, where countless individuals were unjustly incarcerated on trumped-up charges or for merely expressing dissenting opinions. Under Zhukov's leadership, the emphasis shifted towards separating genuine criminals and enemies of the state from those who had been unjustly imprisoned. In addition to the release of prisoners, comprehensive reforms were implemented to overhaul the Gulag system and align it with its intended purpose. Rather than serving as a tool of political repression, the reformed Gulag was reoriented towards rehabilitation and reintegration. Central to this transformation was a renewed focus on humane treatment and the provision of opportunities for inmates to rebuild their lives. One of the key pillars of the reformed Gulag system was the implementation of programs aimed at rehabilitating inmates and preparing them for successful reintegration into society upon their release. This encompassed a multifaceted approach that included educational initiatives, vocational training, and health regimes designed to foster personal growth and development. Inmates were encouraged to engage in productive activities such as skill learning and teaching, enabling them to acquire valuable expertise that would prove beneficial upon their return to civilian life. Moreover, emphasis was placed on instilling communist ideals through educational programs and readings, providing inmates with a deeper understanding of socialist principles and fostering a sense of ideological solidarity. Furthermore, efforts were made to improve living conditions within the Gulag camps, with a focus on enhancing hygiene, nutrition, and overall well-being. Inmates were afforded opportunities to participate in public works projects, where they could earn wages for their labor and contribute to the collective good. This not only provided inmates with a sense of purpose and dignity but also equipped them with the means to support themselves upon their eventual release. By prioritizing rehabilitation and humane treatment, the reformed Gulag system represented a significant departure from the oppressive practices of the past. Under Zhukov's leadership, the Soviet government sought to redress the injustices of the Stalin era and pave the way for a more just and equitable society, where every individual was afforded the opportunity for redemption and a new beginning.
On August 15, 1953, a pivotal moment unfolded in the geopolitical landscape of Europe as the Soviet Union, under the leadership of General Secretary Zhukov, continued its policy of de-escalating tensions with the West. This landmark day witnessed the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, a significant agreement that heralded a new era of neutrality and independence for Austria. The journey towards this historic treaty began with the election of Chancellor Julius Raab in April 1953, who sought to steer Austria towards a more neutral stance in international affairs. In a strategic move, Raab removed the pro-Western foreign minister Gruber and initiated diplomatic overtures to the Soviet Union, signaling Austria's readiness to engage in dialogue on the issue of independence. Responding to Raab's overtures, General Secretary Zhukov recognized the opportune moment to address the Austrian question and agreed to resume talks on Austria's independence. The negotiations culminated in the enactment of the Declaration of Neutrality by Austria's parliament, a groundbreaking commitment that underscored Austria's resolve to chart an independent course free from the influence of military alliances such as NATO or the Warsaw Pact, and to prohibit the basing of foreign troops on Austrian soil. As a tangible gesture of goodwill, the Soviet Union left behind the imposing Soviet War Memorial in Vienna, symbolizing the sacrifices made during World War II, and entrusted the new Austrian government with a symbolic cache of small arms, artillery, and T-34 tanks. Meanwhile, the United States, recognizing the significance of the moment, contributed a substantial gift of "Stockpile A" assets, further solidifying Austria's position as a neutral and independent nation. In a display of magnanimity, the Soviet government pledged to release all Austrian prisoners held in the USSR, further strengthening the bonds of goodwill and cooperation between the two nations. This gesture of reconciliation underscored the Soviet Union's commitment to fostering peace and stability in Europe and paved the way for a new chapter in Austrian-Soviet relations.
The signing of the Austrian State Treaty marked a significant milestone in the post-war era, offering hope for a future defined by peace, cooperation, and mutual respect among nations. By embracing neutrality and independence, Austria emerged as a beacon of stability in a region fraught with Cold War tensions, demonstrating the power of diplomacy and dialogue in resolving longstanding conflicts and forging a path towards a brighter future. As news of the treaty spread across Europe and beyond, it was met with cautious optimism and widespread acclaim. The international community hailed the agreement as a triumph of diplomacy and a testament to the spirit of cooperation and compromise. In the corridors of power in Washington, Moscow, and capitals across Europe, policymakers took note of the historic significance of the treaty and its potential to reshape the geopolitical landscape of the continent. For Austria, the signing of the State Treaty represented the culmination of decades of struggle for independence and sovereignty. From the ashes of World War II and the shadow of Soviet occupation, Austria emerged as a sovereign and independent nation, free to chart its own course in the world. The Declaration of Neutrality served as a cornerstone of Austrian foreign policy, providing a guiding principle for its relations with the rest of the world and ensuring its status as a neutral actor in the global arena. In the years that followed, Austria would emerge as a staunch advocate for peace, disarmament, and international cooperation. Through its active participation in international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Austria played a vital role in promoting dialogue and understanding among nations and advancing the cause of peace and security on the European continent.
(Coup d'etat in Iran in August '53)
The 1953 Iranian coup d'état, known in Iran as the 28 Mordad coup d'état was the U.S.- and British-instigated, Iranian army-led overthrow of the elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in favor of strengthening the monarchical rule of the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, on 19 August 1953, with one of the significant objectives being to protect British oil interests in Iran. It was aided by the United States (under the name TP-AJAX (Tudeh Party) Project or Operation Ajax) and the United Kingdom (under the name Operation Boot). Mosaddegh had sought to audit the documents of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), a British corporation (now part of BP), to verify that AIOC was paying the contracted royalties to Iran, and to limit the company's control over Iranian oil reserves. Upon the AIOC's refusal to cooperate with the Iranian government, the parliament (Majlis) voted to nationalize Iran's oil industry and to expel foreign corporate representatives from the country. After this vote, Britain instigated a worldwide boycott of Iranian oil to pressure Iran economically. Initially, Britain mobilized its military to seize control of the British-built Abadan oil refinery, then the world's largest, but Prime Minister Clement Attlee (in power until 1951) opted instead to tighten the economic boycott[17] while using Iranian agents to undermine Mosaddegh's government. Judging Mosaddegh to be unamenable and fearing the growing influence of the communist Tudeh, UK prime minister Winston Churchill and the Eisenhower administration decided in early 1953 to overthrow Iran's government. The preceding Truman administration had opposed a coup, fearing the precedent that Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) involvement would set, and the U.S. government had been considering unilateral action (without UK support) to assist the Mosaddegh government as late as 1952.British intelligence officials' conclusions and the UK government's solicitations to the US were instrumental in initiating and planning the coup.
Following the coup, a government under General Fazlollah Zahedi was formed which allowed Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the shah of Iran (Persian for 'king'), to rule more firmly as monarch. He relied heavily on United States support to hold on to power. According to the CIA's declassified documents and records, some of the most feared mobsters in Tehran were hired by the CIA to stage pro-shah riots on 19 August. Other men paid by the CIA were brought into Tehran in buses and trucks and took over the streets of the city. Between 200 and 300 people were killed because of the conflict. Mosaddegh was arrested, tried and convicted of treason by the Shah's military court. On 21 December 1953, he was sentenced to three years in jail, then placed under house arrest for the remainder of his life.Other Mosaddegh supporters were imprisoned, and several received the death penalty. Historians disagree on what motivated the United States to change its policy towards Iran and stage the coup. Middle East historian Ervand Abrahamian identified the coup d'état as "a classic case of nationalism clashing with imperialism in the Third World". He states that Secretary of State Dean Acheson admitted the "'Communist threat' was a smokescreen" in responding to President Eisenhower's claim that the Tudeh party was about to assume power.
Throughout the crisis, the "communist danger" was more of a rhetorical device than a real issue—i.e. it was part of the cold-war discourse ...The Tudeh was no match for the armed tribes and the 129,000-man military. What is more, the British and Americans had enough inside information to be confident that the party had no plans to initiate armed insurrection. At the beginning of the crisis, when the Truman administration was under the impression a compromise was possible, Acheson had stressed the communist danger, and warned if Mosaddegh was not helped, the Tudeh would take over. The (British) Foreign Office had retorted that the Tudeh was no real threat. But, in August 1953, when the Foreign Office echoed the Eisenhower administration's claim that the Tudeh was about to take over, Acheson now retorted that there was no such communist danger. Acheson was honest enough to admit that the issue of the Tudeh was a smokescreen.
Abrahamian states that Iran's oil was the central focus of the coup, for both the British and the Americans, though "much of the discourse at the time linked it to the Cold War". Abrahamian wrote, "If Mosaddegh had succeeded in nationalizing the British oil industry in Iran, that would have set an example and was seen at that time by the Americans as a threat to U.S. oil interests throughout the world, because other countries would do the same." Mosaddegh did not want any compromise solution that allowed a degree of foreign control. Abrahamian said that Mosaddegh "wanted real nationalization, both in theory and practice". Political theorist John Tirman points out that agricultural land owners were politically dominant in Iran well into the 1960s, and the monarch Reza Shah's aggressive land expropriation policies—to the benefit of himself and his supporters—resulted in the Iranian government being Iran's largest land owner. "The landlords and oil producers had new backing, moreover, as American interests were for the first time exerted in Iran. The Cold War was starting, and Soviet challenges were seen in every leftist movement. But the reformers were at root nationalists, not communists, and the issue that galvanized them above all others was the control of oil." The belief that oil was the central motivator behind the coup has been echoed in the popular media by authors such as Robert Byrd, Alan Greenspan, and Ted Koppel.
Middle East political scientist Mark Gasiorowski states that while, on the face of it, there is considerable merit to the argument that U.S. policymakers helped U.S. oil companies gain a share in Iranian oil production after the coup, "it seems more plausible to argue that U.S. policymakers were motivated mainly by fears of a communist takeover in Iran, and that the involvement of U.S. companies was sought mainly to prevent this from occurring. The Cold War was at its height in the early 1950s, and the Soviet Union was viewed as an expansionist power seeking world domination. Eisenhower had made the Soviet threat a key issue in the 1952 elections, accusing the Democrats of being soft on communism and of having 'lost China.' Once in power, the new administration quickly sought to put its views into practice." A 2019 study by Gasiorowski concluded "that U.S. policymakers did not have compelling evidence that the threat of a Communist takeover was increasing substantially in the months before the coup. Rather, the Eisenhower administration interpreted the available evidence in a more alarming manner than the Truman administration had."
Gasiorowski further states "the major U.S. oil companies were not interested in Iran at this time. A glut existed in the world oil market. The U.S. majors had increased their production in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1951 in order to make up for the loss of Iranian production; operating in Iran would force them to cut back production in these countries which would create tensions with Saudi and Kuwaiti leaders. Furthermore, if nationalist sentiments remained high in Iran, production there would be risky. U.S. oil companies had shown no interest in Iran in 1951 and 1952. By late 1952, the Truman administration had come to believe that participation by U.S. companies in the production of Iranian oil was essential to maintain stability in Iran and keep Iran out of Soviet hands. In order to gain the participation of the major U.S. oil companies, Truman offered to scale back a large anti-trust case then being brought against them. The Eisenhower administration shared Truman's views on the participation of U.S. companies in Iran and also agreed to scale back the anti-trust case. Thus, not only did U.S. majors not want to participate in Iran at this time, it took a major effort by U.S. policymakers to persuade them to become involved."
In 2004, Gasiorowski edited a book on the coup arguing that "the climate of intense cold war rivalry between the superpowers, together with Iran's strategic vital location between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf oil fields, led U.S. officials to believe that they had to take whatever steps were necessary to prevent Iran from falling into Soviet hands." While "these concerns seem vastly overblown today"[107] the pattern of "the 1945–46 Azerbaijan crisis, the consolidation of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, the communist triumph in China, and the Korean War—and with the Red Scare at its height in the United States" would not allow U.S. officials to risk allowing the Tudeh Party to gain power in Iran. Furthermore, "U.S. officials believed that resolving the oil dispute was essential for restoring stability in Iran, and after March 1953 it appeared that the dispute could be resolved only at the expense either of Britain or of Mosaddeq." He concludes "it was geostrategic considerations, rather than a desire to destroy Mosaddeq's movement, to establish a dictatorship in Iran or to gain control over Iran's oil, that persuaded U.S. officials to undertake the coup." Faced with choosing between British interests and Iran, the U.S. chose Britain, Gasiorowski said. "Britain was the closest ally of the United States, and the two countries were working as partners on a wide range of vitally important matters throughout the world at this time. Preserving this close relationship was more important to U.S. officials than saving Mosaddeq's tottering regime." A year earlier, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill used Britain's support for the U.S. in the Cold War to insist the United States not undermine his campaign to isolate Mosaddegh. "Britain was supporting the Americans in Korea, he reminded Truman, and had a right to expect 'Anglo-American unity' on Iran."
According to Kinzer, for most Americans, the crisis in Iran became just part of the conflict between Communism and "the Free world". "A great sense of fear, particularly the fear of encirclement, shaped American consciousness during this period. ... Soviet power had already subdued Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Communist governments were imposed on Bulgaria and Romania in 1946, Hungary and Poland in 1947, and Czechoslovakia in 1948. Albania and Yugoslavia also turned to communism. Greek communists made a violent bid for power. Soviet soldiers blocked land routes to Berlin for sixteen months. In 1949, the Soviet Union successfully tested a nuclear weapon. That same year, pro-Western forces in China lost their Civil War to communists led by Mao Zedong. From Washington, it seemed that enemies were on the march everywhere."Consequently, "the United States, challenged by what most Americans saw as a relentless communist advance, slowly ceased to view Iran as a country with a unique history that faced a unique political challenge." Some historians, including Douglas Little, Abbas Milani and George Lenczowski have echoed the view that fears of a communist takeover or Soviet influence motivated the U.S. to intervene. On 11 May 1951, prior to the overthrow of Mosaddegh, Adolf A. Berle warned the U.S. State Department that U.S. "control of the Middle East was at stake, which, with its Persian Gulf oil, meant 'substantial control of the world.
Despite the British government's pressure, the National Security Archive released two declassified documents in August 2017 which confirm the British solicitation of the United States' assistance in ousting Mosaddegh. According to these records, the British first approached the American government about a plan for the coup in November 1952 "repeatedly" asking U.S. to join the coup, claiming that the Mosaddegh government would be ineffective in preventing a communist takeover, and that Mosaddegh was a threat to America's global fight against communism, which they believed necessitated action; the records also state that UK and U.S. spy agencies had by then had "very tentative and preliminary discussions regarding the practicability of such a move". At the time, the American government was already preparing to aid Mosaddegh in his oil dealings with the British, and believed him to be anti-communist—considerations which made the U.S. government skeptical of the plot. Since President Truman's term was drawing to a close in January 1953, and there was too much uncertainty and danger associated with the plot, the U.S. government decided not to take action against Mosaddegh at the time.
According to the 1952 documents, it was Christopher Steel, the No 2 official in the British embassy in Washington, who "pitched" the idea of the coup to US officials amid the US-Britain talks which had begun in October. The document also says that the British officials rejected Paul Nitze's suggestion that, instead of executing a coup, they mount a "campaign" against Ayatollah Abolqasem Kashani, "a leading opponent of British involvement in Iran's oil industry", and the communist Tudeh Party. They "pressed US for a decision" since they knew "the Truman administration was in its final weeks". According to Wilber, the British Secret Intelligence Service worked with CIA to form a propaganda campaign via "the press, handbills and the Tehran clergy" to "weaken the Mossadeq government in any way possible". More broadly, the oil nationalization law led to a direct conflict of interests between Mosaddegh and the British government, and the latter internally proposed to regain its control over the oil industry in Iran by following a "three-track strategy" aimed at either "pressuring him into a favorable settlement or by removing him from the office." The three components of Britain strategy consisted of (1) refusing direct negotiation with Mosaddegh, (2) imposing economic sanctions on Iran and performing war games in the region, and (3) the removal of Mosaddegh through "covert political action".
(First successful Soviet test of a hydrogen bomb)
RDS-6s was the first Soviet test of a thermonuclear weapon that occurred on August 12, 1953, that detonated with a force equivalent to 400 kilotons of TNT. RDS-6 utilized a scheme in which fission and fusion fuel (lithium-6 deuteride) were "layered", a design known as the Sloika or the so-called layer cake design, model in the Soviet Union. A ten-fold increase in explosive power was achieved by a combination of fusion and fission, yet it was still 26 times less powerful than the Ivy Mike bomb tested by the USA in 1952. A similar design was earlier theorized by Edward Teller, but never tested in the U.S., as the "Alarm Clock". The Soviet Union started studies of advanced nuclear bombs and a hydrogen bomb, code named RDS-6, in June 1948. The studies would be done by KB-11 (usually referred to as Arzamas-16, the name of the town) and FIAN. The first hydrogen bomb design was the Truba (Russian: Труба, pipe/cylinder) (RDS-6t)). In March 1948 Klaus Fuchs had provided the USSR with documents of the US 'Classical Super'. In these documents the classical super was described as consisting of a gun-type Uranium-235 primary with beryllium oxide tamper and a secondary consisting of a long cylinder with deuterium, doped with tritium near the primary. The design of the RDS-6t was similar to this classical super. The difference was that the light shell of beryllium oxide was replaced by a heavy shell. The assumption was that the deuterium tritium mixture could be easily heated and compressed, and the shock would start the thermonuclear reaction prematurely. A heavy shell opaque to radiation would prevent this unwanted preheating more than the light shell.
In September / October 1948 Andrei Sakharov, working in FIAN, came up with a competing idea of alternating layers of deuterium and Uranium-238 around a fissile core (Sakharov's 'first idea'). This second design was code named Sloika (RDS-6s) or 'Layer Cake' after the layering. In March 1949 Vitaly Ginzburg proposed to replace the deuterium by Lithium-6 deuteride ('second idea'). The proposal was based on the better efficiency due to the generation of tritium by the neutron capture of lithium and the Uranium-238 fission by the 14 MeV neutrons from D + T fusion. At that time Ginzburg did not know that the cross section for D + T reaction was much larger than that for D + D reaction. In April 1949 the group received D + T cross section data obtained from intelligence gathering without mentioning the source. The large advantage of lithium deuteride became evident and the deuterium design was abandoned. Both the 'first' and 'second' idea were used in the RDS-6s. The result was similar to the US 'Alarm Clock', but there is no indication that the Soviets were aware of the concept of the 'Alarm Clock'. After the United States tested Mike in November 1952, Lavrentiy Beria sent a memo to spare no effort on the development of the RDS-6s. In the final development report from June 1953 the yield was estimated at 300 +/- 100 kilotons. The RDS-6s was tested on August 12, 1953 (Joe 4). The measured yield was 400 kilotons, 10% from fission of the Uranium-235 core, 15-20% from fusion and 70 - 75% from fission of the Uranium-238 layers. After the successful test Sakharov proposed a more powerful version of the RDS-6s, code named RDS-6sD.
RDS-4 (also known as Tatyana) was a Soviet nuclear bomb that was first tested at Semipalatinsk Test Site, on August 23, 1953. The device weighed approximately 1,200 kilograms (2,646 lb). The device was approximately one-third the size of the RDS-3. The bomb was dropped from an IL-28 aircraft at an altitude of 11 kilometres (7 mi) and exploded at 600 metres (1,969 ft), with a yield of 28 kt. The Soviet Union's first mass-produced tactical nuclear weapon was based on the RDS-4 and remained in service until 1966. It used a composite core of 4.2 kilograms (9 lb) Pu-239 and 6.8 kilograms (15 lb) 90% enriched U-235 and had a nominal yield of 30 kilotons. RDS-4 "Tatyana" turned out to be very compact - its weight (1200 kg) and dimensions were four times less than that of RDS-1, which allowed the new bomb to be taken into service not only by long-range aviation (Tupolev Tu-4, Tupolev Tu-95, Tupolev Tu-16, Tupolev Tu-22, Myasishchev M-4, and Myasishchev 3M), but also front-line (Ilyushin Il-28, Tupolev Tu-2, Yakovlev Yak-26, Yakovlev Yak-28, Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-19, and Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21). A tactical weapon based on the RDS-4 was also used on September 14, 1954 during Snowball military exercise at the Totsky range (similar to Western Desert Rock exercises), when the bomb was dropped by the Tu-4 bomber (the reverse-engineered Boeing B-29). The purpose of this exercise was not to test the bomb itself, but the ability of using it while breaking through enemy defenses (presumably in West Germany). After the explosion Soviet jet fighters were sent to fly through the mushroom cloud while tanks and infantry were forced to move through ground zero.
The Pact of Madrid, signed on 23 September 1953 by Francoist Spain and the United States, was a significant effort to break the international isolation of Spain after World War II, together with the Concordat of 1953. This development came at a time when other victorious Allies of World War II and much of the rest of the world remained hostile (for the 1946 United Nations condemnation of the Francoist regime, see Spanish Question) to a fascist regime sympathetic to the cause of the Axis powers and established with the Axis assistance. The 1953 accord took the form of three separate executive agreements that pledged the United States to furnish economic and military aid to Spain. The United States, in turn, was to be permitted to construct and to utilize air and naval bases on Spanish territory (Naval Station Rota, Morón Air Base, Torrejón Air Base and Zaragoza Air Base). The US Joint Chiefs of Staff saw these bases and the resulting military alliance with Spain as a necessary military option to allow an orderly retreat of its troops from Central Europe in case of Soviet attack on Westen Europe. Although not a full-fledged military alliance, the pact did result in a substantial United States contribution to the improvement of Spain's defense capabilities. During the initial United States fiscal years 1954 to 1961 phase, military aid amounted to US$500 million, in the form of grants. Between 1962 and 1982, a further US$1.238 billion of aid in the form of loans (US$727 million) and grants (US$511 million) was provided. During the period 1983 to 1986, United States military aid, entirely in the form of sales under concessional credit terms, averaged US$400 million annually, but it declined to slightly more than US$100 million annually in 1987 and in 1988. The military credits were scheduled to be phased out in the fiscal year 1989, in keeping with Spain's growing self-sufficiency in national defense. More than 200 officers and NCOs of the Spanish Armed Forces received specialized training in the United States each year under a parallel program.
(Fidel Castro during his trial)
History Will Absolve Me is the title of a two-hour speech made by Fidel Castro on 16 October 1953. Castro made the speech in his own defense in court against the charges brought against him after he led an attack on the Moncada Barracks in Cuba. The speech later became the manifesto of his 26th of July Movement. Though sentenced to terms of up to 15 years for their roles in the attack, all of the rebels were released after an amnesty granted by Fulgencio Batista in 1955. Castro relocated to Mexico, before returning to Cuba on the Granma yacht in December 1956. The speech was secretly printed as a pamphlet by El Curita at Plaza del Vapor which was demolished in 1959 by the Castro government and made into a park named El Curita.
Castro made his first court appearance on 21 September 1953 in Santiago, as one of around 100 defendants arrested after the Moncada attack. Of these, 65 had in fact not taken part in the operation and included leading politicians — among them the nation′s last democratically elected president, Carlos Prío. Castro, a qualified lawyer, took on his own defense, as did two other defendants. All others were defended by a total of 24 attorneys. Castro based his case on the illegality of the Batista regime and the inherent right of the citizen to rebel against what he perceived to be an illegal government. When asked who was responsible for the attack, Castro replied that "the intellectual author of this revolution is José Martí, the apostle of our independence". Castro also took part in the court′s second hearing on 22 September, but missed day three (25 September) because the regimental chief had wrongly claimed him to be sick, in an effort to dislodge his defence. Castro managed to have a handwritten note handed to the judge in court asking for special safeguards for his life that he said was under threat in America. The court then decided to proceed with the main trial, instructed for the demands in Castro′s letter to be fulfilled and to grant his separate case a new trial at a later date. 31 prisoners were found guilty but most were treated leniently. 19 attackers were acquitted along with the 65 civilians. The only two female participants in the attack, who had not been armed, received sentences of 7 months. They had been charged with cat burglary. Along with three others found to have played a leading role in the attack, Castro's brother Raúl was sentenced to 13 years on what was then called the Isle of Pines.
Castro was brought before a different court on 16 October 1953 for sentencing. It was here that he reportedly made his four-hour speech justifying his actions and outlining his plans for Cuba. During the trial, public outrage at the treatment of the prisoners was seriously diminishing Batista's standing among the population. A local judge telephoned Batista's staff to complain that Batista was reviving the brutal era of former president Gerardo Machado, while a Santiago bishop called upon the courts to spare Castro's life and sought support from Cuba's upper class Catholic contingent. Though Castro was sentenced to join his brother in prison for 15 years, the trial elevated him to semi-heroic status on the island. Castro's speech contained numerous evocations of the "father of Cuban independence" José Martí, whilst depicting Batista as a tyrant. According to Castro, Batista was a "monstrum horrendum ... without entrails" who had committed an act of treachery in 1933 when he initiated a coup to oust Cuban president Ramón Grau. Castro went on to speak of "700,000 Cubans without work", launching an attack on Cuba's extant healthcare and schooling, and asserting that 30% of Cuba's farm people could not even write their own names. In Castro's published manifesto, based on his 1953 speech, he gave de tails of the "five revolutionary laws" he wished to see implemented on the island:
- The reinstatement of the 1940 Cuban constitution.
- A reformation of land rights.
- The right of industrial workers to a 30% share of company profits.
- The right of sugar workers to receive 55% of company profits.
- The confiscation of holdings of those found guilty of fraud under previous administrative powers.
(Kim Il Sung's ambitions knew no bounds)
After the cessation of hostilities in the Korean War, Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea, found himself in a precarious position. Despite his failure to achieve the unification of Korea under his rule, he portrayed the war as a victory for his regime, emphasizing that he had successfully defended the North Korean state against external aggression. However, the conflict had exacted a heavy toll on North Korea, leaving the country ravaged and its economy in ruins. In the aftermath of the war, Kim Il Sung recognized the urgent need for reconstruction and revitalization. He understood that rebuilding North Korea's economy was paramount to ensuring the survival and stability of his regime. As such, he embarked on an ambitious reconstruction effort aimed at revitalizing the country's infrastructure, industry, and agriculture. To spearhead the reconstruction process, Kim Il Sung introduced a comprehensive five-year national economic plan, drawing inspiration from the Soviet Union's successful implementation of five-year plans. The overarching goal of this plan was to transform North Korea's economy into a centrally planned, socialist system, with all major industries and agricultural activities owned and controlled by the state. Central to Kim Il Sung's economic vision was the establishment of a command economy, in which the state exerted centralized control over economic planning, resource allocation, and production decisions. This model, influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology, aimed to eliminate the capitalist elements of the economy and achieve collective ownership of the means of production. Under the five-year plan, North Korea underwent a radical transformation, with a focus on industrialization, modernization, and self-sufficiency. Kim Il Sung envisioned a modern, industrialized socialist state capable of competing on the world stage and providing for the needs of its citizens without reliance on external assistance. One of the key objectives of the economic plan was the rapid expansion and modernization of North Korea's industrial base. Kim Il Sung sought to develop heavy industry, including steel production, machinery manufacturing, and chemical processing, to lay the foundation for industrial self-sufficiency. State-owned enterprises were prioritized and provided with extensive resources and support to achieve these goals. In addition to industrial development, the five-year plan emphasized the collectivization of agriculture as a means of increasing productivity and ensuring food security. Kim Il Sung viewed collectivization as essential for overcoming the inefficiencies of small-scale peasant farming and maximizing agricultural output to feed the population and support industrial growth.
To facilitate collectivization, Kim Il Sung implemented sweeping agrarian reforms, including the formation of collective farms and state farms, the redistribution of land, and the consolidation of agricultural resources under state control. These measures aimed to streamline agricultural production, promote mechanization and modern farming techniques, and increase yields to meet the demands of urbanization and industrialization. The five-year plan also prioritized investment in infrastructure, including transportation networks, energy production, and telecommunications. In pursuit of self-sufficiency and independence, Kim Il Sung sought to reduce North Korea's reliance on foreign trade and external assistance. The economic plan emphasized the development of domestic industries and the promotion of indigenous technologies to reduce imports and enhance national sovereignty. Despite the ambitious goals and aspirations of the five-year plan, North Korea faced numerous challenges and obstacles in its implementation. The country's limited natural resources, outdated infrastructure, and lack of skilled labor posed significant constraints on economic development. Moreover, the legacy of war, including physical destruction and human suffering, hindered progress and placed additional burdens on the state. Furthermore, North Korea's isolation from the international community and its strained relations with neighboring countries, particularly South Korea and the United States, further exacerbated its economic woes. The imposition of international sanctions and trade restrictions further isolated North Korea and limited its access to vital resources and markets. Despite these challenges, Kim Il Sung remained steadfast in his commitment to socialist transformation and economic development. He promoted self-reliance, discipline, and sacrifice among the North Korean people, rallying them behind the cause of building a strong, prosperous socialist state. Kim Il Sung's introduction of a five-year national economic plan marked a pivotal moment in North Korea's history, signaling a shift towards socialism and central planning. Despite facing numerous challenges and obstacles, Kim's vision for economic development laid the groundwork for North Korea's subsequent industrialization and modernization efforts. While the legacy of the five-year plan remains contested and its outcomes debated, its impact on North Korea's economic trajectory and political landscape cannot be denied.
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1. Should all German POW's be released from the Soviet imprisonment?
A) Yes
B) No
2. Please write down how should upcoming administrative reform/anti-corruption and anti-bureaucracy campaign be done?
3. In a few weeks time, General Secretary Zhukov will attend a summit in Moscow, where he will meet with leaders of Eastern European governments. Please write down, on which topics should the summit focus on?
4. As General Secretary Zhukov is now 6 months in charge, it's high time to form a stance of the new Soviet government towards the legacy of 30-years of Joseph Stalin. Please write it down.
A) Yes
B) No
2. Please write down how should upcoming administrative reform/anti-corruption and anti-bureaucracy campaign be done?
3. In a few weeks time, General Secretary Zhukov will attend a summit in Moscow, where he will meet with leaders of Eastern European governments. Please write down, on which topics should the summit focus on?
4. As General Secretary Zhukov is now 6 months in charge, it's high time to form a stance of the new Soviet government towards the legacy of 30-years of Joseph Stalin. Please write it down.
it’s time guys to make the Comitern more international and act like a sorta world government (mandate each other and also help eachother)
1 - A, but prioritizing those who are older, sick or with injuries, and within these, those who come from GDR territories.
2 - Starting with an audit of all departments, and once the results are available, eliminate duplicate, superfluous departments, merge ministries... and with respect to corruption, offer the corrupt a deadline to surrender, in exchange for certain indulgences (retirements, discreet demotions...), after the same, give the new secret police the opportunity to demonstrate their worth, punishing the corrupt with harsh and exemplary sentences.
3 - First of all, the state of the economy and its agricultural and industrial production. Second, the state of the infrastructure and addressing the possibility of a common track gauge to facilitate the transportation of people and goods, and facilitate the integration of all states. Third, address the state of the armed forces and their self-defense capacity before Warsaw Pact forces can intervene. Fourthly, initiate contacts with the secret police forces, to improve the detection of double agents, infiltrators... Fifth and lastly, try to improve COMECON, providing it with greater autonomy and governing and control bodies.
4 - A partial and gradual de-Stalinization, to gradually withdraw its influence until it is eliminated, first eliminating the cult of personality, eliminating or modifying Stalinist laws, accepting that Stalin made mistakes, but at the same time, maintaining certain laws that are positive, praising his figure as a leader during the Second World War... and finally, rehabilitating the figure of politicians opposed to Stalin and purged, but starting little by little (Trosky, I'm sorry but you are not going to be rehabilitated until mid 60's)
2 - Starting with an audit of all departments, and once the results are available, eliminate duplicate, superfluous departments, merge ministries... and with respect to corruption, offer the corrupt a deadline to surrender, in exchange for certain indulgences (retirements, discreet demotions...), after the same, give the new secret police the opportunity to demonstrate their worth, punishing the corrupt with harsh and exemplary sentences.
3 - First of all, the state of the economy and its agricultural and industrial production. Second, the state of the infrastructure and addressing the possibility of a common track gauge to facilitate the transportation of people and goods, and facilitate the integration of all states. Third, address the state of the armed forces and their self-defense capacity before Warsaw Pact forces can intervene. Fourthly, initiate contacts with the secret police forces, to improve the detection of double agents, infiltrators... Fifth and lastly, try to improve COMECON, providing it with greater autonomy and governing and control bodies.
4 - A partial and gradual de-Stalinization, to gradually withdraw its influence until it is eliminated, first eliminating the cult of personality, eliminating or modifying Stalinist laws, accepting that Stalin made mistakes, but at the same time, maintaining certain laws that are positive, praising his figure as a leader during the Second World War... and finally, rehabilitating the figure of politicians opposed to Stalin and purged, but starting little by little (Trosky, I'm sorry but you are not going to be rehabilitated until mid 60's)
A. It would help East Germany in gaining a large number of people that they can use their own economy and industry.
This is going to be difficult on the reality that the Soviet system was filled with corruption and bureaucracy and any real attempt at solving it is going to lead to mass arrests or firings. However while it might weaken us a bit I do believe decisive action should be taken with a general purge of most elements who were corrupt or incompetent from within the nation.
Really the hardest pat is going to be avoiding corruption since the Soviet system simply does little to support competency/hard work especially since we are most likely going to replace them with people loyal to us anyways. That and the whole lying about things to meet quotas is going to cause several problems no matter what we do or our demands to save face which again will always lead to some form of corruption, lying, and general inefficiency.
Try to find ways to further their development with our own along with how we can help them rebuild from WW2. Maybe push for easier flow of people from across the Warsaw pact?
Try to avoid outright calling him out but also increasingly get attention towards our reforms and newer ideas and projects to at least get some attention away from Stalin. Allow some soft criticism of the man and his regiment with increasing liberty in terms of criticism as time goes on to slowly damage Stalin's image while making us look as reformers and new leaders that will drive the nation away from Stalinist ideals.
Also I cannot help but feel that our deal with China is not going to do much in terms of helping China due to their own staunch support for Stalinist/Maoist ideology and the reality that China really wanted to be its own thing. Not counting the whole mass corruption or lying that officials will do once they get access to those resources wasting large amounts of them. I mean we are dealing with Mao who decided to keep selling food away while the nation was dealing with one of the worst famines in history which he created by the way.
Also North Vietnam is not going to like further Chinese influence in the nation so actually getting Chinese support might hurt our positions with them. We should overall be the main ones supporting them over China if no other reason than to keep China in check.
Dear comrades and friends of the party, once again we reunite towards discussing key objectives of the socialist world in it's existence to liberate the worldwide working class and bring forth communism.
On the first Topic, we oughta to release the POWs but gradually. We must understand that such a quick and sudden release of the POWs would cause a crash on the already strained East German government, instead, we need to organize a screening process to ensure who to release first, making adjustments in order to select those based on professions that are the most needed and with higher education as well as those who are married, have some sort of illness, are of more advanced age or a mixture of those. Further, we also should ensure they're being educated in the new Socialist ideology as we do not want any unrepentant Nazis to make underground right wing communities that erode our state within.
On our second issue. We need to slowly "unravel" the corruption networks as well as decrease but improve the bureaucracy to make it less likely to be corrupted. It has become obvious that the Shadow of Stalinism still hangs over our Politburo given he had created a Nomenklatura made to serve their own interests and thus avoid his power plays, what we must do above all else is a entire re-organization on how to center and direct the bureaucracy, removing obsolete or unnecessary positions, diminish the number of serving bureaucrats to avoid a bloating, create tighter standards for entering, a "new blood" position where more dynamic members are given new places of powers to help move in the gears and stepside the older conservative guard. Thus by steeling and polishing the bureaucracy we can massively decrease corruption, remember comrades, everyone falters at least once so fully eliminating corruption is impossible but we can also tight the noose around it as much as possible to prevent it to corrode the state, this also ties with my previous desire for computer investment as having a centralized and interconnected set of computers who can calculate and story information to be sent anywhere in the union would allow us to cut down on the bureaucracy even more while increasing the quality of management and information.
For the third question, We must both stress the importance of economic cooperation and development as well as political responsibility, not to mention further emphasizing our unwavering support for anti colonial struggles from workers all over the world. In a age where the capitalist powers are doing everything they can in order to keep the workers of the world oppressed, either at home or with their colonies, as well as undermine our systems, we as the bulwarks of communism must keep up with the West via not only military might but also economic improvement to ensure the wellbeing of our liberated people in order to export socialism to the world, this shall include not only a shared economic area for trading of raw materials but also mutual technological and scientific development as several nations think better than one, this shall also include things like a shared sports league to foster socialist brotherhood and joy but also programs like a interconnected web of train networks, electrification of the Warsaw Pact with nuclear energy, encouraging of tourism as to further foster understanding and knowledge between the people. Alongside this of course we must hammer into the leaders the importance of flexibility and dialogue between the Politburo and it's people, what worked for one country may not work for another, thus we should encourage leaders to take into account the advantages and disadvantages their nations face before deciding on the course of action and if needed, to ask for assistance from their socialist brothers in order to develop true working class solidarity, this of course will also include cooperation between the security apparatus in order to both capture internal subversives but also to "acquire information" from "areas of interest".
For our final interest, We must both recognize what Comrade Stalin did for us while also recognizing and moving past his many mistakes. Despite our denouncement of Stalinist high terror and creation of bureaucratic class that serves itself rather than the people, we still must recognize the leading role Stalin had in both modernizing and defending the USSR during it's moment of greatest crisis, of the expansion of our borders, of being able to share socialism with our Eastern and Central European brothers and even our atomic stockpile we are improving, while he'll never be in the same position as Marx, Engels and Lenin where, Comrade Stalin despite his many flaws we're working on correcting still left positive impacts on our USSR that would be folly to ignore and call him a devil instead of understanding his mixed legacy and appreciate the good we got while still being able to look towards the future past his mistakes that cost us dearly in many areas.
A). It has almost been a decade, and while some of them have committed crimes worthy of frozen hell, a majority of them are guilty of being on the wrong side. Release the elderly, sick, and those without a record of crimes first, and gradually move up the list.
@ruffino's plan, but we should also reduce the incentive for corruption by encouraging honesty and competence. Perhaps reducing the penalties for failure to meeting quotas and encourage record-keeping for stronger veracity.
I support @ruffino's plan, but also we should discuss the public opinion in each of the states, and how we can improve them through slight liberalization and rise in standard of living. We can tie that with economic developments.
Gradual de-Stalinization. 70% Good, 30% Bad. Reintroduce the people he purged, but gradually. Remove the cult of personality and allow criticism against his actions.
A) Same idea as @Kurd Gossemer since going too quick will make the peace talks with protesters null.
A mix of @Fratsup and @Kurd Gossemer but also have the newly formed KGB to help as well.
A mix @Fratsup, @Kurd Gossemer and @ruffino plans.
Again, a mix @Fratsup, @Kurd Gossemer and @ruffino plans.
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Honestly, I'd like to depose the Kim family and replace them with a more competent and non-militaristic leader.
Also no voting on Iran...?