I was like 90% joking when I first said I wanted a Terrence Malick GAW film but on further thought it actually would kind of kick ass. Maybe a HBO miniseries instead?
Sequel de Mayo (Cinco de Mayo, Vol. II)
- Thread starter KingSweden24
- Start date
So many Civil War films in OTL you can remake I this ATL Great American War.
Gettysburg is now Harrisburg.
Glory could be about the last battle in DC before it was overrun by Confederates.
Cold Mountain is instead a movie about the Confederate Coup, the death of the President Vardaman and ascension of Patton..
Gettysburg is now Harrisburg.
Glory could be about the last battle in DC before it was overrun by Confederates.
Cold Mountain is instead a movie about the Confederate Coup, the death of the President Vardaman and ascension of Patton..
Sure, but “Long March” is fairly widely understood among us amateur historians?
dcharles
Banned
Yeah. And the spelling of Mao's given name doesn't really have anything to do with the joke. I'm assuming the user is just impervious to puns.
Most puns can be limited to the first two letters: P-U.
I just missed it.I’m wondering how the racial and political situation in the confederacy will play out after the end of this war. With atrocities committed by both sides, with Confederate Whites committing more and larger scale atrocities due to the simple fact that they can and most Confederate Blacks are more interested in getting the hell out of dodge rather than sticking around to fight usually better armed Confederate Whites, and the Confederacy definitely going to be a economic basket case…it leaves plenty of room for large scale atrocities that could go down.
Plus the entirety of Confederate society is going to be shaken up by the emancipation of slaves…which is another area of tension and humiliation for the Confederate White (mostly aristocratic plantation owner interests) government and society to swallow. Plus the Confederate army has been up to large scale atrocities manufacturing.
I’m thinking that large scale movement of Confederate Blacks to Kentucky and US conquered border regions and Confederate Whites out of those locations into the still independent lands of the Confederacy could be possible…and by large scale movement I mean very possibly forced expulsions on both sides.
Plus the entirety of Confederate society is going to be shaken up by the emancipation of slaves…which is another area of tension and humiliation for the Confederate White (mostly aristocratic plantation owner interests) government and society to swallow. Plus the Confederate army has been up to large scale atrocities manufacturing.
I’m thinking that large scale movement of Confederate Blacks to Kentucky and US conquered border regions and Confederate Whites out of those locations into the still independent lands of the Confederacy could be possible…and by large scale movement I mean very possibly forced expulsions on both sides.
Patton is truly f**cked. The Confederate Congress at gunpoint will rafty the treaty, but I will expect many assasination attempts by the paramilitary groups calling him a "Yankee Puppet" or a traitor
Once he finishes his time in office (if he is still alive), I could see him moving to some place like Australia.
The other thing that I truly wonder is on the day that the War ends, will there be more healthy (without war wounds) white males 18-45 or more healthy (without war wounds) negro males inside the confederacy. One side effect of limiting the size of the State Militias is the idea that you could actually have a larger organized military group of negros than the size of the State Militia. Imagine the Mississippi State Militia trying to retake control of the "Black Belt" and *losing* a military confrontation!
It is still my headcanon that there is a movie showing the removal and death of Vardaman where he gives some angry rant about race mixing or whatever, and that in the German Empire in the present t day it's a meme to make reactions with fake subtitles of what Vardaman is saying. lol
That sound you just heard?
That was James Vardaman rolling in his grave at extremely high velocity.
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Welp, we know that the Confederacy won't have to worry about importing coal or oil since they can just attach a belt to his corpse and power the nation from it.
Based on the last time we had the demographics discussion roughly 40% of military-aged white males are now dead, from a population which was a bit less than twice as large as the black military-aged male population.
So they’re running even, minus refugee emigration and civilian deaths from shortages and famine, which probably fell disproportionately on the enslaved population. So overall there’s probably something like a 10:9 balance in favor of white people in military potential.
But set against that is the fact that the military casualties will have disproportionately fell on those best suited to military service; brave enough to volunteer and do the job even if it killed them.
The residual population is not going to be as effective a military force.
I wouldn’t be surprised if one of the stories of the disintegration that the CSA sees this coming decade is the rise of basically independent black warlord states that control big parts of MS, AR, LA, AL, and maybe GA and SC.
The US or various actors there prop them up in a combination of “if they have their own homes there they won’t migrate here” and genuine sympathy for their plight if they’re reconquered.
Eventually the CSA government “reunites” the country by beating some white warlords into submission and crafting a political settlement with the rest. They offer enough local autonomy to the black ones to get them to accept the figleaf of federal authority instead of incurring the casualties and destruction needed to truly bring them to heel.
You get something akin to the ROC in the 1930’s, with lots of warlords-made-good as local big men in politics and some ethnic/linguistic enclaves that are pretty much independent for domestic affairs.
They’re only hammered into line a bit more when Long comes into the picture with a less racialist, more populist ideology to genuinely weld the country back together, albeit imperfectly.
In Rome's Image: Italy and the 20th Century
"...Boselli was even older than Giolitti, and was far too radical on the question of the Church, and thus was a non-starter. It became Salandra, only invited into Cabinet in the spring of 1914 in the first place, who emerged as the new Prime Minister upon Giolitti's long-anticipated resignation, appointed on the advice of his outgoing predecessor.
There was much good to say in favor of Salandra. Credible liberals such as Vittorio Orlando could support him and were rewarded for such support with the Finance Ministry, a key boon for the Anglophilic wing of the UL, while staunch conservatives also considered him an ally, which led to the appointment of the ultra-reactionary Sidney Sonnino as his Foreign Minister. This created a unique triumvir atop Italian politics as 1917 marched on, with the more collaborative Salandra in the middle managing a cabinet with many of the same personalities of the late Giolittian years but in shuffled positions.
And collaborative Salandra proved to have to be. He lacked the longevity, force of personality and indeed cunning of Giolitti and the same mastery of transformismo; his sympathies lay very clearly with the Catholic Electoral Union, rather than the Radicals, Democrats or parties even further to the left. Upon his nomination as Prime Minister in February 1917, it seemed indeed like Salandra would have a very charmed eight months ahead until the elections due for that October; the new leader of the UEC upon the death of Gentiloni the previous year was a lay priest named Luigi Sturzo, a figure who would before long tower over Italy and the Leonine alike, who got on well with Salandra but represented a much more explicitly Catholic worldview by the standards of 1917 Italy's secular and anti-clerical political establishment. Salandra's alliance with Sturzo helped not only make Papa Sturzo a major figure in his own right, but Salandra's contempt for Sacchi and Nitti as leaders of the Radical Party due to their republicanism badly weakened the UL as well over the course of the next year as the center-and-left alliance constructed by Giolitti to suck in the Radicals and Democrats (while excluding the Republicans and Socialists) with external support of the UEC badly frayed.
The truth was that Giolitti's clientelist but centrist posture had given way to Italy's most conservative government in decades, arguably more orthodox in a right-wing orientation than Crispi's had been at its height, but Salandra enjoyed what can by Italian political standards be regarded as something of a honeymoon due to the French military budget of 1917, which in tandem with the chaotic non-resolution of the Hungarian Crisis to the east served to terrify Italian policymakers. The pivot to supporting the UEC was indeed a shrewd and cynical move on Salandra's part as much for his domestic distrust of the PRI and PDI as it was to suggest in the direction of Paris that Italy was wholly and fully committed to the Leonine Compromise that was now turning fifty years of age (that Pope Gregory XVII nonetheless was lukewarm in his tolerance of the UEC at best of course complicated such matters, and Sturzo represented a very different branch of the Catholic Church than the Pontiff and his increasingly ultramontanist curia). It was also the case that France's belligerent course beginning in late 1916 served to help rally support of various disparate factions of the Italian political scene around Salandra for at least a few months, including some of the more centrist figures in the PSI.
Italy's military budget of 1917 was thus a counter-escalatory reaction to events in France and Austria but, also, reflective of her strange position in the world. The alliance with Germany had never been tested, and increasing German ambitions in the Americas and Africa had in fact persuaded Rome that if push came to shove Italy may indeed stand alone against the two larger powers on either side of her. This was among the reasons why Italy, despite quiet assurances from German diplomats, did not nudge Athens closer to war with the Ottomans in the two years before the Central European War broke out, even as Europe was convinced that a conflict in the Aegean was inevitable with fraying relations and an arms race.
Based purely on the budgeting and preparations that had already been made, Italy would by 1919 have ten dreadnought battleships across four classes and six pre-dreadnoughts in support roles, as well as sixteen cruisers built in Italian harbors or bought from Britain. This was a substantial naval force for a country of Italy's size and wealth, and as such most of the preparations for a potential future conflict with France and Austria was borne out by the Army. The 1917 budget provided for two more dreadnoughts to be finished by 1920 and two more by 1922 as well as six more cruisers, but the vast majority of the funds flowed into new artillery, new rifles, and after the experiences of the Great American War, new airplane design for supporting actions in what was anticipated to be a "battle for the Alps."
Even relative moderates such as Sacchi voted in support of Salandra's remarkable expansion of the Army, which was to be headed by Chief of Staff Armando Diaz and his well-regarded second-in-command, Pietro Badoglio. They were inspired in part by a well-timed report by Diaz in 1917 that was secretly disseminated to a number of powerful figures in Italian politics that conspicuously did not include high-ranking Socialists that cast immense doubt on Italy's preparedness for war, whether with the Ottomans or anybody else; a similar report in 1915 had suggested that Italy "would lose a war with Serbia if waged today," but had not been acted upon. The conditions of 1917 were very different, however, with the European balance suddenly thrown into disarray by the convulsions in Hungary, the escalation of tensions in the Balkans, and now France's new course. Diaz in particular was glad to have a new investment in artillery; he had previously had as little as a hundred and fifty pieces for a proposed army of forty divisions of men.
The path towards 1917's elections thus looked clear; Salandra had the broad support of the political spectrum (even Socialist firebrands like Mussolini) for his rearmament program, and that broad support helped paper over the very real disputes over other domestic and foreign policies that strongly displeased the likes of Nitti, Sacchi and Colajanni. But those disputes would not be subsumed long, for the UL was not as much a popular movement as a formation of the political establishment designed by Giolitti and dependent even four years earlier upon the Patto Gentiloni to survive - and it was not at all clear that Salandra, despite his remarkable success in passing the rearmament budget, could conjure such similar magic..."
- In Rome's Image: Italy and the 20th Century
There was much good to say in favor of Salandra. Credible liberals such as Vittorio Orlando could support him and were rewarded for such support with the Finance Ministry, a key boon for the Anglophilic wing of the UL, while staunch conservatives also considered him an ally, which led to the appointment of the ultra-reactionary Sidney Sonnino as his Foreign Minister. This created a unique triumvir atop Italian politics as 1917 marched on, with the more collaborative Salandra in the middle managing a cabinet with many of the same personalities of the late Giolittian years but in shuffled positions.
And collaborative Salandra proved to have to be. He lacked the longevity, force of personality and indeed cunning of Giolitti and the same mastery of transformismo; his sympathies lay very clearly with the Catholic Electoral Union, rather than the Radicals, Democrats or parties even further to the left. Upon his nomination as Prime Minister in February 1917, it seemed indeed like Salandra would have a very charmed eight months ahead until the elections due for that October; the new leader of the UEC upon the death of Gentiloni the previous year was a lay priest named Luigi Sturzo, a figure who would before long tower over Italy and the Leonine alike, who got on well with Salandra but represented a much more explicitly Catholic worldview by the standards of 1917 Italy's secular and anti-clerical political establishment. Salandra's alliance with Sturzo helped not only make Papa Sturzo a major figure in his own right, but Salandra's contempt for Sacchi and Nitti as leaders of the Radical Party due to their republicanism badly weakened the UL as well over the course of the next year as the center-and-left alliance constructed by Giolitti to suck in the Radicals and Democrats (while excluding the Republicans and Socialists) with external support of the UEC badly frayed.
The truth was that Giolitti's clientelist but centrist posture had given way to Italy's most conservative government in decades, arguably more orthodox in a right-wing orientation than Crispi's had been at its height, but Salandra enjoyed what can by Italian political standards be regarded as something of a honeymoon due to the French military budget of 1917, which in tandem with the chaotic non-resolution of the Hungarian Crisis to the east served to terrify Italian policymakers. The pivot to supporting the UEC was indeed a shrewd and cynical move on Salandra's part as much for his domestic distrust of the PRI and PDI as it was to suggest in the direction of Paris that Italy was wholly and fully committed to the Leonine Compromise that was now turning fifty years of age (that Pope Gregory XVII nonetheless was lukewarm in his tolerance of the UEC at best of course complicated such matters, and Sturzo represented a very different branch of the Catholic Church than the Pontiff and his increasingly ultramontanist curia). It was also the case that France's belligerent course beginning in late 1916 served to help rally support of various disparate factions of the Italian political scene around Salandra for at least a few months, including some of the more centrist figures in the PSI.
Italy's military budget of 1917 was thus a counter-escalatory reaction to events in France and Austria but, also, reflective of her strange position in the world. The alliance with Germany had never been tested, and increasing German ambitions in the Americas and Africa had in fact persuaded Rome that if push came to shove Italy may indeed stand alone against the two larger powers on either side of her. This was among the reasons why Italy, despite quiet assurances from German diplomats, did not nudge Athens closer to war with the Ottomans in the two years before the Central European War broke out, even as Europe was convinced that a conflict in the Aegean was inevitable with fraying relations and an arms race.
Based purely on the budgeting and preparations that had already been made, Italy would by 1919 have ten dreadnought battleships across four classes and six pre-dreadnoughts in support roles, as well as sixteen cruisers built in Italian harbors or bought from Britain. This was a substantial naval force for a country of Italy's size and wealth, and as such most of the preparations for a potential future conflict with France and Austria was borne out by the Army. The 1917 budget provided for two more dreadnoughts to be finished by 1920 and two more by 1922 as well as six more cruisers, but the vast majority of the funds flowed into new artillery, new rifles, and after the experiences of the Great American War, new airplane design for supporting actions in what was anticipated to be a "battle for the Alps."
Even relative moderates such as Sacchi voted in support of Salandra's remarkable expansion of the Army, which was to be headed by Chief of Staff Armando Diaz and his well-regarded second-in-command, Pietro Badoglio. They were inspired in part by a well-timed report by Diaz in 1917 that was secretly disseminated to a number of powerful figures in Italian politics that conspicuously did not include high-ranking Socialists that cast immense doubt on Italy's preparedness for war, whether with the Ottomans or anybody else; a similar report in 1915 had suggested that Italy "would lose a war with Serbia if waged today," but had not been acted upon. The conditions of 1917 were very different, however, with the European balance suddenly thrown into disarray by the convulsions in Hungary, the escalation of tensions in the Balkans, and now France's new course. Diaz in particular was glad to have a new investment in artillery; he had previously had as little as a hundred and fifty pieces for a proposed army of forty divisions of men.
The path towards 1917's elections thus looked clear; Salandra had the broad support of the political spectrum (even Socialist firebrands like Mussolini) for his rearmament program, and that broad support helped paper over the very real disputes over other domestic and foreign policies that strongly displeased the likes of Nitti, Sacchi and Colajanni. But those disputes would not be subsumed long, for the UL was not as much a popular movement as a formation of the political establishment designed by Giolitti and dependent even four years earlier upon the Patto Gentiloni to survive - and it was not at all clear that Salandra, despite his remarkable success in passing the rearmament budget, could conjure such similar magic..."
- In Rome's Image: Italy and the 20th Century
"Hmm. Does the name of the book indicate that Italy will actually be a more unified country iTTL, so much less chance of a party like the Northern League?
Great news, Italy will not be totally unprepared for the war and some of his OTL weakness has been adressed and more importaly Cadorna is not in command, not that Diaz is a nicer man even him is an harsh disciplinarian, what he lack is the pure arbitrarity in giving such punishment and this 'mystic sadism' that engulfed Cadorna behaviour towards his men (at least in OTL).
While he was a worse strategist than Cadorna and hadn't his gift for logistic and pure organization he greatly understand the soldiers and that morale and propaganda were extremely important, plus his less abrasive personality will probably avoid the sack of a such number of italian officers in this war.
Plus he also lack the mutal hate between him and Giolitti and a general distrust of the government (that was reciprocated) so some level of better coordination can be achieved.
Badoglio will be probably his usual mediocre self but it's the favorite of the royal court so there is nothing to do about him
This is pretty close to how things will evolve
Definitely. You might still have some regionalist instinct but not outright secessionist.
Also I spaced on this but thank you to @lukedalton for helping me out with this post!
Yeah, the big thing is that Italy has two years to prep, basically. That said there’s no Italo-Turkish War equivalent to let the army and navy get some experience, but then again none of Germany/France/AH have fought a peer conflict in decades either
Not putting Cadorna anywhere near a front line will automatically elevate Italy's success in any future war by a factor of ten lol.